As US revisits Doha Accord, regional peace hinges on what Pakistan does

The Joe Biden administration has indicated that it is reviewing the United States’ Doha Accord with the Taliban. Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Adviser, recently told his Afghan counterpart, Hamdullah Mohib, that Washington is “taking a hard look” at the agreement.

The Doha Accord

The accord, signed in Doha in February 2020 between the US and the Taliban, had many infirmities and conceded too much to the Taliban. The dialogue preceding the accord, though portrayed as broad-based, facilitated negotiations with the Haqqani Network (HN) -- a group that the US had called “a veritable arm of the ISI.” The morality behind negotiating with a group designated a Foreign Terrorist Organisation was buried and the New York Times even carried an op-ed by HN leader Sirajuddin Haqqani on whom the FBI has a $5 million bounty.

Under Donald Trump, the US side took decisions that were not theirs to take, and the agreement with the Taliban contained secret annexures that were kept away from the legally constituted Afghan State. It was forced into referring to the Taliban as the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’, which is not recognised by the United States as a State.

The process was never Afghan-led, driven or owned. It was, at best, US-led, Pakistan-driven and Haqqani-owned. The levers remained with Pakistan, and a fallout is that the Taliban old guard, likely more reasonable, has probably been marginalised.

The Taliban rebuffed US efforts to secure a ceasefire but agreed to a temporary reduction of violence, but in fact violence actually increased during the process. It has not lived up to its commitment to distance itself from the Al Qaeda. Washington, however, stuck to the timeline, bringing down troops from 12,000 to 4,500, and arm-twisted Kabul into releasing 5,000 Taliban prisoners.

The next phase -- intra-Afghan negotiations -- has limped along without Kabul being enthusiastic. The negotiations are now focussed, though denied by Washington, on an interim administration and a Taliban-dominated advisory council. This is close to being conspiratorial as it means jettisoning Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and eroding his support base. When Afghan NSA Hamdullah Mohib complained that the US’ chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad was “delegitimising” the Kabul government and acting as a “viceroy,” the US reacted by making it known that it would no longer deal with him.

The process undermined Kabul, the violence and assassinations were abhorrent. The lack of a forceful response from the US, or even calling the bluff about who was responsible, exposed the accord’s infirmities. This has portents for a future in which violence could force decisions.

The accord pivoted Pakistan, giving it a larger role. Pakistan sold (a) the idea that it could only do so much because there were limitations on the control it exercises (merely the latest in a long list –- non-state actors; Pakistan is also a victim of terror; etc); (b) it fed on US fears about Al Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State-Khorasan (ISK) (it inconceivable that a 70-year-old Egyptian could move around undetected in Pakistan supervising a terrorist organisation, and the ISK appears to be hitting only Kabul); and (c) that India and its consulates were meddling inside Pakistan (our consulates in Jalalabad and Herat are now closed).

The latest ploy is to prey on US fears of a civil war in Afghanistan if it revokes the agreement. It is not in Pakistan’s interest for the US to pull out. Pakistan does not have the economic heft to provide succour to Afghanistan. If there is a return to Taliban rule, or civil war, foreign aid will dry up and refugees will, inevitably, stream across the border. Pakistan would be hard-pressed to find the resources to look after them and they would create pressures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where a nationalist movement is underway.

The agreement falls short of Indian expectations. The Haqqani Network has Indian blood on its hands, and it answers to Rawalpindi. What is also crucial is the role of non-state actors and sanctuaries -- the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operates in Afghanistan from sanctuaries in Kunar. It morphs as it suits them -- into the Taliban’s red unit, the ISK or even under the AQ’s black flag in Kunduz. They were with the ISIS in Syria. Our experience with them has been painful and they are, to us, an “irregular special forces arm of the Pak army.” They are a global menace.

Reactions to Biden review

Demanding full implementation of the accord as the “best prescription and only roadmap for ending the war,” the Taliban warned of violence if the US forces were not withdrawn. To drum up regional support, Taliban leader Mullah Ghani Baradar visited Iran and Russia in end-January.

In Tehran, Baradar told Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, that they “do not trust the US an inch and will fight any party that serves as its mercenary.” Shamkhani criticised US intentions but opposed a Taliban takeover. He was quoted as saying that Iran would “never recognise a group that wants to come to power through war.” Moscow expressed support for intra-Afghan talks to end the fighting and “create an effective national government.” It suggested enlarging the troika of China and Pakistan to work for a peaceful settlement.

Moeed Yusuf, Pakistan’s equivalent of an NSA, stuck to script, cautioning that while Pakistan is “available to facilitate peace in Afghanistan”, it cannot be “the potential solution for all problems” and then be “seen as the reason for all evils” if there is no solution.

NATO officials told Reuters that they expect the new administration to “tweak” its policy and international troops to stay on beyond the May deadline. They put the onus on the Taliban for not having met conditions.

For Biden, repudiating the accord could lead to more violence and loss of American lives. Sticking with the accord addresses some goals but does not guarantee that it will stem violence. Trying to distance the Taliban from the AQ is fine but the groups simply change their names and identities.

Where does the US go from here? The plus is that you have the two sides talking. Reworking the accord to retain some troops -- for counter-terrorism (or a more robust CIA-contractor presence) would be practical and would create confidence in Kabul. An arrangement to bring the Taliban into government, instead of bringing in a new interim administration, would be one way of ensuring that the gains of the recent past are not jettisoned. But for that, the US needs to lean on Pakistan. The moot question is, how far can they push Pakistan without driving them into a warmer Chinese embrace?

Whether Pakistan eschews export of terrorism or not is really the bellwether of Pakistani intentions. On this hinges regional peace.