<p>Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for greater Centre-state coordination on internal security in the recently held Inter-State Council meeting at New Delhi. Today, internal security assumes utmost importance with the Maoist challenge and cross-border terrorism, which threaten all the 29 states across the country. However, who exactly is responsible for internal security? Is it the Centre or the states, or both? What does the Constitution say on the matter?<br /><br /></p>.<p>Unfortunately, the Constitution does not refer either to ‘security’ or ‘internal security’ anywhere. However, it mentions five related terms namely ‘pubic order’ (List II, Entry 2), ‘war’ (Article 352), ‘external aggression’ (Article 352), ‘armed rebellion’ (Article 352), and ‘internal disturbance’ (Article 355). <br /><br />The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution handles the vertical division of powers. It provides three exhaustive lists – Union, State, and Concurrent – with residual powers to the Centre. In the context of internal security, the Union list has 25 entries, as ag-ainst five entries in the state list and 11 entries in the concurrent list. <br /><br />These apart, a number of Articles in the Constitution suggest that the Centre enjoys more powers than the states on internal security matters. Some of the relevant Articles include: 245-254, 256-258, 312, 339, 352, 353, 355, 356 and 365.<br /><br />The constitutionality underlying deployment of central forces or agencies in the states has to be interpreted in some of these provisions. Since the “defence of India and every part thereof” is the Centre’s responsibility under Entry 1, List I, it has the blanket power of deployment of “armed forces of the Union” in any of the states for the defence of the country, which includes grave threats like terrorism. <br /><br />Under Article 355, the Centre can deploy its forces to protect a state against “external aggression and internal disturbance,” even when the state concerned does not requisition the Centre’s assistance and is reluctant to receive central forces. <br /><br />In the case of a state’s opposition to the deployment of armed forces of the Union, the right course for the Centre is to first issue directives under Article 355 to the state concerned, and “in the event of the state not complying with the directive of the Central government, the Centre can take further action under Article 356.” <br /><br />Though the Centre is in a stronger position constitutionally, it has not been assertive due to political expediency. Of the numerous Articles mentioned, only Article 356 has been used more than required and that too for political purposes. <br /><br />Initially after independence, there was “hegemonic consensus” inter alia on security between the Centre and the states. But, the idea of “strong Centre” was jolted since the late 1960s when parties with different political ideologies started to rule the states even while the Congress party was in power at the Centre. The pendulum gradually started to swing towards the states more forcefully since the late 1980s due to the emergent political and economic situation prevalent in the country. <br /><br />The country’s political landscape transformed post-1991 from a one party dominant rule to the onset of a coalition era. Also, regional parties like the Telugu Desam, the DMK, the Asom Gana Parishad and the People’s Conference gained prominence and started to question the existing Centre-state relations structure. <br /><br />These states resented any kind of “Centre’s encroachment” under the guise of security or development. Similarly, the new economic policy of 1991 turned around a weak economy and created a ‘federal market economy.’ Thereafter, the Centre’s economic leverage declined considerably, especially vis-a-vis the ‘empowered states.’ <br /><br />Changing face of threat<br /><br />Today, the dynamics of internal security threats that confront India have changed considerably. New threats have emerged, apart from aggravation of the existing ones. The distinction between exclusively external threats like war and external aggression and internal security threats has been blurred. For instance, Pakistan’s “sub-conventional warfare strategy” vis-a-vis India is simply “war by other means”. Therefore, after the 1989 Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism poses an externally-fostered internal security threat to India. <br /><br />Other internal security threats, like organised crime, terrorism, fake currency notes, illegal migration, trafficking in arms and drugs, gun running and explosives, trans-border infiltration and cybercrimes, have both inter-state and international ramifications. It is, therefore, difficult to club these threats under ‘public order’ as many states attempt to do. In fact, the Padmanabhaiah Committee report goes on to call them as “federal offences” since they are detrimental to the “security, unity and integrity” of India apart from having inter-state and international dimensions. <br /><br />In Kartar Singh vs state of Punjab, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between “public order” and “terrorism”: “Conceptually, public order and terrorism are different not only in ideology and philosophy but also in cause or the mens rea, the manner of its commission and the effect or result of such activity.”<br /><br />Although state police forces are the “first responders,” they are not a strong link in the entire response chain. With their restricted territorial jurisdiction and limited resources, state police forces find it difficult to deal with externally-fostered internal security threats or those issues with inter-state or global dimensions. Consider the lackadaisical role of the Punjab Police in the recent terrorist strike at Pathankot. <br /><br />The Centre cannot afford to ignore the importance of states to effectively respond to internal security challenges. It needs to empower the states and take them into confidence in the decision-making. For instance, the Centre’s attempt under UPA government to create the National Counter Terrorism Centre failed due to lack of Centre-state coordination in 2009.<br /> <br />The federal interdependence of the Centre and the states in matters of internal security is often lost sight of in the political one-upmanship. It is important to de-politicise security. The Constitution should clear the cobwebs on who is responsible for internal security. It could include a new entry – ‘Internal Security’ – in List III (Concurrent List) to enable a clear-cut role for the Centre with the concurrence of the states. <br /><br /><em>(Manoharan is Associate Professor and Shagun is a Master’s student in the Department of International Studies, Christ University, Bengaluru)</em></p>
