What ails Namma Metro, Bengaluru's long-promised lifeline?

Bengaluru: When the first metro train chugged into the MG Road station on October 20, 2011, Bengalureans rejoiced with childlike excitement. 

It was the city’s first metro corridor — a 6.7-km section of the Purple Line from MG Road to Baiyappanahalli — and citizens were convinced that a reliable and affordable solution to Bengaluru’s notorious traffic woes had finally arrived.

They believed that the city would expand the metro fast enough — within 10-15 years — to cover all major areas. The excitement was pure, the hope infectious. 

But 14 years on, the excitement has ebbed, the hope dimmed. As construction slows and expansion drags, citizens wonder what’s really ailing Namma Metro? Why has the proposed panacea failed to ease traffic woes? 

The first Delhi Metro line opened on December 24, 2002. By the 14th anniversary, the city had built more than 200 km of the network, including the airport line. 

In contrast, Bengaluru’s metro network has not crossed 100 km even after 14 years.

And instead of expanding the network within the city, Bengaluru Metro is going to the outskirts. 

With an acute shortage of trains, Bengaluru Metro’s busiest stations resemble Mumbai’s crowded local train stations. Train frequency is below par, operations start late on Sundays and fares are high. 

The deeper malaise lies within the institution itself. Namma Metro gets a new managing director every two years, doesn’t have its own head office and is struggling to attract and retain technically qualified people. 

“In the initial years, what we needed was a strong foundation to guide future progress, but that was never laid. It began as an ad hoc system with retired people at the helm of affairs, and it still is,” says a person in the know.  

Hiring woes

Experienced engineers from the railways and other professionals from other metros hesitate to come here because the pay is substantially lower, there is no regular employment, contracts are shorter (1-3 years against five years). Hence, BMRCL is heavily dependent on retired employees, some working even beyond 70 years. 

Such service conditions undermine continuity for a project that typically takes at least five years. 

In 2023-24, the BMRCL had 2,313 employees, nearly half of them hired on contract.

“We’re also facing a shortage of train operators,” a second person says. 

Rented head office

Despite having sufficient land, BMRCL still functions out of a rented office atop the BMTC bus station in Shanthinagar, paying Rs 8 crore - Rs 9 crore annually.

“Chennai Metro has built a swanky, nine-storey building of its own, complete with an adjacent township. Even smaller metro railway companies like Lucknow, Kochi, Nagpur, etc, have their own head offices,” the person adds. 

Network expansion

The second person explains how political pressure is dictating new lines. “Delhi Metro relies on its Comprehensive Mobility Plan (CMP) for expansion and seeks the government’s permission to make Detailed Project Reports (DPRs). But in Bengaluru, it’s the political leaders who decide where the metro should expand.” 

And instead of preparing the DPR for 100-200 km, Bengaluru metro has traditionally proposed only 30-40 km, leading to piecemeal approvals. 

According to the person, the thumb rule is to first expand within the city centre, build a circular line and increase interchange stations. 

“That’s how you get ridership. Look at what happened with the RV Road interchange station. Our ridership increased by 2.5 lakh. Delhi Metro did the same, with dozens of interchange stations. Its daily ridership is 70 lakh”. 

The CMP prepared by the Department of Urban Land Transport (DULT) suggested two new lines within the city. An inner ring metro with 22 stations and another line connecting Vellara Junction and Whitefield via Old Airport Road.  “We aren’t studying the feasibility of either line,” a third person confirmed. 

Key positions vacant

The BMRCL has been without two key directors. The Director (Operations and Maintenance) superannuated in February, while the Director (Project and Planning) retired in May. 

In June, BMRCL invited applications to fill both positions. But even after five months, no interviews have been conducted, the people say. “Both appointments have to be cleared by the ministry,” one of them said. 

The cost of slow construction

Slow construction not only leads to cost overruns, but also holds up revenue generation. A year’s delay escalates the cost by a minimum of 5%. 

The cost of Phase 2 (75.06 km) has increased from Rs 30,695 crore to Rs 40,614.27 crore and its new deadline is December 2026, a six-year delay from the original target. 

Phase 2A/2B will also likely see cost escalation. Its deadline has been revised, from June 2026 to December 2027. Phase 3, okayed by the Centre in June 2025, has yet to see groundwork. Even before tenders are called, its deadline has been revised by a year to 2031. 

Financial pressures

Operational inefficiencies have compounded financial pressures. 

With the state not keen to continue shadow cash support, BMRCL increased the fares in February 2025, by an average of 51.55% before discounts and 46.39% after discounts. It also plans to increase the fares by up to 5% every year, starting February 2026. 

The Karnataka High Court’s November 3, 2025, judgement that the Centre has “pervasive control” over Namma Metro and the state “plays second fiddle” may further complicate matters. 

Fourteen years after that jubilant first ride, Bengaluru’s metro dream stands at a crossroads. Whether it can regain public trust will depend as much on new lines as on fixing the system that runs them.