Beyond a point, diplomacy becomes counterproductive

Amidst the India-China military stand-off in Eastern Ladakh, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat recently said there are military options to deal with transgressions by the Chinese army, but it will be exercised only if talks at the military and the diplomatic level fail. This is a significant statement that implies that war begins when diplomacy ends. China appears to favour its military, rather than diplomacy with India, as an instrument of foreign policy. For any country, the instruments of foreign policy available are: aid, diplomacy, trade and war (and terrorism, as Pakistan uses).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping 18 times since May 2014 and pursued personal diplomacy in the hope that this would solve the border dispute, which remains the main irritant in India-China relations. Political direction and vision determines the nature and content of the country’s China policy. India’s relations with China are handled by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), armed forces and Intelligence agencies. In a sense, the MEA is the lead agency that calls the shots, while the military leadership and the Intelligence agencies have a peripheral role in the formulation of New Delhi’s China policy. The political leadership has all along made the diplomatic corps the centrepiece of its China policy and downgraded the role of the military on this score.

India’s diplomats dealt with China till the 1980s exclusively. Since the 1990s, India has also added military diplomacy, with its military commanders at various levels visiting China to promote goodwill between the two militaries. Besides, warship visits and joint military exercises were other elements of military diplomacy. Over the years, New Delhi has attempted to appease Beijing with its ‘One China’ policy and by politically reining in the Tibetan community in India. Such soft options appear to have failed with China which has consistently adopted a hostile posture towards India, as evident from territorial incursions as well as its pro-Pakistan moves in international fora like the UN.

Clearly, for India, diplomacy has not worked with China, given the military incursions along the border from time to time. Most notably, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attempted to occupy Sumdorung Chu in 1986-87 but was successfully evicted by the Indian Army.

To what extent India demonstrated the role of force to do so remains debatable. However, this proved to be a major challenge to peaceful bilateral relations and eventually led to summit diplomacy.

The two Asian neighbours, which share a 4,056-km border, embarked on diplomacy in December 1988 when then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited the then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing. Ever since then, there have been innumerable joint working group meetings between the two sides. These diplomatic dialogues initiated bilateral trade, with the understanding that the tricky border dispute between the two countries should not hamper other aspects of their relationship. As a result, bilateral trade eventually reached gargantuan proportions, and China at one point became India’s largest trade partner. However, it is now time to acknowledge that India’s China policy has proved a failure despite the time, effort, energy and expenditure invested to promote the relationship.

In fact, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, like all other previous bilateral agreements signed by the two sides in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012, has remained ineffective in checking Chinese incursions in Ladakh. On an average, PLA intrusions occur 250-300 times annually and usually during July and August, when the weather is favourable. From 2010 to 2013, China made nearly 600 incursions into the Indian side.

Why is the Indian Army unable to stop these intrusions? New Delhi expects the Indian Army to repeatedly thwart Chinese intrusions, without clear political directions to tackle the Chinese military threat, which nibbles away at Indian territory. For instance, the development of border roads was never accorded the priority it merited. This hampers rapid military mobilisation to the LAC to enhance force levels against China. Moreover, military modernisation is not backed by political will and drags on at a glacial pace. Also, interaction between the political and military leadership remains weak during peacetime, when financial sanctions are cleared for armament procurements and allied equipment to ensure peak military preparedness.

For instance, frontline troops, particularly infantry soldiers, deployed on the LAC are not issued combat support systems like battlefield management systems, battlefield surveillance radars, long-range reconnaissance systems and night vision devices – all ‘force multipliers’ against a determined adversary.

Today, the political leadership needs to come to grips with the harsh reality that Chinese strategic culture, which conditions the mindset of its leadership, only respects the role of force in international politics.

India’s military muscle to engage China should not be underestimated, especially its airpower capabilities, which could prove a potent weapon in the Himalayan airspace. Besides, Indian soldiers have demonstrated their daring deeds on the Himalayan heights against Pakistan.

The ghost of 1962 should not cloud the thinking of the political leadership 58 years later. Today, the political leadership should not hesitate to repose their faith in the country’s military prowess to protect its territorial integrity. The pursuit of diplomacy beyond a point becomes counterproductive to national interest and image.

(The writer is a former Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Christ Deemed to be University, Bengaluru)