<p>Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for greater Centre-state coordination on internal security in the recently held Inter-State Council meeting at New Delhi. Today, internal security assumes utmost importance with the Maoist challenge and cross-border terrorism, which threaten all the 29 states across the country. However, who exactly is responsible for internal security? Is it the Centre or the states, or both? What does the Constitution say on the matter?<br /><br /></p>.<p>Unfortunately, the Constitution does not refer either to ‘security’ or ‘internal security’ anywhere. However, it mentions five related terms namely ‘pubic order’ (List II, Entry 2), ‘war’ (Article 352), ‘external aggression’ (Article 352), ‘armed rebellion’ (Article 352), and ‘internal disturbance’ (Article 355). <br /><br />The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution handles the vertical division of powers. It provides three exhaustive lists – Union, State, and Concurrent – with residual powers to the Centre. In the context of internal security, the Union list has 25 entries, as ag-ainst five entries in the state list and 11 entries in the concurrent list. <br /><br />These apart, a number of Articles in the Constitution suggest that the Centre enjoys more powers than the states on internal security matters. Some of the relevant Articles include: 245-254, 256-258, 312, 339, 352, 353, 355, 356 and 365.<br /><br />The constitutionality underlying deployment of central forces or agencies in the states has to be interpreted in some of these provisions. Since the “defence of India and every part thereof” is the Centre’s responsibility under Entry 1, List I, it has the blanket power of deployment of “armed forces of the Union” in any of the states for the defence of the country, which includes grave threats like terrorism. <br /><br />Under Article 355, the Centre can deploy its forces to protect a state against “external aggression and internal disturbance,” even when the state concerned does not requisition the Centre’s assistance and is reluctant to receive central forces. <br /><br />In the case of a state’s opposition to the deployment of armed forces of the Union, the right course for the Centre is to first issue directives under Article 355 to the state concerned, and “in the event of the state not complying with the directive of the Central government, the Centre can take further action under Article 356.” <br /><br />Though the Centre is in a stronger position constitutionally, it has not been assertive due to political expediency. Of the numerous Articles mentioned, only Article 356 has been used more than required and that too for political purposes. <br /><br />Initially after independence, there was “hegemonic consensus” inter alia on security between the Centre and the states. But, the idea of “strong Centre” was jolted since the late 1960s when parties with different political ideologies started to rule the states even while the Congress party was in power at the Centre. The pendulum gradually started to swing towards the states more forcefully since the late 1980s due to the emergent political and economic situation prevalent in the country. <br /><br />The country’s political landscape transformed post-1991 from a one party dominant rule to the onset of a coalition era. Also, regional parties like the Telugu Desam, the DMK, the Asom Gana Parishad and the People’s Conference gained prominence and started to question the existing Centre-state relations structure. <br /><br />These states resented any kind of “Centre’s encroachment” under the guise of security or development. Similarly, the new economic policy of 1991 turned around a weak economy and created a ‘federal market economy.’ Thereafter, the Centre’s economic leverage declined considerably, especially vis-a-vis the ‘empowered states.’ <br /><br />Changing face of threat<br /><br />Today, the dynamics of internal security threats that confront India have changed considerably. New threats have emerged, apart from aggravation of the existing ones. The distinction between exclusively external threats like war and external aggression and internal security threats has been blurred. For instance, Pakistan’s “sub-conventional warfare strategy” vis-a-vis India is simply “war by other means”. Therefore, after the 1989 Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism poses an externally-fostered internal security threat to India. <br /><br />Other internal security threats, like organised crime, terrorism, fake currency notes, illegal migration, trafficking in arms and drugs, gun running and explosives, trans-border infiltration and cybercrimes, have both inter-state and international ramifications. It is, therefore, difficult to club these threats under ‘public order’ as many states attempt to do. In fact, the Padmanabhaiah Committee report goes on to call them as “federal offences” since they are detrimental to the “security, unity and integrity” of India apart from having inter-state and international dimensions. <br /><br />In Kartar Singh vs state of Punjab, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between “public order” and “terrorism”: “Conceptually, public order and terrorism are different not only in ideology and philosophy but also in cause or the mens rea, the manner of its commission and the effect or result of such activity.”<br /><br />Although state police forces are the “first responders,” they are not a strong link in the entire response chain. With their restricted territorial jurisdiction and limited resources, state police forces find it difficult to deal with externally-fostered internal security threats or those issues with inter-state or global dimensions. Consider the lackadaisical role of the Punjab Police in the recent terrorist strike at Pathankot. <br /><br />The Centre cannot afford to ignore the importance of states to effectively respond to internal security challenges. It needs to empower the states and take them into confidence in the decision-making. For instance, the Centre’s attempt under UPA government to create the National Counter Terrorism Centre failed due to lack of Centre-state coordination in 2009.<br /> <br />The federal interdependence of the Centre and the states in matters of internal security is often lost sight of in the political one-upmanship. It is important to de-politicise security. The Constitution should clear the cobwebs on who is responsible for internal security. It could include a new entry – ‘Internal Security’ – in List III (Concurrent List) to enable a clear-cut role for the Centre with the concurrence of the states. <br /><br /><em>(Manoharan is Associate Professor and Shagun is a Master’s student in the Department of International Studies, Christ University, Bengaluru)</em></p>
