China is exporting its authoritarian practices and values to Global South

The export of technologies used for surveillance and repression of dissent has raised concerns about the export also of Beijing’s authoritarian practices and values.

At the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum held in Lianyungang in the eastern coastal province of Jiangsu on September 9-10, China’s Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong announced that Beijing would help train nearly 5,000 foreign police and law enforcement officers from the 122 participating countries in the next five years.

In addition to training officials, the minister also announced that China will send police consultants and support countries to enhance their capacity in law enforcement and policing. The announcement signals ramping up the already extensive co-operation in policing, judiciary, and military domains.

The forum was established in 2023 following the announcement of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) by China’s President Xi Jinping, along with the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilizational Initiative. The announcement of training of law enforcement officials is among an array of initiatives to extend the GSI. However, several initiatives now clubbed under the GSI, such as co-operation in law enforcement, were implemented before the announcement of the GSI in 2021.

For instance, China has trained 40,000 lawyers and magistrates from African countries in the last few years. China has also signed or is in talks for extradition treaties with 59 countries, most of them from Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the last 10 years.

China has also exported technical equipment to security and law enforcement agencies of African and Asian countries, often disguised as co-operation under its Digital Silk Road. While China’s export of technologies and technical equipment to aid law enforcement agencies in usually poor and authoritarian countries in Asia and Africa builds upon the dominance of Chinese mobile and technology companies which have expanded their markets in these countries, the export of technologies used for surveillance and repression of dissent have raised concerns about the export also of Beijing’s authoritarian practices and values.

China’s expanding security co-operation, especially in non-military security domains such as police and legal institutions, also stems from its growing concerns about the security of Chinese workers and companies in conflict-ridden and politically unstable environments. In response to such problems since the early 2000s, several countries in Asia and Africa have seen a growing presence of Chinese Private Security Companies (PSCs), which provide consultancy and assessment of threats, security guards, and training to local PSCs in the host countries.

While the involvement of private security actors is not a uniquely Chinese phenomenon, China’s frequent concealment and denial of such actors’ presence in politically unstable yet strategically significant countries such as Pakistan have raised questions about China’s intentions and methods to extend its influence.

Wang’s announcement comes in the backdrop of the Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027) adopted at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing from September 4 to 6, which announced an array of co-operation initiatives, including training of 1,000 police officials and export of policing equipment to African countries. Moreover, the action plan also emphasised building high-level and regular dialogue and co-operation mechanisms with police chiefs and ministers, especially from Eastern African countries.

China has played down its intention to export its political system and values, arguing that each country should develop its political system and economic models according to its national conditions. However, reading between the lines of announcements and official documents provides enough hints of China’s objective of spreading its norms and values through micro-level co-operation practices in multiple security, legal, and other such domains. For example, Wang emphasised the oft-repeated phrase that the forum is an effort to share “concepts and practices” of security, underlining China’s intention to diffuse security-related practices, and norms among participating countries.

China already has varying degrees and types of co-operation with law enforcement agencies from around 100 countries, and the announcement to ramp up training and capacity development reflects further deepening of such exchanges.

However, African countries have been the focus so far through various co-operation mechanisms established under the FOCAC. China’s establishment of the Forum on Cooperation in Public Security in 2023 expands the ambit of co-operation in law enforcement beyond African countries to a new set of countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially the South Pacific island nations.

These efforts come against the backdrop of China’s diplomatic efforts to promote its concept of security, often in opposition to interventionist policies and practices as well as the interests of Western countries, under the rubric of the GSI and intense geopolitical contention in the region.

(Devendra Kumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.