India's stakes in Erdogan's Pak trip

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s reception at Nur Khan Air Base in Islamabad, complete with a 21-gun salute and the presence of Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and President Asif Ali Zardari, indicates the strategic value Pakistan places on its ties with Turkey. Not that this comes as a surprise, considering the deep historic, cultural, and diplomatic ties shared between both countries. Erdogan’s two-day state visit to Pakistan on February 12-13 marked the final stop of the Turkish president’s three-nation tour across three Muslim-majority countries of Asia, including Malaysia and Indonesia. The visit, at the invitation of the Sharif government, was reportedly held to boost trade and economic ties. 

Beyond the ceremonial optics lies a more nuanced relationship — one that signals both practical cooperation and ideological affinity.

One of the most prominent aspects of Islamabad-Ankara relations is their defence ties, with Turkey emerging as the second-largest weapons supplier to Pakistan, after China.

In recent years, these defence relations have manifested in the signing of deals on the acquisition of naval vessels and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), besides joint exercises, military training, and technological transfers. Pakistan has also expressed interest in buying Turkey’s KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet, demonstrating Islamabad’s hedging strategy to reduce reliance on Western military supplies. Moreover, both countries are reportedly establishing a joint factory to produce Turkish-made jets. The desire to diversify its defence supplies was also evident in Islamabad’s reported decision to procure 40 J-35 stealth fighter jets from China. Despite reports in the Turkish media of the US Congress reconsidering its decision to halt the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, Ankara is similarly expected to seek alternative defence partners to lower Western dependency.

The Turkey-Pakistan relationship has extended to multilateral forums. In 2020, Turkey was the only country among 39 member states of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to support Pakistan’s removal from the grey list. Turkey also backed Pakistan's inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) while opposing India's membership in 2016. This long-standing relationship seamlessly fits into Turkey’s plans to expand its influence in Asia, particularly among key Muslim nations. However, Islamabad needs to evaluate whether Ankara’s indigenous defence programmes can deliver long-term benefits while considering its financial capacity to enable this transaction.

While defence cooperation remains significant, shared concerns over extremism, particularly the threat posed by Afghanistan-based Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), may also bestand out as a crucial point of convergence between Turkey and Pakistan. Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the ISKP has staged plots in both countries, with the translational group claiming an attack on a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul that killed one individual in January 2024. The second round of Pakistan-Turkey Counter-Terrorism Consultations in Islamabad on February 10 signals a renewed commitment to intelligence sharing and cooperation. However, the effectiveness of these dialogues in producing tangible mechanisms remains to be seen. 

India is bound to keep a close eye on these engagements. Historically, Turkey has been one of Pakistan’s most vocal supporters on Kashmir, especially as the issue's international resonance diminishes. In return, Pakistan has backed Turkey’s territorial claims to Cyprus. That said, Erdogan’s omission of the Kashmir conflict in his latest UN General Assembly speech in September 2024 suggests a strategic recalibration, likely aimed at avoiding friction with New Delhi. Separately, Ankara remains a strong advocate for the Palestinian cause, a stance in sync with Pakistan’s foreign policy. However, this selective emphasis on Muslim world causes suggests a realpolitik approach.

While Turkey’s strong defence and political alignment with Pakistan, along with its broader consensus on the Kashmir issue, remains a point of contention in India-Turkey ties, both countries may still have room for economic diplomacy. The steady flow of goods and services highlights the role of trade in sustaining relations. Although India and Turkey do not have a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), both have established economic pacts such as the Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation, 1996, and the Agreement on Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters, 2015. In 2023, bilateral trade between India and Turkey stood at approximately $10 billion, with India exporting $6.66 billion to Turkey and importing approximately $1.14 billion.

These agreements will continue to facilitate a framework for smoother trade operations, even if diplomatic relations face challenges. Additionally, Turkey’s softened stance towards India likely stems from its purported aspiration to gain New Delhi’s support for joining multilateral groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Overall, Erdogan’s visit to Islamabad is not expected to significantly change current dynamics, with India likely to balance strategic ties by acknowledging Ankara’s closeness to its regional adversaries.

(The writer is a research analyst for Pakistan Desk at Takshashila Institution)