They worked in tandem

Ever since the BJP selected Narendra Modi to be its prime ministerial candidate in the coming election, there has been a determined attempt by the party's spokespersons and sections of the media to identify  Modi with Sardar Patel,   Rahul Gandhi with Jawaharlal Nehru and rewrite history to turn the  former into India's saviour and the latter into a weak  ‘internationalist’ who, had he been allowed to have his way in 1947 and 1948, might have cost India Kashmir and  possibly Hyderabad as well. Had the Indian elite been more self confident, or had a better sense of humour, it would have been able to laugh these antics of politicians seized by pre-election jitters away. But since it doesn’t, we are in imminent danger of rewriting our own history in the popular mind in a manner that can endanger the future unity of the country. 

The latest salvo in this battle of images  has been occasioned  by the post-dated November 13 Blog of L K Advani, the BJP’s most respected leader.  Citing an interview given to me by Field Marshall Sam Manekshaw in December 1993 for a book titled ‘Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History,’ Advani  concluded  that “even on sending the army into J&K following the attack on J&K by tribesmen and Pakistan in 1947, Nehru had similar reservations (to those he later had on Hyderabad).” Advani is writing his memoirs. Rabble rousing is the last thing he has in mind. But since my book has provided the ammunition for this latest salvo, i would like to set the record straight.

Advani has reproduced Manekshaw’s interview with complete fidelity. His conclusion that Pandit Nehru had differences with Sardar Patel over sending the army into Kashmir is also true. But it is not the whole truth. The real disagreement between them was not over whether to send the army in but  when, and under what circumstances. Nehru stated, at a meeting of the defence committee of the cabinet on October 24, 1947  that he saw no reason not to send the army because  Kashmir was a sovereign state facing an invasion and had the right to ask India for help. However, Mountbatten  severely discouraged him from doing so without first getting Kashmir's accession to India.

Since the Maharaja had already offered his accession to Nehru three weeks earlier through his prime minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Nehru readily agreed but insisted that Maharaja Hari Singh had to attach a written commitment to the Instrument of Accession that he would  put Sheikh Abdullah in charge of the government and ratify it by ascertaining  the wishes of the people. Fearing, with good reason, that such a commitment would become a prelude to abdication, the Maharaja had resisted Nehru’s demand till the eleventh hour.

Better idea

So on Nehru and Mountbatten’s insistence the cabinet  decided on October 24 to send VP Menon to Srinagar to persuade the Maharaja. The minutes of the meeting record that his task was only to make Hari Singh see reason and come back for further instructions but Patel, who had a far better idea of how precarious the situation in Srinagar was instructed Menon to carry a copy of the Instrument with him for the Maharaja to sign immediately if he agreed.

In Srinagar Menon found that the raiders were only a few kilometres  from the airport and the Maharaja was in imminent peril of  capture. By the time he persuaded him to attach the commitment that Nehru required it was late in the night. Dictating, manually typing, correcting, retypind and manually replacing typos would have taken several more hours, so Menon urged Hari Singh to leave for Jammu immediately, and promised to bring him the attachments to sign in Jammu the next day. But before he could come back to Jammu, the Indian army had begun to land in Srinagar.

Nehru was neither weak nor indecisive. His reason for insisting upon Hari Singh's virtual hand over of power to Sheikh Abdullah  was his worry over the repercussions that accepting Hari Singh’s accession to India without a ratification by the people would have upon Hyderabad. In the run up to independence the Nizam had spared no effort to persuade the British to give Hyderabad state dominion status within the British empire. When he failed he signed a standstill agreement with India, but one that only committed him to not joining Pakistan.

Delhi  continued to negotiate with him to bring him into the union, even offering him autonomy in domestic affairs but when Pakistan – based raiders invaded Kashmir and advanced swiftly towards Srinagar, he suffered a change of heart and demanded independence once more. Only this time it was with the threat that he would accede to Pakistan if he was refused.

 Nehru therefore feared that if India accepted Hari Singh’s accession without caveats he would set a precedent that the Nizam of Hyderabad could cite, in order to accede to Pakistan. The only way this could be avoided was if, despite being Muslim, a sizable part of the population of Kashmir chose to belong to India. The support of the National Conference in Kashmir was therefore essential to clear the way for the annexation, if it became necessary, of Hyderabad.

Sardar Patel rendered invaluable service to India by sending the Instrument up with Menon, quite possibly without Nehru’s knowledge. This was the document that Manekshaw saw Menon handing over to Mountbatten before the defence committee’s meeting on October 25. But it was Nehru who cleared the way for the legitimate takeover of Hyderabad.