Chinese Communist Party's Fourth Plenum signals political flux and economic challenges

The much-delayed Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee met in Beijing from October 20-23. Of the seven plenary sessions during a CCP congress, the fourth typically focuses on strengthening the party and governance. At this meeting, the formulation of the 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026–2030, personnel appointments and policy changes took precedence over other matters.

The session heard the work report submitted by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, followed by a 5,000-word declaration of the plenum’s “decisions.” These are binding on all party members and influence the CCP’s and government’s major work until 2027 and beyond.

Several past plenary sessions have been trend-setting. The Fourth Plenum in 1989, for instance, removed CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang for supporting the protesting students at Tiananmen Square, paving the way for Jiang Zemin’s rise. Likewise, the 1999 Fourth Plenum reformed moribund State-Owned Enterprises, while the 2014 Plenum introduced law-based governance, further strengthening the Party’s control.

One of the major outcomes of this year’s Plenum is the adoption of the 15th Five-Year Plan up to 2030. Five-Year Plans began in 1953, and 14 such long-term plans have been implemented so far. Despite debates between Communist leaders like Deng Xiaoping, who favoured market reforms, and Chen Yun, who advocated stronger planning, the latter’s approach prevailed—preserving a centralised planning model but allowing adjustments.

The previous, 14th Five-Year Plan set targets for a “dual circulation” strategy to reduce export dependence while boosting domestic consumption, and identified around eleven areas to achieve global leadership, including hi-tech manufacturing, automation, robotics, nanotechnology, biotechnology, 5G telecom, renewable energy, drones, shipbuilding, trade, sports, and culture. China has since made major strides in 5G, electric vehicles, and solar energy, yet failures in other sectors remain largely unacknowledged.

A sharp decline in economic growth—from nearly 10% a decade ago to 4–5% currently—and the continuing tariff conflict with the US have undermined China’s prospects. The CCP’s promise to maintain higher growth rates now appears dented, resulting in socio-economic challenges.

The 15th Five-Year Plan, to be implemented from March 2026, focuses on two central themes: taking the lead in hi-tech sectors and expanding social welfare programmes. It emphasises innovation-led growth, AI Plus, commercial spaceflight, quantum technologies, a unified national market, carbon emission targets, marine economy, reducing income inequality, housing, pensions, boosting domestic consumption, addressing agricultural challenges, and other priorities. Achieving these goals, however, remains easier said than done.

Attendance patterns at plenary sessions are closely watched for hints of leadership shifts. The Plenum was supposed to include 205 full CC members and 171 alternate members, yet 23 full members were absent. Notably, 27 of 44 military members were recently purged, and eight of the nine expelled officers were full CC members. Eleven alternate members were promoted to full CC membership, leaving several vacancies and raising speculation about potential leadership reshuffles. Xi Jinping’s freeze on the emergence of the sixth generation of leadership means any political change is expected to be gradual and subtle, visible mainly at the next CCP national congress in 2027.

Amid the ongoing tariff war with the United States, the Fourth Plenum had to weigh domestic political debates and “raging storms.” While the US and China have held four rounds of talks—in London, Madrid, Stockholm, and Geneva—the trade war continues to roil stock markets, investment flows, trade, and business confidence.

China has attempted to offset these pressures by leveraging its monopoly over rare earth metals, fentanyl exports, technological breakthroughs, and trade diversification. However, the country’s real estate crash, mounting local debt, rising urban unemployment, and slowing growth have intensified the economic strain. Beijing has also begun imposing export control measures on Chinese-produced rare earth metals and other strategic goods.

Several marginalised CCP leaders—including Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Hu Chunhua—are reportedly at odds with Xi Jinping. The recent purge of nine senior military officers, including Politburo member General He Weidong, Admiral Miao Hua, and Defence Minister Li Shangfu, created three vacancies in the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). Rampant corruption in the armed forces, including promotions by bribery, along with tensions between “princelings” and officers from lower ranks, has affected morale and could harm combat effectiveness.

The fact that many purged officers served with Xi in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces two decades ago suggests his support base in the military may be shrinking. This shift has strengthened the influence of 75-year-old CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, a key figure at this Plenum. The meeting also nominated 67-year-old Zhang Shengmin as Vice Chairman of the CMC; he oversees the military’s anti-corruption drive.

The Fourth Plenum comes at a critical time, as preparations are underway for a potential “grand political bargain” between Xi and US President Donald Trump at the upcoming APEC summit in South Korea. The discussions could take place before the temporary trade agreement expires on November 10. Yet, while the CCP’s propaganda machinery projected stability, confidence, and “dare to struggle” rhetoric, the underlying reality points to an arduous journey ahead.

(The writer is a professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University)