<p>The implementation of the Indian Army’s “Cold Start”doctrine, which lacks consensus in India and has not been fully embraced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, is likely to yield “mixed results” if put to use under present circumstances, Roemer says.<br />Roemer also noted that India did not implement Cold Start even after the audacious 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.<br /><br />“The GoI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GoI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan,” the cable said.<br /><br />“The doctrine is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan,” says the leaked cable of February 16 and signed by Roemer.<br /><br />“Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response,” the cable says.<br /><br />“It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GoI (Government of India) uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government,” it said. The cable adds that if India was to implement Cold Start, given its present military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the US Mission that India would encounter mixed results.<br /><br />“We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold Start. <br /><br />First, the GoI refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question the GoI’s willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option,” the cable said. <br /><br />Pak knew about it<br /><br />“Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled. This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India,”the cable said.<br /><br />“Even more so, it calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options,” it said. <br /><br />“Finally, several very high level GoI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear,” it said.<br /><br />India was sceptical<br /><br />It said Indian leaders realise that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they can’t be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. “In the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response, GoI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a resulting loss of the moral high ground that GoI leaders believe India enjoys in its contentious relationship with Pakistan,” it said.<br /><br />According to the cable, the Indian government’s intent to ever actually implement Cold Start was very much an open question. “The Cold Start doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold Start,” it said.<br /></p>
<p>The implementation of the Indian Army’s “Cold Start”doctrine, which lacks consensus in India and has not been fully embraced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, is likely to yield “mixed results” if put to use under present circumstances, Roemer says.<br />Roemer also noted that India did not implement Cold Start even after the audacious 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.<br /><br />“The GoI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GoI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan,” the cable said.<br /><br />“The doctrine is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan,” says the leaked cable of February 16 and signed by Roemer.<br /><br />“Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response,” the cable says.<br /><br />“It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GoI (Government of India) uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government,” it said. The cable adds that if India was to implement Cold Start, given its present military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the US Mission that India would encounter mixed results.<br /><br />“We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold Start. <br /><br />First, the GoI refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question the GoI’s willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option,” the cable said. <br /><br />Pak knew about it<br /><br />“Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled. This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India,”the cable said.<br /><br />“Even more so, it calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options,” it said. <br /><br />“Finally, several very high level GoI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear,” it said.<br /><br />India was sceptical<br /><br />It said Indian leaders realise that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they can’t be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. “In the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response, GoI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a resulting loss of the moral high ground that GoI leaders believe India enjoys in its contentious relationship with Pakistan,” it said.<br /><br />According to the cable, the Indian government’s intent to ever actually implement Cold Start was very much an open question. “The Cold Start doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold Start,” it said.<br /></p>