A deadly cycle of errors and neglect

Stampedes happen in India with alarming frequency, and they continue to be seen as accidents, like the ones that happen on our roads. But stampedes are not accidental and are caused by predictable, controllable factors, like many road accidents are. The stampede at a temple in Srikakulam, in Andhra Pradesh, which led to the death of at least nine people, mostly women and children, was also preventable. This year, India has lost scores of lives in stampedes – from the Kumbh tragedy through incidents at the New Delhi railway station, the Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bengaluru, and a political rally in Karur. There have been other incidents that claimed fewer lives or were not reported.

Stampedes are invariably traced to overcrowding, poor preparedness, inadequate infrastructure, and lapses in safety and security arrangements, though the triggers could be different in each case. The Srikakulam incident is reported to have happened when a railing erected for crowd control collapsed. It caused people to fall off stairs, leading to chaos and trampling. The newly built, privately-owned temple received on Saturday five times the number of devotees it receives on a normal day – the railings and barricades in place were not enough to control the movement of people. The administration and the police have said they were not informed of the event, but it is their responsibility to take note of unusual crowding and ensure that order is maintained. The statement of the owner of the temple that it was “an act of God” shows how such incidents are viewed by many.

Guidelines issued by the National Disaster Management Authority and in the National Building Code comprise norms and courses of action to prevent stampedes and to handle them if they occur. Law enforcement personnel undergo training to tackle such situations. Still, these incidents keep occurring. Most of the stampedes happen in religious congregations, political rallies, and entertainment venues. The organisers often fail to assess the crowd volume, and even when they do, facilities to ensure orderly movement fall short. Crowd control is often left to untrained volunteers, and the authorities are found wanting in discharging their responsibilities. After every major stampede, inquiries are instituted, but punishment for lapses is rare. The fallout does not inform preparedness, lessons are not learnt, and the cycle of mishaps continues. Investigations are also found to be politicised, as in the case of the Karur stampede, failing to fix accountability and delaying the truth. Deterrence is key – the approach has to shift from an acceptance of inevitability to strong preventive measures backed up by quick follow-through action against the offenders.