Clouds of instability over Afghanistan after Trump pushes to reclaim Bagram airbase

Since its takeover in August 2021, the second Taliban regime, though exclusionary and ultra-orthodox, has maintained relative stability in Afghanistan. It has kept its nemesis – the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) – largely at bay. However, clouds of instability are now emerging over Afghanistan.

US President Donald Trump, whose first administration had concluded the one-sided Doha Agreement with the Taliban in 2020 for the exit of American forces from Afghanistan, has often blamed former President Joe Biden for the disorderly withdrawal in August 2021. He has also criticised him for abandoning the Bagram airbase to the Taliban, claiming that the Chinese have taken it over – a claim denied by the Taliban. Originally built in the 1950s with Soviet assistance for the Afghan air force, the Bagram base was expanded during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was further upgraded by the Americans and served as their largest military base in Afghanistan during the War on Terror. Located north of Kabul, Bagram has a strategic location in proximity to Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia and China.

Trump has said recently that his administration is trying to get Bagram back from the Taliban who, he said, “need things from us”, thereby hinting at a possible quid pro quo. He also threatened the Taliban with unspecified “bad things” if they did not concede the US demand, which he justified by citing Bagram’s proximity to “where China makes its nuclear weapons”. A US delegation led by Adam Boehler, the US Special Envoy for Hostage Response, accompanied by Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Special Representative for Afghanistan, was in Kabul recently to discuss prisoners’ exchange and bilateral relations. However, it is not clear if Bagram came up during the visit.

The Taliban have rejected Trump’s demand, stating that Afghanistan’s independence and territorial integrity are of the utmost importance. They have also recalled that under the Doha Agreement, the US pledged not to use or threaten force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan.

To what extent Trump would pursue the matter in the face of Taliban resistance is difficult to say. He had equally fervently voiced his desire to take Greenland and the Panama Canal at the beginning of his current term, but has not persisted with it. The Taliban could bargain for recognition and large-scale material and financial assistance in any negotiations on the issue. However, the US presence in Bagram would go against their core ideology. After all, they fought against all odds to rid Afghanistan of foreign forces. It would also annoy China, which has closely engaged with the Taliban, Iran and Russia, the only country that has formally recognised the Taliban government. Reacting to Trump’s demand, China has emphasised Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. A compromise on Bagram with the US could also trigger desertions from the Taliban ranks to IS-K. Therefore, any gains in return for handing over Bagram to the Americans would amount to a pyrrhic victory for the Taliban.

What are the “bad things” that Trump could do to the Taliban? A ground offensive to take Bagram would be ironical for a man who signed a lop-sided deal in 2020 to exit Afghanistan. Retaining the airbase against the wishes of the Taliban would be a daunting task. US assistance to Afghanistan has nearly dried up since Trump’s return to power. He could, however, squeeze financial and material assistance from other international sources. He could also encourage and assist Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban and now largely in exile.

Even as Trump has raised the pitch on Bagram, Pakistan is moving towards a breaking point with the Taliban. Paradoxically, the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, aided and abetted by Pakistan, has added to Pakistan’s security nightmare. Pakistan alleges that the mounting terror attacks in its tribal belt and Balochistan are carried out by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch insurgents from Afghan soil – a charge fiercely denied by the Taliban. Coercive measures by Pakistan, such as restrictions on Afghan trade, expulsion of a large number of Afghans and air raids against purported TTP targets, have failed to change the situation. Pakistan has, of late, said that as many as 70% of those involved in TTP attacks in its territory are Afghans. It knows that it cannot succeed militarily in Afghanistan, where the mighty Soviet army and the US-led NATO forces failed to prevail. Bereft of viable options, it may eventually resort to what it has done repeatedly in the past – try to destabilise the current Kabul regime. There are telltale signs of Pakistan trying to build contacts with Afghan leaders and groups opposed to the Taliban. A proposed meeting of Afghan exiles in Islamabad last month under the aegis of an institute with close links to the army, postponed at the last minute, was a pointer in this direction. The Taliban have accused Pakistan of sheltering IS-K militants on its soil.

Could Trump, miffed with the Taliban on the Bagram issue, but increasingly enamoured of Pakistan, and the Pakistani establishment, join hands in destabilising the Taliban? The move would be utterly short-sighted, but not unprecedented in the history of the transactional relationship between the two sides.

India has had civilisational links with the Afghan people. Instability in Afghanistan and the festering of religious extremism there and in Pakistan have adversely impacted India. Ideally, India would like to see a stable, democratic, inclusive and moderate Afghanistan. However, this remains a distant goal because of Afghanistan’s internal dynamics and the short-sighted policies of major powers and Pakistan over the years. In the meantime, India cannot afford to abandon Afghanistan. Therefore, it acted nimble-footedly after the Taliban victory in 2021 to successfully set up a working relationship with them by, inter alia, providing humanitarian assistance and expressing willingness to provide developmental aid. If there is again a meltdown in Afghanistan, India would have to act similarly to safeguard its interests.

(The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan and author of India’s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship)