Two elections, one threat that blurs borders

As Bangladesh and West Bengal go to vote, divisive poll narratives risk fuelling cross-border animosity

The elections to the West Bengal Assembly are expected to be held in March-April 2026. They could coincide disconcertingly close to the general elections in Bangladesh, which are to be held on February 12. This sets up a platform, dangerously, for an expression of West Bengal’s issues historically intertwined with the former East Bengal.

The cross-border interplay is particularly relevant to certain political forces in India to polarise the societies, just as they are relevant to similarly religious-minded forces in Bangladesh, in the run-up to the elections there. Ironically, both these political forces seeking electorally convenient polarisation are on opposite sides of religious denominations. It is a case of opposite, yet like-minded bigotry, which seeks to posit a distractive and divisive agenda of religiosity over more important issues such as socio-economic development, education, employment, and agrarian distress.

If West Bengal is a state trying hard to overcome its anti-industry image owing to ideological/political choices, trade unionism, and conflicts over land acquisition, Bangladesh, with its rising tensions/protests, political instability, and communalism, is suffering a perception challenge that could derail its “economic miracle” trajectory from the last couple of decades. On both sides of the border, there is a dire need to debate and discuss hard data on employment opportunities, infrastructure, social harmony, and long-term development. But the reality is that the politics of reimagined identity, backed with hate mongering, fear, and faith, is poised to dominate the elections. As political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot insists, “When identity becomes the primary political currency, issues of livelihood, health, and education are pushed to the margins.”

A spill-over of toxic religiosity from the Bangladeshi electoral hustings is inevitable. It is likely to be appropriated and repurposed for inflammatory narratives of othering in West Bengal. The sad failure to deliver economic security on both sides of the border will not lead to a necessary questioning of the same by the masses. Instead, identity politics will be valourised, and symbolic victories will be misread as material progress. The ensuing Bangladeshi tumult is already fodder for West Bengal politics as a cautionary tale, marked with conversations of a “takeover” by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, and consequences of “appeasement” of certain faiths.

These are not unfair conversations, as India can ill-afford any more refugees/illegal immigrants, as they are an unsustainable burden on the economy and a security threat. But the problem starts when the partisan framework of “them-versus-us” is not framed in an Indian-versus-Bangladeshi context, but in a Hindu-versus-Muslim frame. This simplistic outlook slots people of specific religious faiths into one country, and not the other. In the bargain, many of our own become “them”. So the familiar narrative of the West Bengal dispensation going “soft” on illegal immigrants gains currency, though border management and the protection of territorial integrity are Central Government subjects.

Paradoxically, the creation of Bangladesh punctured the ‘Two-Nation Theory’, which premised that religion ought to be the basis of nationhood. Bengalis in what was once called East Pakistan insisted that culture, language, and good governance triumphed over the inherent pettiness of co-religiosity. But as the Bangladesh of 2026 is looking increasingly different from what was conceived in 1971, many underlying principles of politics – in Bangladesh and West Bengal – will be rewritten, with religiosity at the core.

A recipe for polarisation

Narratives that initially centred on the weakening of democratic institutions, nepotism, and economic frustrations have been hijacked by religious parties in Bangladesh. The initial trigger to the Bangladeshi youth uproar was the controversial and partisan High Court decision to reinstate 30% job quotas for descendants of the liberation war freedom fighters. But now, that frustration among the youth has given way to the anchorage of anti-India and religiously charged sentiments that have nothing to do with the foundational issues.

With the relatively moderate Awami League banned from contesting the forthcoming elections, the choice India has will be between the bad and the worse – the return of the Bangladesh National Party led by Tarique Rahman, or more worryingly, a coalition of religious parties led by the Jamaat-e-Islami. Either way, the road to Jatiya Sangsad, the Bangladesh parliament, will be paved for the political side that sounds shriller about India. This regrettable clamour amongst the two principal blocs in the Bangladeshi electoral fray to sound more nationalistic and pious will provide ammunition to the national/regional parties in West Bengal to stitch their respective spiels, bereft of introspection or insight on the real issues of the state. Religion will override real issues, yet again.

To hold some of our own minorities to the politics and passions of our neighbouring countries, be it Pakistan or Bangladesh, is to short-sell the idea of India, which was always in sharp contrast with the concept of religion-driven nationhood, which defined Pakistan at inception, and seemingly Bangladesh now. Care to not fall for the short-termism of an electoral victory and risk a larger polarisation in India with its myriad minorities is the crying call of the hour. However, these are different times. In the era of the freedom struggle, India’s leadership had a noble and inclusive bearing, in contrast with the leadership of Pakistan (and Bangladesh today). That separation of moral grounding no longer exists.

(The writer is a former Lt Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.