India-China LAC stand-off: Four years and counting

The elusive Elephant-Dragon Détente

As India goes into parliamentary elections, its military stand-off with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh is set to enter its fifth year. With a formidable presence of 50,000 to 60,000 troops on each side of the disputed frontier, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has recently termed the situation “very tense and dangerous.”

The preceding four years have witnessed moments of acute tension, with physical clashes at Pangong Tso and Galwan and the Indian occupation of the Kailash range, which led to a situation that the then Indian Army chief General Manoj Naravane described as “nearing breaking point”. Since then, disengagement has occurred at Pangong Tso, Galwan, and the Hot Springs area, with troops facing off in close vicinity pulled back, creating buffer zones. Disagreement persists at Demchok and Depsang, where Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers are obstructing the Indian Army from accessing areas that were traditionally patrolled by it.

India's stance is clear: normalising relations with China hinges on reinstating the status quo as it existed along the LAC in April 2020. However, due to developments over the past four years, achieving such a reset is not practically feasible.

The creation of buffer zones has changed the shape of the LAC. Patrolling limits have been redefined, and both sides are unable to move into buffer zones to reach areas that define their perception of the LAC. This situation is unlikely to change even if an agreement is reached on Depsang and Demchok. More likely, such an agreement could lead to additional buffer zones coming up at the LAC.

Military postures have hardened. The Indian Army has inducted additional forces to strengthen defences on the LAC, with more than a doubling of the border guarding force in eastern Ladakh. One of India’s three strike corps has pivoted its operational role from the western border to the LAC. New weapon systems have been inducted, surveillance posture enhanced, and infrastructure development has speeded up. There is similar activity on the Chinese side. These are almost irreversible changes, and a return to the April 2020 posture is very unlikely.

Perhaps the most significant fallout of the ongoing standoff has been the breakdown of confidence-building measures or CBMs that guided the conduct of both militaries along the LAC. After the first set of CBMs was adopted in 1993, there has not been a single death of a soldier on either side due to a border incident until the clash in Galwan in June 2020.

Admittedly, there has been a gradual erosion of CBMs since 2013, when the PLA intruded in Depsang, followed by events in Chumar in 2014 and Doklam in 2017. Nonetheless, these incidents were peacefully resolved because both militaries exercised restraint, enabling diplomacy to succeed.

The CBMs unravelled entirely when the PLA unilaterally carried out multiple encroachments in eastern Ladakh in May 2020. This has led to a situation where there is a lack of trust and deep suspicion of China’s intentions on the Indian side. Local incidents can escalate, as it almost happened in December 2022, when hundreds of Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed at Yangtse in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in severe injuries on both sides.

Resolving the impasse at the LAC requires political resolution at the highest levels. However, this seems improbable if China continues to insist that the situation at the LAC should not influence the development of mutual ties. India vehemently disputes this standpoint, making it clear that Chinese actions at the LAC have eroded the entire basis of bilateral relations.

The four years that have passed offer a glimpse into the foreseeable future. In the current climate of suspicion and mistrust generated by China violating agreements and undermining established CBMs, India will continue to enhance its military capability along the LAC as a deterrent against potential incursions.

There is a fragile peace at the LAC, and it can only be strengthened if China shows greater sensitivity to the Indian position and takes concrete steps to re-establish trust.

Lt Gen (retd) D S Hooda

(The writer is the former commander of the Indian Army’s Northern Command. He is currently a senior fellow at the Delhi Policy Group.)