Robust policy needed

MARITIME SECURITY: Centre's abortive attempts to create the position of a Maritime Security Adviser supported by an advisory board are a serious gap.

Controversy characterises Coast Guard DIG BK Loshali’s recent statement about his orders to blow up the Pakistani boat on December 31. Apart from the diplomatic fall out of the statement, it questions the authenticity of the Defence Minister’s public pronouncements. In a wider perspective, the controversy once again focuses attention on maritime security management in the country, especially without a maritime security adviser, despite the several wake up calls coming our way for the last several years.     

Importantly, the 26/11 sea-borne Mumbai attack by Pakistani terrorist Ajmal Kasab and his mates was the loudest warning in 2008. Thereafter in 2011, two abandoned vessels drifted onshore along the Mumbai coastline undetected – either by the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard or the state marine police – the three maritime security agencies – which indicates serious gaps in coastal security.

Despite the fact that arms and ammunition for the 1993 Mumbai blasts were conveyed across the seas, the security bureaucracy remained ‘sea-blind’ and never anticipated a sea-borne threat. Repeated maritime security failures have occurred over the years due to lack of maritime domain knowledge and narrow ‘turf’ interests among the bureaucracy that manifests in ambiguity, severe lack of coordination and lack of clear cut authority and responsibility. Clearly, a systemic failure characterises maritime security management.

The maritime canvas comprises 7,516 km coastline, 2.03 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone and numerous island territories poses vulnerabilities in the absence of adequate security surveillance. It includes the security of 200 odd minor and intermediate ports, many of which are not International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code compliant. The ISPS aims to enhance the security of ships and port facilities developed by the International Maritime Organisation following the 9/11 attacks.

It requires merchant ships to provide data of crew, cargo, destination port in order to avoid scope for threats of terrorism, piracy and smuggling through the seas. It came into force in July 2004 and prescribes responsibilities for governments, shipping companies, mercantile marine crew and port facility personnel to continuously detect, assess and evaluate threats.  

Besides, most major ports are not Container Security Initiative compliant and lack the required X-Ray machines to scan the thousands of inbound containers for contraband, such as arms and ammunition. With over three lakh registered fishing vessels, identification at sea remains a big problem.

Moreover, a large number of valuable assets along the coastline that could be easily targeted by terrorists such as nuclear plants, ports, off-shore oil platforms and industrial complexes among others compound threats to maritime security. The biggest threat arises from clandestine violent non state actors and manifests itself in terms of asymmetric threats such as maritime terrorism, piracy, illegal migration, gun-running, and narco- terrorism.

Today, the diverse maritime security stake holders include: the ministries of defence, external affairs, surface transport, home affairs, agriculture (which  administers the department of fisheries), petroleum and natural gas, Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, the state marine police wings, port managements, Directorate General Shipping, shipyards, shipping companies, Central Industrial Security Force, Border Security Force, Water Wing and Indian Customs. While multiple agencies to contend with, the existing arrangement is fairly top heavy at New Delhi, but peters out at the state and local levels, where it becomes rudderless.

Seamless connectivity

Moreover, our federal structure which involves Centre-State relations creates its own dynamics with some states being pro-active towards coastal security, while others tend to just coast along. With the seas permitting seamless connectivity, the coastal security of the nation can only be good as the weakest link; in this case, the nine coastal states and four union territories.  

The government’s abortive attempts to create the position of a Maritime Security Adviser supported by an advisory board are a serious gap. Former National Security Adviser and West Bengal Governor M K Narayanan acknowledged that despite his best efforts, he was unable to appoint a Maritime Security Adviser and referred to it at a seminar in Kolkata in April 2013.

A maritime security adviser would act as an inter-agency channel among these diverse security and stake – holder organisations to provide the policy coherence so necessary for effective maritime security management. A lead coordinator could cut through all this maritime opacity and render suitable advice to the government. Also President Pranab Mukherjee in his address to the 16th Lok Sabha last year mentioned about the constitution of a National Maritime Authority. Yet, nine months later, nothing seems to have taken shape.   

Today six years after 26/11, the Cabinet Secretary, continues to head the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security, once every six months to coordinate maritime security matters. A more regular and professional hands on approach is also critical. 

The challenge of maritime security management which emanates from a large maritime canvas, multiplicity of agencies and lack of maritime knowledge calls for the appointment of a maritime security adviser supported by a maritime security advisory board which reports to  the NSA. It would need to mesh well with the existing intelligence and security architecture in the country and hopefully would also give us a long overdue robust maritime security policy.

(The writer is former Principal Director Naval Intelligence and also served in
the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India)