Long road to democracy: Myanmar becomes testing ground for regional diplomacy

The solution to the country’s civil war must come from within despite efforts by neighbours.

The civil war between the military and the opposition forces—the People's Defense Forces (PDFs), Local Defense Forces (LDFs) and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)—has intensified and unleashed a wave of violence that has pushed the country into a humanitarian and economic catastrophe. As the country enters its fifth year under military rule, over 5,350 civilians are dead, there are more than 3.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), with roughly a third of the population estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance, and over half the population is living below the poverty line.

The hope for a swift return to democracy remains elusive. The military's proposed elections are widely viewed as a sham. International pressure has yielded limited results, with regional players struggling to find common ground on a path forward. The recent ceasefire, brokered by China, provides a temporary respite, although past experiences suggest that such ceasefires are often short-lived.

Recent diplomatic efforts, including regional talks hosted by Thailand and India’s benign engagement with resistance forces, as well as the Ambassador's visit to Rakhine State, reflect concerted efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Myanmar. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat (AMM Retreat), the first meeting under Malaysia’s Chairmanship, Malaysia unequivocally prioritised an immediate ceasefire over elections and reiterated ASEAN's continued efforts within the framework of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC).

China-brokered ceasefire and shadows of peace

The resistance groups are showcasing their growing power, capturing 80 towns and 200 military bases, particularly the Arakan Army (AA), which has gained full control of the border with Bangladesh. Of particular concern to China is the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which controls Lashio and large tracts of territory across its border.

Last week, China brokered a new ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the MNDAA, following a previous ceasefire that collapsed last year, as well as the detainment of MNDAA leader Peng Daxun—though Beijing claims he is there for medical care. While the new agreement aims to reduce tensions and promote dialogue, both sides have previously violated ceasefires. This agreement comes on the heels of similar announcements from the Three Brotherhood Alliance members—the TNLA and AA—who have indicated their willingness to engage in political dialogue.

China, a key ally of the Myanmar military, has been actively involved in mediating the conflict, driven by concerns about instability along its border, the impact on its economic interests, and its strategic priorities. Last year, China announced the establishment of a security company to protect its projects in Myanmar. Initially, China appeared to tacitly support the offensive led by resistance forces but later intervened to de-escalate the situation, reflecting its growing influence. Soon after the agreement, border gates at Chinshwehaw and adjacent territories controlled by the United Wa State Army were reopened. However, it remains to be seen whether this ceasefire will pave the way for a more durable peace in Myanmar.

Contested elections

Since the takeover, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has decried the results of the 2020 elections and promised "free and fair" elections as part of his five-step roadmap, which is expected to gain traction in 2025-26. In the meantime, the Union Election Commission (UEC) was reformed, and rules for registering parties were rewritten, leading to the exclusion of the National League for Democracy and 39 other parties. A closer examination of the election plans raises serious concerns about their credibility, inclusivity, and, most importantly, the military’s ability to appear conditionally democratic.

The military, which has ruled Myanmar for more than seven decades, is reluctant to relinquish power. The 2008 Constitution was designed to ensure the continuation of military dominance by reserving 25 per cent of parliamentary seats for the military. Since Parliament can convene with just 50 per cent of seats filled, holding elections for an additional 25 per cent of seats would allow the military to retain control. The plan is to conduct elections in the heartland—roughly 165 towns—while excluding areas controlled by resistance forces, similar to past elections in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Furthermore, the UEC has the authority to relocate polling booths to safer areas, effectively disenfranchising a significant portion of the population and enabling the military to claim legitimacy through partial participation.

Moreover, the proposed shift to a proportional representation system, ostensibly to benefit ethnic minority parties, may ultimately strengthen the military's hold on power. Details such as constituency boundaries and seat allocation remain unclear, raising concerns about potential manipulation. At the same time, the military’s diplomatic outreach—including visits to China, Russia, India and Brunei—seeks to gain international recognition. Meanwhile, the UEC has implemented restrictive measures on other parties, limiting their engagement with foreign entities.

Malaysia charts a course on Myanmar

As ASEAN Chair in 2025, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has unequivocally prioritised an immediate ceasefire over elections. At the AMM Retreat, Ibrahim reiterated ASEAN's continued efforts to address the Myanmar crisis within the framework of the 5PC. However, the statement also acknowledges the significant challenges that remain, including ongoing violence and the lack of substantial progress in implementing the 5PC. Myanmar joined ASEAN under Malaysia's Chairmanship in 1997. While Anwar has previously suggested removing Myanmar from ASEAN, at the recent retreat, he said that dialogue and diplomacy were the only ways to resolve the crisis.

The appointment of a Special Envoy, Othman Hashim, represents a crucial step, but the success of his mission will depend on the cooperation of all stakeholders. Before assuming its role as ASEAN Chair, PM Anwar formed an informal advisory team to address regional challenges, officially confirming former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as part of the team. However, this move has been criticised, as Thaksin is known to serve military interests, and his earlier efforts to hold discreet meetings with EAOs yielded no results.

Malaysia’s emphasis on "values of compassion, justice, and integrity" provides a moral framework for addressing the Myanmar crisis by engaging all relevant stakeholders. By rejecting the military's election plan and emphasising the need for inclusive dialogue, Malaysia has taken a principled stand against the regime. It has also reiterated the decision to limit Myanmar's participation in ASEAN summits to the non-political level.

India's approach: Balancing engagement with security concerns

India has adopted a pragmatic and cautious approach towards Myanmar, balancing its security and economic interests. India maintains engagement with the military, evident from the recent visit by Indian Ambassador Abhay Thakur to Sittwe and a meeting with Rakhine Chief Minister U Htein Lin. Last year, Foreign Minister S Jaishankar met Myanmar's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Than Shwe, in New Delhi, marking the first high-level dialogue with the military regime since the 2021 coup. These meetings have stressed the early return of peace and stability, securing Indian projects such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transport Corridor (KMMTC), and fostering development across the borders. This aligns with India’s Act East Policy and efforts to counter growing ties between Myanmar and China.

Simultaneously, with the increasing power of EAOs, particularly in border regions, India has engaged benignly with opposition forces, providing humanitarian assistance both in Myanmar and northeast India. Northeast India, especially Manipur, has been exposed to vulnerabilities stemming from the conflict in Myanmar. In December 2024, India’s Union Ministry of Home Affairs introduced a new protocol to regulate cross-border movement within 10 kilometres, following an earlier decision to suspend the Free Movement Regime (FMR).

Regarding Myanmar's elections, regional countries are expected to accept the results, despite their likely manipulation. To ensure free and fair elections, inclusivity is paramount—a dialogue must be established between resistance forces and the military. The elections should include the 40 parties excluded earlier, along with others that have emerged from the ongoing crisis. Revisiting provisions in the 2008 Constitution is also critical. Federalism should become a key governance structure, with adequate power devolution to Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). While EAOs currently hold de jure power, it is time to formalise their de facto role, ensuring functional governance and accountability.

The military should focus on safeguarding territorial integrity and sovereignty, respecting the mandate of a democratically elected government. Although a prolonged period of instability seems likely, regional players can facilitate dialogue. Ultimately, the solution to Myanmar’s crisis must be Myanmar-led.

(The writer is a Senior Research Associate at Chintan Research Foundation)