<div>China’s stubborn and public opposition to India’s application for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has elicited diverse responses in India. <br /><br />Many commentators have found fault with the government’s decision to apply for membership. Some of them have claimed that the decision betrays a lack of understanding of our interests. They have unconvincingly argued that the membership will not give us any benefits in addition to what we already enjoy under the 2008 waiver. <br /><br />These commentators seem to be confounding the desirability of the goal with its feasibility. Others have questioned the timing and approach. They have argued that the government failed to assess the depth of the Chinese opposition and it should not have invested so much of prime ministerial capital on a relatively minor issue.<br /><br />The failure in Seoul has also led some commentators to question the government’s reported decision to bandwagon behind the US and to remind us of the Nehruvian foreign policy. They seem to have forgotten that in the end, Nehru’s India was utterly friendless and isolated (Ambassador Eric Gonsalves’ account of his time in Burma after the 1962 war is revealing in this regard). <br /><br />And, then there were those who called for retaliation conveniently forgetting what happened a few weeks ago when the government “mistakenly” issued visas to Uighur dissidents after China bailed out a Pakistani terrorist. The intense public debate on this issue has failed to address a few basic questions: What kind of relations does China want with us? What kind of relations do we want with China? Do we hold any bargaining chips?<br />There is a broad consensus within India that China does not seek a relationship of equals. It goes out of its way to block India’s ascent and clumsily hides behind procedures, whether on the issue of sanctioning Pakistan-based terrorists or the membership of UNSC (United Nations Security Council) or NSG. China does not mind being the last man standing against India, and Pakistan is ever willing to give it company. <br /><br />The Chinese media deliberately assumes a highly disparaging and combative tone in its India-related commentary. While the Chinese state-run media reflects its government’s attitude toward India and Indians, China’s apologists argue that it makes its editorial decisions autonomously.<br /><br />However, India or at least its foreign policy experts are deeply divided over what constitutes normal relations with China. This involves two issues. How do we conduct our relations with a country that openly attacks our interests? The Chinese government adopts maximalist positions in the international arena and then apologists tell us that we should quietly resolve the issues so that China does not have to suffer a loss of face if its government has to retreat. <br /><br />But what about our face? It is, therefore, good that the government did not shy away from openly identifying China, while remaining “engaged.” The Chinese stand in Seoul strengthens the government against those who believe that India should defer to the Chinese way of doing things.<br /><br />The other issue is the more difficult one. What are the preconditions for our normal relations with China? Return of Aksai Chin? Reduction in trade imbalance? Support for dismantling Pakistan’s cross-border terror apparatus? Support for a seat in UNSC or NSG? We have to honestly admit that in all these cases, China holds all the cards and we do not hold many bargaining chips. For example, if China agrees to return Aksai Chin, what can we give it in return?<br /><br />India cannot use its membership in Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to make China yield on the NSG front because the latter does not seem to care much for an early entry into MTCR. Boycotting Chinese goods is easier said than done. The WTO obligations are not the only or even the most important obstacles. A trade boycott is both domestically and internationally untenable. Bulk of imported goods are produced by international manufacturing chains that include China. So, a boycott will hurt friends and enemies alike.<br /><br />Jobless growth<br /><br />India’s free media and internet have excited the consumer, who thanks to our jobless growth does not have the purchasing power to satisfy his newfound needs. Cheap Chinese imports, wholly of Chinese origin, cater to the needs of the economically disenfranchised masses. So, a boycott of these Chinese imports will hurt the ruling coalition, whether NDA or UPA, by denting the purchasing power of consumers. <br /><br />Our goal should be to reduce dependence on Chinese imports through economic reforms that boost job creation in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, which will increase the purchasing power of masses and expand the production base. Whether we like the label Make in India or not, that is the only defence against China.<br /><br />Those who call for strengthening the alliance with the US and deal with the threat posed by China, forget that the US benefits by keeping India weak and that our existing nuclear fire power is sufficient to prevent an all-out confrontation. In any case, China’s preferred strategy is to inflict thousand small cuts through short-duration surprises on the border, cross-border attacks via Pakistan, deployment of its army in PoK (Pak Occupied Kashmir) and Gilgit-Baltistan, cyber-attacks, dumping goods, and needless dogfights in international institutions.<br /><br />Defence against this Chinese strategy does not require stockpiling bombs. Rather we need political resolution of insurgencies, police and defence reforms, reliable bullet-proof vests, night vision equipment and high altitude clothing for our troops, adequate rotation and training of forces deployed on borders and in internal conflict zones, enhanced cyber security, and a larger and better trained foreign department with room for experts on, say, international law and trade. <br /><br />While we work along these lines, we should aim at staged cordiality in bilateral ties for whatever it is worth and suspend it occasionally when it suits us.<br /><br />(The writer teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru)<br /><br /></div>
