The last viceroy

Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy of India, is often described as the man who freed and divided India. With Independence Day around the corner, Salil Misra attempts to decipher the role he played in India’s independence and partition.

In many ways, the Viceroyalty of Mountbatten was unusual and unique. He was the last viceroy who came to India and served as the British representative for the shortest duration, from March 22 to August 15, 1947. Yet it was during his term that the two most monumental decisions were taken with huge consequences for Indian society and politics — independence and partition. What role did Mountbatten play in each of these events? Was he the prime mover or even a catalyst? Or, was he simply an observer, albeit an important one, in the inevitable unfolding of historical events? In other words, did he take the initiative in pushing India towards independence and partition?

Or, was he simply a ‘bird in a storm’ unable to resist the flow of the storm and simply flowing with the tide? Did he make his choices, or was he served with a fait accompli? The answers to these questions obviously vary. What is, however, undeniable is that as India’s last viceroy, it was given to Mountbatten to take the most important decisions regarding India’s future. It is also ironical that the British became the most important actors in Indian politics at a time when their leaving had become a certainty. They took the most important decisions on Indian politics, with tremendous long-term consequences, in their capacity as rulers about to abdicate power and go back to their home country. What is history’s verdict on Mountbatten’s role? Did he write the script or simply implement the script already written?

There is evidence to suggest that the truth is somewhere in between. It is true that by around 1946, well before Mountbatten arrived in India, the British had given up all hopes of being able to hold on to India, the most precious jewel in the British crown. The entire edifice of the British rule had been sustained by two pillars — administrative and politico-ideological. The administrative pillars consisted of the army, bureaucracy and the police. The politico-ideological pillars consisted of prominent Indians — the princes and the big landlords among others — who provided the ideological support to British rule. In other words, Indians had played an important role in sustaining the British rule. By 1946, these pillars had collapsed and it had become impossible for the British to continue ruling India without an alternative support system. The question was not whether, but when and on what terms, the British would leave. It is important to recognise that the decision to leave India had been taken before Mountbatten took over as the viceroy.

In fact, Mountbatten was chosen as viceroy precisely because he was considered suitable for the task of negotiating India’s independence. Fully aware that their days in India were over, the British still wanted to maintain the illusion that independence was merely the result of a gradual process of transfer of power to Indians that had been initiated by the British since many decades. Indian freedom had to be projected as granted by the British rather than wrested by Indians. Mountbatten’s task was to perpetuate this myth of British ‘granted’ transfer of power while negotiating independence with Indians.

So when Mountbatten arrived in India, he carried a clear mandate that power was to be transferred to India. There was no doubt or dispute on this. The only dispute was  — power to whom? To one central government, or to provincial governments, or to some other agencies? The British Government had made a declaration of a transfer of power to Indians by June 1948, prior to Mountbatten’s arrival. But the declaration was vague on how and to whom this power was to be transferred. It was here that Mountbatten came to play an extremely important role.

Upon his arrival, Mountbatten inherited a situation that was far from being conducive for smooth political negotiations. Lord Wavell, his predecessor, had implemented the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946 and put in place an Interim Government consisting of Congress and Muslim League leaders. Given the irreconcilable differences between the two, the Interim Government could not function at all and remained a non-starter. The Cabinet Mission Plan was projected as a possible solution to the problem of partition, but the Plan itself became a problem, requiring a solution.

This was not all. During 1946-47, India came closer than ever before to a civil-war-like situation. The violence between Hindus and Muslims threatened to tear apart the entire social fabric of Indian society. The violence started with Bengal in August 1946 and soon reached Bihar, Bombay, UP, and eventually Punjab, where it was most brutal and vicious. The important thing about this violence was that it affected the politics of the times in a most decisive manner. The important political questions of the day could not remain untouched from the orgy of violence that engulfed the country. The major political decisions were taken in the light of this violence.

Climate of unrest

The communal violence suited the politics of Muslim League very well. Muslim League, under Jinnah’s leadership, had been demanding Pakistan since 1940 as a separate nation-state of Indian Muslims on the ground that Hindus and Muslims could not live together in peace. The violence appeared to validate these claims. The violence also made Congress leaders rethink their commitment to a united India.

The British, at this stage, were not too keen on the partition of India. But they were also not very committed to the idea of a united India. They would certainly not go out of their way to maintain the unity of the country. If they were going to leave India anyway, what difference did it make whether they left behind one country or two?

It was in this political climate that Mountbatten landed in India. The first thing he did was to write to the main Indian leaders — Gandhi, Jinnah and Nehru — inviting them separately for talks. Gandhi was the first to reply: “I dare not resist your kind call.” Gandhi came to Delhi on March 31, 1947 and met Mountbatten every day until April 4. Gandhi knew that freedom was coming for sure and therefore focused all his energy on trying to avert the partition.

He even went to the extent of suggesting that Jinnah could be given the power to choose his own cabinet in the Interim Government that would govern the country. If this did not work, Gandhi suggested that Mountbatten should insist on the existing Interim Government to go on working for the next 14 months and then hand over power to it before finally leaving. Gandhi even suggested that Mountbatten could also continue staying on in India as the head of an Indian government. Mountbatten was genuinely surprised by Gandhi’s proposal and thought it was completely impractical.

Impractical it was, but it does show Gandhi’s extreme anxiety and his utmost desire to go to any extent to avoid the partition. Fully convinced that just about anything — from anarchy to a civil war — was better than partition, Gandhi was willing to contemplate any scheme that could possibly prevent the partition. Earlier in 1944, Gandhi had tried to persuade Jinnah about the same thing but without any success. Knowing that he had exhausted all possibilities with Jinnah, Gandhi was now working with Mountbatten to avoid the partition.

After Gandhi, Jinnah was the next Indian leader Mountbatten met. Mountbatten wrote in his report: “In complete contrast to Mahatma Gandhi’s charm and friendliness, Jinnah was, when he arrived, in a most frigid, haughty and disdainful frame of mind.” But he also knew that Jinnah was the “man who held the key to the whole situation”. Their conversation continued from April 5 to April 10, 1947. Jinnah was categorical and uncompromising that “India had now passed beyond the stage at which any compromise solution could possibly work.”