<p><br /> A number of factors are contributing to mutual suspicions, thus, triggering security dilemmas and renewed defence preparations. <br /><br />These include the unresolved border dispute, rise of these two countries in Asia and beyond, resources competition and vying for leadership positions despite reiterating that there exists enough space in Asia for both. Such defence preparation is seen in the higher budgetary allocations to this sector. Today, China has become the largest defence spender in Asia. <br /><br />Estimated officially at $77 billion (and according to other estimates about $150 billion), China has surpassed Japan in this field and has been allocating resources for modernising its armed forces. <br /><br />By this, it is planning to transit into revolution in military affairs and intends to wage local war under informationised conditions. In the last two decades of modernisation, China’s military today is enhancing nuclear and conventional deterrence. <br /><br />As a result, the transitions in the Chinese military are clearly visible: on January 11, 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite test with a ground-based missile destroying one of its retired Fengyun satellite located at about 860 km in orbit. <br /><br />Later, on the same day in 2010, China successfully conducted an interceptor missile test for beefing up its ballistic missile defence networks. Further, the Chinese air force had unveiled newer versions of multirole aircraft (J-10), while acquiring others from Russia (Su-27 and Su-30), even as its commander in chief Xu Qilian proposed plans for furthering the offensive capabilities of not only the air force but also in the space arena. <br /><br />New-found confidence<br /><br />China's naval outreach in the Indian Ocean is causing concerns. In October 2006, a Chinese conventional submarine trailed USS Kittyhawk near Okinawa - reflecting the new-found confidence in the country’s naval forces. <br /><br />Further, the Chinese navy sent seven contingents so far for Somalia counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean from December 2008 and its naval officers argued for “permanent supply bases” abroad, including in Oman, Yemen and Pakistan. China in April 2009 also organised an international fleet review - underlining the global tasks of its naval forces. <br /><br />The reference of the joint communiqué last week to cooperation in the Gulf of Aden further legitimises China's role in the region.<br /><br />In the Beijing parade on October 1, 2009, China unveiled 52 new weapon systems, including newer inter-continental ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles, despite a no first use nuclear doctrine. Several of these missile systems are deployed in Qinghai and Kunming Military Districts with focus on India. <br /><br />In this backdrop, former Army Chief Deepak Kapoor’s observation in October 2009 that India is preparing for a two-front (Pakistan and China) war under nuclear conditions is no surprise. This statement was followed by the Indian defence minister’s observations to the standing committee of defence of the parliament that the strategic assets (possibly nuclear or ballistic missiles) of the country would be shifted to northeast India. Finally, in August 2010, A K Anthony announced concrete plans for deployment of Agni III missile systems.<br /><br />Another dimension of the defence preparation is the military logistics build-up in Tibet. This is reflected in the construction of the Tibet railway, building road networks and air fields and laying down fibre optic networks. <br /><br />China had opened a fifth airport, the Xigaze Peace Airport in October, in addition to linking this city with Lhasa with a new rail line. These have contributed to swift deployments of troops in Tibet against India. <br /><br />It is relevant here to cite China’s People’s Daily which highlighted in August this year that the Tibet railway transported missile systems. It is not surprising that as a result the Indian military had elevated threat perceptions on the northern borders from low to medium levels. <br /><br />Enhanced exercises<br /><br />China is also involved in hydro-electric projects not only in Tibet but also in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In addition, the June 2008 agreement between China and Pakistan for widening of the Karakoram Highway enhances power projection of China, while at the same time cumulatively achieving “low level equilibrium” as Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh lamented in September this year. <br /><br />Also, to enhance these capabilities, the Chinese military conducts on an average about 12-15 exercises in Tibet with strategic orientation towards India, despite the 1996 agreement between India and China. In contrast to the previous exercises, recent ones are intended to display capabilities in landings on mountain tops (given the terrain in Arunachal Pradesh), offensive manoeuvres and logistics supplies. In October this year, for instance, the Chinese military conducted its first ever live fire exercise involving air force, artillery and electronic warfare troops near the Indian borders in Tibet. <br /><br /><em>(The writer is Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.)<br /></em></p>.<p><a href="../content/123731/managing-india-china-ties.html">Managing India-China ties</a></p>.<p><a href="../content/123734/highs-lows.html">The highs and lows</a></p>.<p><a href="../content/123729/of-erasing-scratches-our-minds.html">Of erasing ‘scratches on our minds’</a> </p>
