<div>As the year 2015 drew to a close, South Asian strategic landscape was undergoing another one of its multiple transitions that had defined the region since the advent of Narendra Modi as India’s prime minister and Ashraf Ghani as Afghanistan’s president in 2014. Both leaders have been unpredictable in their approaches towards their neighbour and regional adversary, Pakistan.<br /><br />Where Modi had taken an uncompromising position towards Pakistan’s support of terrorism in the region in his first few months in office, Ghani had been more conciliatory to begin with. By the time 2015 came to an end, it was clear that both New Delhi and Kabul were having a re-think on how to tackle Islamabad’s regional designs.<br /><br />The Heart of Asia Conference in Islamabad early December brought together Asian countries to discuss the future of Afghanistan where External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said that India was prepared to work with the Afghan government to help strengthen its security forces. Swaraj emphasised the need for greater cooperation between India and Pakistan, calling for both sides to show the “maturity and self-confidence to do business with each other and strengthen regional trade and cooperation.”<br /><br />Swaraj took that opportunity to reach out to Pakistan suggesting that India “is prepared to move our cooperation at a pace which Pakistan is comfortable with.” This was the clearest indication yet from the Modi government that it remains committed to improving bilateral ties with Pakistan. The ball is now in Pakistan’s court to reciprocate, more specifically in the court of the Pakistani military which continues to enjoy veto powers over their nation’s India policy.<br /><br />Amidst reports that the United States, China and Pakistan are working towards reviving the reconciliation attempts between the Afghan government and the Taliban, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s meeting with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani on the sidelines of the World Climate Change Conference in Paris in November assumed a new significance.<br /><br />But what really changed the terms of South Asian debate was a brief but widely watched interaction between Sharif and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in Paris at a time when there were no formal talks going on between India and Pakistan. The two nations took a step towards restoring their dialogue when their National Security Advisors met in Bangkok secretly in November paving the way for Indian external affairs minister’s visit to Pakistan for the regional meeting on Afghanistan.<br /><br />South Asia is passing through a phase where Pakistan is getting increasingly isolated and India under Modi is making its presence felt around the world. Modi’s pro-active diplomacy has expanded the strategic space for India to manoeuvre in South Asia and beyond. Just last month, New Delhi took an important step towards operationalising its 2011 strategic partnership agreement with Kabul by deciding to deliver four Russia-made Mi-25 attack helicopters, with the Indian Air Force, to the Afghan National Army by early 2016.<br /><br />This marks a significant departure in India’s Afghan policy which has so far consistently refused to supply any lethal weaponry to Afghanistan and has limited its outreach to supplying military transport vehicles and some unarmed helicopters apart from providing military training to around 1,000 Afghan security personnel every year in India.<br /><br />India’s decision comes against the backdrop of growing resentment in Afghanistan about Pakistani military establishment’s unwillingness to change its strategic agenda vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Ghani had hoped for a new phase in Afghan-Pakistan ties when he reached out to Islamabad immediately after his elections even at the cost of antagonising India.<br />But it did not work out as he had hoped for. The military in Pakistan scuttled this Afghanistan-Pakistan rapprochement. The peace process inevitably came to a standstill and after the fall of Kunduz in late September, it was clear that Ghani will have to go back to his predecessor’s policy of engaging India substantively in Afghanistan’s transition.<br /><br />Kabul’s outreachKabul’s latest outreach to New Delhi which involves an upgrade in defence ties has once again put pressure on Islamabad. Meanwhile, Modi’s energetic global and regional diplomacy is further marginalising Pakistan. Without mentioning Pakistan, Modi’s foreign policy has had a laser-like focus on achieving support from other states on India’s agenda of isolating those states that support and nurture terrorism.<br /><br />In the current anti-Islamic State climate, Modi’s warnings are hitting closer to home for most states. New Delhi has also been trying to convince China of the need greater counter-terror cooperation and recently the two nations have agreed to develop dedicated communications channels to exchange intelligence on terrorism.<br /><br />Pakistan is feeling the heat and its civilian leadership recognises the changing realties. It is not surprising therefore that the Pakistani Prime minister is keen to reassure Afghanistan of Pakistan’s sincerity in working with Kabul “as an equal and sovereign state” but has also expressed his desire for a dialogue with India “without preconditions.”<br /><br />But both New Delhi and Kabul remain cautious as the real power centre in Pakistan, its military intelligence complex, remains as intransigent as ever. Citing security reasons, it prevailed upon Pakistan’s civilian government to deny Afghanistan’s request to permit Afghan trucks a throughway to Delhi and to load cargo as they returned from Wagah to Afghanistan. Afghanistan, in response, pushed back and denied Pakistan’s request for access to Tajikistan, leading to a failure of bilateral trade talks.<br /><br />It is this zero-sum mentality of the Pakistani military that continues to be the biggest stumbling block in South Asia’s economic prosperity. And unless this mindset changes, the peace process, be it the Afghan-Taliban one or the India-Pakistan one, will remain a work in progress.<br /><br /><em>(The writer is Professor of International Relations, King’s College London)</em></div>
