Pak-China nuke proliferation via Gujarat port? That seems to be the case

On November 18, based on specific intelligence, officials of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) seized a consignment aboard a ship flying under the Singapore flag that had landed at Mundra port in Gujarat’s Kutch district. It was material that Pakistan was sending from its Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, K-2, to a Chinese nuclear facility in Shanghai. India’s two nuclear-armed rivals were exchanging nuclear material between them, using an Indian port!

What was the material? It was likely spent nuclear fuel, perhaps being sent back to China for reprocessing, although Indian officials haven’t confirmed that this was indeed the case. The consignment had seven containers, with four barrels in each container. Pakistan’s Foreign Office was quoted days after the seizure that the containers were “empty” and had been used for transporting “nuclear fuel” from China.

Why Pakistani authorities thought it fit to send it via India is a question that needs to be asked.

The case was highlighted after Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone (APSEZ), which operates the Mundra port, issued a statement saying that Customs and DRI officials had seized several containers from a foreign vessel at the port on concerns that they contained undeclared hazardous cargo.

Following scientific examinations of the consignment of “empty nuclear fuel containers”, the DRI is set to issue “show cause” notices to the parties concerned, including the cargo ship that brought the consignment, before it initiates the process to formally confiscate the material for violation of several laws and for “serious breach of national security.”

The examinations, sources said, have found that the consignment not only fell under the “hazardous” goods category, it also breached several laws, including the Indian Arms Act, Customs Act, Weapon of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act and also violated Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) rules as these specialised containers are regulated under the Export of Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list.

“Tests have confirmed that although the containers didn’t have radioactive substances, it (the consignment) breached laws that prohibit the import-export of nuclear fuel and related materials without authorisation,” a senior officer with knowledge of the investigation told DH on condition of anonymity.

“It has been confirmed that these are specialised containers meant to carry nuclear fuel. There are stickers showing them as hazardous class-7 (radioactive substance), but the bill of entry mentioned only ‘empty fuel containers’. This is a serious breach of India’s security, even if the consignment was not meant for landing at Mundra port,” he said.

Two other sources told DH that it was surmised that China had sent the fuel directly to Pakistan some months ago. “We believe that after using the fuel, Pakistan tried to transport the empty containers back through commercial sea route disregarding local laws. Since the consignee violated major Indian rules and undermined our security, these expensive and specialised containers are going to be confiscated. Discussions are also on to register a criminal case as well.”

Not the first breach

The November 18 seizure is not the first time that such a security breach has been reported. In the past, at least two major incidents were reported from Kandla and Mundra ports. “The Customs department needs to change its policy on consignments which are not supposed to land at our ports, known as remain on-board (RoB), so that we have all the details before a ship arrives. Our current system is not as robust as that of other nations, such as the US.”

“Our investigation is still going on. More than the value and misdeclaration of the consignment, it concerns national security. We don’t know if the nuclear fuel was used for power generation or for making weapons. We can’t rule out nuclear proliferation, either. The case is still under investigation,” said a fourth source in the know of the investigation.

Ballistic missile parts

In February 2020, Customs officials seized an industrial autoclave — a dual-use technology machine that can be used in the production of rocket motors for ballistic missiles — from a Hong Kong-flagged ship at Kandla port. The shipment had been loaded at China’s Jiangyin port and was headed to the Karachi port in Pakistan.

Then, too, the consignment had been mis-declared as “Heat Treatment Furnace Casing System.” When DRDO scientists were called in to inspect the machine, they declared that “it had critical defence applications in the vulcanisation of insulation in small motors and for chemical coating of parts used in missile launchers”.

Sources in Customs told DH that earlier this year, the department had sent a “show cause” notice to three entities associated with the seizure, including the master of the vessel, the shipping firm based in Mumbai, and the sub-agent of another shipping firm.

These three entities were found in violation of “section-2(b) of Indian Arms Act read with Customs Act, Section 30(2) of Customs Act, Section 11 and 13 of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery System Act, Import Manifest Regulations, 1971, and SCOMET regulations.” The National Investigation Agency (NIA) also registered an FIR in this case. NIA did not respond to a request for comment on the case.

Aircraft-launching gear

In November 2019, officials had discovered two military-grade aircraft launching gears – used to launch aircraft from aircraft carriers – in containers marked “empty” that had been unloaded at Mundra port. Sources said that no information regarding them had been declared in the shipping manifest. Investigations revealed that “Aircraft Launching Gear, Skyhook Mark 3”, manufactured and sold by Insitu Inc. and shipped from the US, was officially marked as being meant for the Royal Saudi Land Forces, and were to be unloaded at Jeddah port.

“There is evidence suggesting that cargo handlers and shipping firms were aware of the glitch but failed to take remedial steps. They didn’t feed data into their systems. They didn’t try to sort out the glitch, and the same came up only after their lapses were detected by Customs when it arrived. They were strategic military goods and their import posed a serious threat to national security,” an investigation found.