<p><br /> A number of factors are contributing to mutual suspicions, thus, triggering security dilemmas and renewed defence preparations. <br /><br />These include the unresolved border dispute, rise of these two countries in Asia and beyond, resources competition and vying for leadership positions despite reiterating that there exists enough space in Asia for both. Such defence preparation is seen in the higher budgetary allocations to this sector. Today, China has become the largest defence spender in Asia. <br /><br />Estimated officially at $77 billion (and according to other estimates about $150 billion), China has surpassed Japan in this field and has been allocating resources for modernising its armed forces. <br /><br />By this, it is planning to transit into revolution in military affairs and intends to wage local war under informationised conditions. In the last two decades of modernisation, China’s military today is enhancing nuclear and conventional deterrence. <br /><br />As a result, the transitions in the Chinese military are clearly visible: on January 11, 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite test with a ground-based missile destroying one of its retired Fengyun satellite located at about 860 km in orbit. <br /><br />Later, on the same day in 2010, China successfully conducted an interceptor missile test for beefing up its ballistic missile defence networks. Further, the Chinese air force had unveiled newer versions of multirole aircraft (J-10), while acquiring others from Russia (Su-27 and Su-30), even as its commander in chief Xu Qilian proposed plans for furthering the offensive capabilities of not only the air force but also in the space arena. <br /><br />New-found confidence<br /><br />China's naval outreach in the Indian Ocean is causing concerns. In October 2006, a Chinese conventional submarine trailed USS Kittyhawk near Okinawa - reflecting the new-found confidence in the country’s naval forces. <br /><br />Further, the Chinese navy sent seven contingents so far for Somalia counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean from December 2008 and its naval officers argued for “permanent supply bases” abroad, including in Oman, Yemen and Pakistan. China in April 2009 also organised an international fleet review - underlining the global tasks of its naval forces. <br /><br />The reference of the joint communiqué last week to cooperation in the Gulf of Aden further legitimises China's role in the region.<br /><br />In the Beijing parade on October 1, 2009, China unveiled 52 new weapon systems, including newer inter-continental ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles, despite a no first use nuclear doctrine. Several of these missile systems are deployed in Qinghai and Kunming Military Districts with focus on India. <br /><br />In this backdrop, former Army Chief Deepak Kapoor’s observation in October 2009 that India is preparing for a two-front (Pakistan and China) war under nuclear conditions is no surprise. This statement was followed by the Indian defence minister’s observations to the standing committee of defence of the parliament that the strategic assets (possibly nuclear or ballistic missiles) of the country would be shifted to northeast India. Finally, in August 2010, A K Anthony announced concrete plans for deployment of Agni III missile systems.<br /><br />Another dimension of the defence preparation is the military logistics build-up in Tibet. This is reflected in the construction of the Tibet railway, building road networks and air fields and laying down fibre optic networks. <br /><br />China had opened a fifth airport, the Xigaze Peace Airport in October, in addition to linking this city with Lhasa with a new rail line. These have contributed to swift deployments of troops in Tibet against India. <br /><br />It is relevant here to cite China’s People’s Daily which highlighted in August this year that the Tibet railway transported missile systems. It is not surprising that as a result the Indian military had elevated threat perceptions on the northern borders from low to medium levels. <br /><br />Enhanced exercises<br /><br />China is also involved in hydro-electric projects not only in Tibet but also in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In addition, the June 2008 agreement between China and Pakistan for widening of the Karakoram Highway enhances power projection of China, while at the same time cumulatively achieving “low level equilibrium” as Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh lamented in September this year. <br /><br />Also, to enhance these capabilities, the Chinese military conducts on an average about 12-15 exercises in Tibet with strategic orientation towards India, despite the 1996 agreement between India and China. In contrast to the previous exercises, recent ones are intended to display capabilities in landings on mountain tops (given the terrain in Arunachal Pradesh), offensive manoeuvres and logistics supplies. In October this year, for instance, the Chinese military conducted its first ever live fire exercise involving air force, artillery and electronic warfare troops near the Indian borders in Tibet. <br /><br /><em>(The writer is Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.)<br /></em></p>.<p><a href="../content/123731/managing-india-china-ties.html">Managing India-China ties</a></p>.<p><a href="../content/123734/highs-lows.html">The highs and lows</a></p>.<p><a href="../content/123729/of-erasing-scratches-our-minds.html">Of erasing ‘scratches on our minds’</a> </p>