<div>As the year 2015 drew to a close, South Asian strategic landscape was undergoing another one of its multiple transitions that had defined the region since the advent of Narendra Modi as India’s prime minister and Ashraf Ghani as Afghanistan’s president in 2014. Both leaders have been unpredictable in their approaches towards their neighbour and regional adversary, Pakistan.<br /><br />Where Modi had taken an uncompromising position towards Pakistan’s support of terrorism in the region in his first few months in office, Ghani had been more conciliatory to begin with. By the time 2015 came to an end, it was clear that both New Delhi and Kabul were having a re-think on how to tackle Islamabad’s regional designs.<br /><br />The Heart of Asia Conference in Islamabad early December brought together Asian countries to discuss the future of Afghanistan where External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said that India was prepared to work with the Afghan government to help strengthen its security forces. Swaraj emphasised the need for greater cooperation between India and Pakistan, calling for both sides to show the “maturity and self-confidence to do business with each other and strengthen regional trade and cooperation.”<br /><br />Swaraj took that opportunity to reach out to Pakistan suggesting that India “is prepared to move our cooperation at a pace which Pakistan is comfortable with.” This was the clearest indication yet from the Modi government that it remains committed to improving bilateral ties with Pakistan. The ball is now in Pakistan’s court to reciprocate, more specifically in the court of the Pakistani military which continues to enjoy veto powers over their nation’s India policy.<br /><br />Amidst reports that the United States, China and Pakistan are working towards reviving the reconciliation attempts between the Afghan government and the Taliban, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s meeting with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani on the sidelines of the World Climate Change Conference in Paris in November assumed a new significance.<br /><br />But what really changed the terms of South Asian debate was a brief but widely watched interaction between Sharif and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in Paris at a time when there were no formal talks going on between India and Pakistan. The two nations took a step towards restoring their dialogue when their National Security Advisors met in Bangkok secretly in November paving the way for Indian external affairs minister’s visit to Pakistan for the regional meeting on Afghanistan.<br /><br />South Asia is passing through a phase where Pakistan is getting increasingly isolated and India under Modi is making its presence felt around the world. Modi’s pro-active diplomacy has expanded the strategic space for India to manoeuvre in South Asia and beyond. Just last month, New Delhi took an important step towards operationalising its 2011 strategic partnership agreement with Kabul by deciding to deliver four Russia-made Mi-25 attack helicopters, with the Indian Air Force, to the Afghan National Army by early 2016.<br /><br />This marks a significant departure in India’s Afghan policy which has so far consistently refused to supply any lethal weaponry to Afghanistan and has limited its outreach to supplying military transport vehicles and some unarmed helicopters apart from providing military training to around 1,000 Afghan security personnel every year in India.<br /><br />India’s decision comes against the backdrop of growing resentment in Afghanistan about Pakistani military establishment’s unwillingness to change its strategic agenda vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Ghani had hoped for a new phase in Afghan-Pakistan ties when he reached out to Islamabad immediately after his elections even at the cost of antagonising India.<br />But it did not work out as he had hoped for. The military in Pakistan scuttled this Afghanistan-Pakistan rapprochement. The peace process inevitably came to a standstill and after the fall of Kunduz in late September, it was clear that Ghani will have to go back to his predecessor’s policy of engaging India substantively in Afghanistan’s transition.<br /><br />Kabul’s outreachKabul’s latest outreach to New Delhi which involves an upgrade in defence ties has once again put pressure on Islamabad. Meanwhile, Modi’s energetic global and regional diplomacy is further marginalising Pakistan. Without mentioning Pakistan, Modi’s foreign policy has had a laser-like focus on achieving support from other states on India’s agenda of isolating those states that support and nurture terrorism.<br /><br />In the current anti-Islamic State climate, Modi’s warnings are hitting closer to home for most states. New Delhi has also been trying to convince China of the need greater counter-terror cooperation and recently the two nations have agreed to develop dedicated communications channels to exchange intelligence on terrorism.<br /><br />Pakistan is feeling the heat and its civilian leadership recognises the changing realties. It is not surprising therefore that the Pakistani Prime minister is keen to reassure Afghanistan of Pakistan’s sincerity in working with Kabul “as an equal and sovereign state” but has also expressed his desire for a dialogue with India “without preconditions.”<br /><br />But both New Delhi and Kabul remain cautious as the real power centre in Pakistan, its military intelligence complex, remains as intransigent as ever. Citing security reasons, it prevailed upon Pakistan’s civilian government to deny Afghanistan’s request to permit Afghan trucks a throughway to Delhi and to load cargo as they returned from Wagah to Afghanistan. Afghanistan, in response, pushed back and denied Pakistan’s request for access to Tajikistan, leading to a failure of bilateral trade talks.<br /><br />It is this zero-sum mentality of the Pakistani military that continues to be the biggest stumbling block in South Asia’s economic prosperity. And unless this mindset changes, the peace process, be it the Afghan-Taliban one or the India-Pakistan one, will remain a work in progress.<br /><br /><em>(The writer is Professor of International Relations, King’s College London)</em></div>