<div>China’s stubborn and public opposition to India’s application for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has elicited diverse responses in India. <br /><br />Many commentators have found fault with the government’s decision to apply for membership. Some of them have claimed that the decision betrays a lack of understanding of our interests. They have unconvincingly argued that the membership will not give us any benefits in addition to what we already enjoy under the 2008 waiver. <br /><br />These commentators seem to be confounding the desirability of the goal with its feasibility. Others have questioned the timing and approach. They have argued that the government failed to assess the depth of the Chinese opposition and it should not have invested so much of prime ministerial capital on a relatively minor issue.<br /><br />The failure in Seoul has also led some commentators to question the government’s reported decision to bandwagon behind the US and to remind us of the Nehruvian foreign policy. They seem to have forgotten that in the end, Nehru’s India was utterly friendless and isolated (Ambassador Eric Gonsalves’ account of his time in Burma after the 1962 war is revealing in this regard). <br /><br />And, then there were those who called for retaliation conveniently forgetting what happened a few weeks ago when the government “mistakenly” issued visas to Uighur dissidents after China bailed out a Pakistani terrorist. The intense public debate on this issue has failed to address a few basic questions: What kind of relations does China want with us? What kind of relations do we want with China? Do we hold any bargaining chips?<br />There is a broad consensus within India that China does not seek a relationship of equals. It goes out of its way to block India’s ascent and clumsily hides behind procedures, whether on the issue of sanctioning Pakistan-based terrorists or the membership of UNSC (United Nations Security Council) or NSG. China does not mind being the last man standing against India, and Pakistan is ever willing to give it company. <br /><br />The Chinese media deliberately assumes a highly disparaging and combative tone in its India-related commentary. While the Chinese state-run media reflects its government’s attitude toward India and Indians, China’s apologists argue that it makes its editorial decisions autonomously.<br /><br />However, India or at least its foreign policy experts are deeply divided over what constitutes normal relations with China. This involves two issues. How do we conduct our relations with a country that openly attacks our interests? The Chinese government adopts maximalist positions in the international arena and then apologists tell us that we should quietly resolve the issues so that China does not have to suffer a loss of face if its government has to retreat. <br /><br />But what about our face? It is, therefore, good that the government did not shy away from openly identifying China, while remaining “engaged.” The Chinese stand in Seoul strengthens the government against those who believe that India should defer to the Chinese way of doing things.<br /><br />The other issue is the more difficult one. What are the preconditions for our normal relations with China? Return of Aksai Chin? Reduction in trade imbalance? Support for dismantling Pakistan’s cross-border terror apparatus? Support for a seat in UNSC or NSG? We have to honestly admit that in all these cases, China holds all the cards and we do not hold many bargaining chips. For example, if China agrees to return Aksai Chin, what can we give it in return?<br /><br />India cannot use its membership in Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to make China yield on the NSG front because the latter does not seem to care much for an early entry into MTCR. Boycotting Chinese goods is easier said than done. The WTO obligations are not the only or even the most important obstacles. A trade boycott is both domestically and internationally untenable. Bulk of imported goods are produced by international manufacturing chains that include China. So, a boycott will hurt friends and enemies alike.<br /><br />Jobless growth<br /><br />India’s free media and internet have excited the consumer, who thanks to our jobless growth does not have the purchasing power to satisfy his newfound needs. Cheap Chinese imports, wholly of Chinese origin, cater to the needs of the economically disenfranchised masses. So, a boycott of these Chinese imports will hurt the ruling coalition, whether NDA or UPA, by denting the purchasing power of consumers. <br /><br />Our goal should be to reduce dependence on Chinese imports through economic reforms that boost job creation in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, which will increase the purchasing power of masses and expand the production base. Whether we like the label Make in India or not, that is the only defence against China.<br /><br />Those who call for strengthening the alliance with the US and deal with the threat posed by China, forget that the US benefits by keeping India weak and that our existing nuclear fire power is sufficient to prevent an all-out confrontation. In any case, China’s preferred strategy is to inflict thousand small cuts through short-duration surprises on the border, cross-border attacks via Pakistan, deployment of its army in PoK (Pak Occupied Kashmir) and Gilgit-Baltistan, cyber-attacks, dumping goods, and needless dogfights in international institutions.<br /><br />Defence against this Chinese strategy does not require stockpiling bombs. Rather we need political resolution of insurgencies, police and defence reforms, reliable bullet-proof vests, night vision equipment and high altitude clothing for our troops, adequate rotation and training of forces deployed on borders and in internal conflict zones, enhanced cyber security, and a larger and better trained foreign department with room for experts on, say, international law and trade. <br /><br />While we work along these lines, we should aim at staged cordiality in bilateral ties for whatever it is worth and suspend it occasionally when it suits us.<br /><br />(The writer teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru)<br /><br /></div>
