Will it help?

Can New Delhi sustain its interest in Central Asia long enough to carve out a strategic profile in this very important region.

In a significant move, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting the five Central Asian countries this week. He is also attended the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summits during his visit.

For some time now, India has been keen to enhance its ties with the regional states in Central Asia and Modi’s decision underlines his government’s resolve to take these ties to a new level after years of neglect. Over his decade long prime ministership, Manmohan Singh could only visit two countries in the region: Uzbekistan in 2006 and Kazakhstan in 2011.

Central Asia just about managed to garner some attention of the Indian foreign policy establishment in 2013 when then external affairs minister Salman Khurshid visited Kyrygyzstan to attend the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) and to Uzbekistan.

At the SCO, Khurshid had underscored New Delhi’s desire to seek full member status of the six-nation grouping and made it clear that India remained keen to deepen security-related co-operation with it, particularly with the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS).

India has also been willing to sign the Model Protocol of Intent in the near future as a demonstration of its commitment. Given the rapidly evolving security situation, Khurshid linked developments in Afghanistan to the need for a pan-regional effort in managing the negative externalities cropping up there.

Major countries have competed for power and influence in Central Asia since the 19th century and that “Great Game” seems to be back with a bang. The importance of the SCO that has evolved into a forum for discussion on regional security and economic issues cannot be overstated in this context.

It has become even more important post-September 11, 2001, because growing ethnic nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism is a major cause of concern for Russia, China and Central Asian states.

Russia and China have been successful in using the strong aversion of the United States to terrorism after September 11 for their own ends to tackle Islamic insurgency within their territories. In the post–9/11 environment, the SCO serves as a means to keep control of Central Asia and limit US influence in the region. In fact, the SCO denounced the misuse of anti-terror war to target any country and threw its weight behind the UN in an attempt to show its disagreement with the US-led war in Iraq.

India has long wanted to play a larger role in the SCO and has been seeking support from individual member states for quite some time. New Delhi has only been successful in achieving an upgrade from its observer status.

The organisation had earlier  repeatedly failed to achieve a consensus on India’s role in the grouping. It is not very difficult to see why. China had remained reluctant to see India as a full member of the group despite its official rhetoric to the contrary.

The SCO was founded in Shanghai in 2001 by the presidents of Russia, China, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. India was admitted as an observer at the 2005 Astana Summit along with Iran and Pakistan. Though the 2010 Tashkent Summit lifted the moratorium on new membership, India’s role in the grouping so far remained a marginal one. While the Ufa SCO summit saw India and Pakistan joining the SCO, the two will now have to wait till next year to get full membership of the Organisation.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India last year, Beijing promised to support India's candidature for full membership in the SCO. Beijing, however, has also ensured that Pakistan too becomes a full member. The others with observer status include Iran, Afghanistan and Mongolia.

Energy-rich nations

The SCO region covers almost 60 per cent of the total Eurasian landmass, with over 1.5 billion in population, including some of the world’s leading energy-rich nations. So, its importance is only likely to grow in the coming years. India’s growing interests in Central Asia too are well-recognised.
There is a growing convergence between the US and Indian interests, especially their reluctance to see the region fall under the exclusive influence of Russia or China. India was worried in the 1990s when Russian influence weakened substantially with a commensurate rise in that of China’s. This negatively impacted upon Indian threat perceptions that stabilised only after the growing US presence since 2001.

India views itself as a stabiliser and security provider in Central Asia and with its growing economic clout in recent years, an attractive economic power. India’s interest in securing reliable energy supplies and trade through Central Asia remains substantial. There is a seamless logical web from the objective of ensuring Central Asian stability and our voice there to the conclusion that India must also ensure reliable energy access to oil and gas sources in Central Asia.

Despite all the public bonhomie, Russia and China are eyeing each other warily in the region. Beijing's economic transformation of the lands west of its restive Xinjiang province has gathered pace in the last decade, overhauling Russia as the main trade partner of four of the five Central Asian countries that gained independence from Moscow in 1991 as it splurges billions of dollars on roads and pipelines to link up the disjointed region.

Russia still view Central Asia as its backyard and so is concerned about China’s growing footprint. But there is little it can do. As such, bringing in powers like India which can counterbalance China in the SCO makes perfect sense.

It remains to be seen if India can sustain its interest in Central Asia for long enough to carve out a strategic profile in this very important region. A place in the SCO is just a beginning.

(The writer is Professor of International Relations, King’s College London)