Death knell of federalism

The prime minister recently convened an all-party meet to explore the possibility of holding simultaneous elections to the Parliament and the state legislative assemblies. In this backdrop, the debate around ‘one nation, one election’ has been resurrected. It is imperative that we discuss the efficacy of the idea.

Representative democracy is imperfect and continuous public participation through elections provides a system of communication to cure these imperfections. Thereby, the current electoral system of multiple elections provides political diversity, which is essential to address the country’s social diversity. An analysis of historical and constitutional narratives around elections establishes beyond doubt that the ‘one nation, one poll’ proposal is impractical, unworkable and can lead to a scenario where the necessary balance of democracy is lost.

The first elections to the Lok Sabha and all state assemblies were held simultaneously in 1951-52. The practice continued in the next three elections till 1967 but got disrupted post-1967 due to premature dissolution of some legislative assemblies. Thereafter, due to political instability across various states and the Lok Sabha, it became impossible to hold simultaneous elections. However, the electoral system that lasted till 1967 was not a planned electoral process but continued because power was concentrated in a single party. So, the simultaneous polls till 1967 can be attributed more to the dominance of a single party throughout the nation and less to a well-organised plan by the election commission to hold simultaneous polls.

Article 83(2) of the Constitution provides that the House of the people shall continue for five years from the date of its first meeting. For the government to conduct simultaneous polls, the tenure of the state assemblies will have to be either curtailed or extended, which is not provided for under the current provisions in normal circumstances. Article 85(2)(b) of the Constitution grants the President the power to dissolve the Lok Sabha. The exercise will require extensive amendments to Articles 83, 174 and 356 of the Constitution. These amendments can upset the balance of power between the state and the Union in favour of the latter. Even if some of the articles are amended, practical problems will arise.

Federal implications

The idea of simultaneous polls undermines the parliamentary system itself. One of the basic features of the parliamentary system is that it offers the prerogative of dissolution of the legislature to the executive, which will end if the term of the central and state legislatures is fixed through amendment of the Constitution. The introduction of simultaneous polls will make Article 356 a rule rather than an exception. It will be against the wishes of our constitutional forefathers.

Simultaneous polls will give unprecedented power to the President, who acts on the aid and advice of the prime minister and the council of ministers. This system would obviously favour the national parties and marginalise the regional parties.

A state government during President’s rule is virtually under the direction and control of the Union government. In practice, the executive authority is delegated by the President to the governor. The governor functions on the aid and advice of his advisers, who are mostly bureaucrats. This is simply surpassing the principles of democracy because neither the governor nor his advisers are elected by the people and as such they are not the representative of the will of people.

Democracy is not just about ensuring proper election to the central and state legislatures. Democracy in its real sense is about ensuring accountability to the people. Frequent elections also evaluate the representatives and the party to which the representative belongs. One of the major consequences of simultaneous polls is that it will vastly diminish public participation.

Simultaneous polls will also unduly benefit the national parties as most of the conversations at the time of synchronous elections will be about the issues that plague the nation at large. In these campaigns, local issues that are present in the most immediate environment will be lost. This will divert local issues from peoples’ attention and the election will solely be based on national issues.

Staggered elections do not only help in representing both local and national issues, but they also provide a way to keep a check on the work of the government and express the displeasure of the people against the government’s deeds and convey the people’s mood to the ruling parties.

According to research by the IDFC institute, voters get confused between national and local issues and there is a 77% chance that they will vote for the same party for the Centre and the state during simultaneous polls. However, the same data shows that when elections are held beyond six months of the national elections, the chances of voters voting for the same party dropped to 48%. This data means that holding simultaneous polls influences voter behaviour to ignore the immediate local issues and vote on national issues.

Effectively, this will result in the national parties winning both state and Lok Sabha elections, thereby marginalising regional parties which often represent the interests of local social and economic groups. This will have a debilitating effect on the federal principles of our Constitution.

Lastly, the only argument in favour of simultaneous polls that has some ground is of expenses. But we need to ponder over the fact that the Constitution-makers did not mention “simultaneous elections” in the Constitution. They presumably held the view that some costs are inevitable and essential in running an effective democratic system. In a country as diverse and large as India, elections are bound to be expensive.

The financial costs of multiple elections are easier to endure than the degradation of democratic and constitutional principles through ‘one nation, one poll’. The proposal for simultaneous elections to the Parliament and state assemblies therefore lacks imagination, practicality and a profound understanding of the federal spirit of the Constitution.

(The writer is a student at National Law School of India University, Bengaluru)