Make anti-defection law stringent, effective

Politicians changing and defecting from their political allegiances has been part of India’s democratic process since the first elections in 1952. However, such practices reached its epitome in the 1960s and 1970s, forcing Parliament to amend the Constitution by bringing the Anti-Defection Law (ADL) in 1985.

At a time when the Government of Karnataka is revisiting the ADL, it is appropriate to analyse anti-defection and the reforms that could streamline it.

On May 28, 2020, the state government invited suggestions/recommendations to the ADL as a move to bring reforms in the existing law which has proved to be a failure in curbing defections across the country, and Karnataka per se. Karnataka’s three-party political setup provides conducive environment for defections, and all the three major parties in the state seem to have been taking advantage of the setup.

Political parties have become an ubiquitous feature of parliamentary democracy since they are associations of people with similar political ideologies and goals. However, defections in the past have shown that political ideologies often come only second to the aspirations of the political representatives. Thus, parties become supreme instead of the people.

In the recent past, the polity has witnessed formation of state governments being dependent on coalitions. Such a scenario makes the government vulnerable, considering there is a scope of the defection of MPs/MLAs. As a result of this, the Speaker, who is from the ruling party, is entrusted with the power to decide the fate of his/her party’s power. Thus, entrusting a partisan role to supposedly a non-partisan office.

The ADL, which was implemented to curb defections, utterly diminishes the scope and relevance of deliberations and debates in the House, especially when a single party has a significant majority.

A Bill will pass in the House irrespective individual views of the representatives of the ruling party and interests of the constituents since abstention or voting against party’s direction (whip) will amount to defection. This also adversely affects the attendance in the House and increases disruptions and walkouts.

In a parliamentary system, the goal of the representative is to achieve the maximum possible interest of his/her people through effective negotiation and compromise, and to that end, internal party democracy becomes crucial, which is witnessing a steep decline in our system across parties.

The ADL shifts the centrality of democracy from people to party, and to the supreme authorities within the party. The ADL per se is a yellow flag on democracy and an ADL which fails to curb defections is a red flag.

This calls for an urgent need for reforms in the ADL to save democracy from evils of defection. Many MLAs and MPs who defect are disgruntled and see no incentive to serve their party, and the ADL worsens the matter by preventing the MLAs/MPs from voicing anti-party opinions in the House or before the public.

The law needs to recognise the thin line of difference between defection and dissent. The law must be limited to matters concerning budget, money Bill or confidence motion.

An independent committee chaired by the President/Governor and consisting of two judges of the Supreme Court/ High Court, Speaker of the House, and Chief Election Commissioner must be set up to decide defection matters.

A permanent and independent Commission must be set up with an aim to strengthen intra-party democracy. A voice within the party will provide the MLAs/MPs with an incentive to remain with the party, and more importantly, put forth the needs of his/her constituents. The Commission, to remain independent, must consist of members from judiciary, legislature and the executive.

Politicians are one of the quickest to respond to incentives and are best at avoiding disincentives. Thus, the member who defects must be prohibited from occupying ministerial position not just for the current term but also the next term of the House.

Viable option

With the 2019 Supreme Court decision on Karnataka defections, resignation has become a viable option of MLAs/MPs to avoid penalties under ADL. Thus, resignation’s scope must be limited. However, it is important to distinguish between bona fide vs mala fide reasons for resignation and defection – that is, ideological vis-à-vis money or power as the reason, respectively.

The issue of defection must not be seen in isolation. It is coupled with several other issues such as the lack of the right to reject in elections. The voters are forced to choose the least undesirable candidate among the lot, which might be a reason why defecting politicians are winning re-elections. The issue is also connected to corruption and identity politics.

Political parties might be reluctant to accept the reforms suggested to ADL, especially those reforms which suggest increased penalty for defection. Arguably, political parties, especially in Karnataka and similar states, see a scope for securing power by poaching MLAs/MPs. Power-hungry political parties without a firm political ideology will not miss the opportunity to secure power and supremacy.

Defection is a problem which requires a systemic and systematic solution. Government of Karnataka’s attempt to curb defection, even though appreciable, will be successful if only the government makes continued efforts across the political and electoral spectrum.

It is not an issue which can be resolved with a single legislation; it requires incessant measures from the government and people’s eternal vigilance.

To this end, the current attempt to reform the ADL in Karnataka is critical to make the role of the Speaker, the House and defection more stringent and effective, in order to save our democracy which is fast declining.

(Singai is Associate Professor, Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences, Bengaluru; Erinjingat and Manoj are students, Ramaiah College of Law, Bengaluru)