<p>Prime Minister Narendra Modi has accelerated relation-building with the US with his fourth visit to that country in his two years in office. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the leadership on both sides is obviously cognizant of the potential of the relationship as well as its limitations. </p>.<p>The US is very difficult to deal with because of its immense power, its assumption that others must subscribe to its economic, political and legal notions to merit the benefits of a close partnership, the constant pressure it applies for market opening and reforms, and its sanctimoniousness on human rights and religious freedoms. <br /><br />The US no doubt considers India difficult as well, resistant to change, wedded to outmoded economic ideas - a hindrance in international trade negotiations - unwilling to make clear external political choices, attached still to notions of “strategic autonomy”. This makes the management of ties difficult.<br /><br />If Modi believes, as he said in his excellent address to the US Congress, that India considers the US “an indispensable partner”, the purpose would be to garner more American support for his development ambitions for India encapsulated in various specific campaigns he has launched, respond to the aspirations of the modernising young Indian entrepreneurial class, capitalise on India’s high growth rates when the global economy is still sluggish, position India as a partner of choice at a time when China is challenging US power and the US looking for burden-sharing in maintaining the global order, and encourage joint combat against religious extremism and terrorism in our region, a point he weaved into his speech discreetly. <br /><br />His purpose in pitching the relations to that height would also be to contain the pressure from anti-India US lobbies, as evidenced by the New York Times editorial on the day of Modi’s arrival opposing India’s NSG membership on entirely specious grounds and the US Congress holding hearings on the deteriorating state of human rights and religious freedoms in India. <br /><br />The joint statement on Modi’s visit recapitulates the diverse elements of the expanding relationship, updates progress in some areas and contains some new elements. In the area of civil nuclear cooperation, the immediate start of preparatory work (engineering and site design work) for six 1,000 Westinghouse reactors in Andhra Pradesh is mentioned, along with a competitive financing package to be negotiated between India and the US EXIM Bank and contractual arrangements to be finalised by June 2017. <br /><br />The scope of this announcement is unclear. Because the site for these reactors has been changed from Gujarat to Andhra Pradesh, it would seem that the "pre-Early Works Agreement” involving the Gujarat site may now be repeated at the new site. One cannot reasonably expect actual construction to begin until a contract is signed.<br /><br />Expanding relationship<br /><br />In their joint press conference, Modi had specifically thanked Obama for his support for India’s NSG membership. The joint statement mentions Obama’s support for India’s membership and his call on other countries to do so, with China no doubt in view of its public opposition to India’s membership. It remains to be seen whether the US, given the increasing tensions in its relations with China, will be able to persuade the latter to discard its unreasonable position. <br /><br />India’s imminent entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was positively noted in the statement, for which the road had been cleared by India signing the Hague Code of Conduct on ballistic missile proliferation.<br /><br />Significantly, the two leaders applauded the completion of a roadmap for future cooperation under the 2015 US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. This suggests that the Joint Vision would be translated into practical steps in coming years, even though we have currently rejected the idea of joint patrols in the South China Sea. <br /><br />Significantly, while repeating the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and exploitation of resources as per international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, a specific reference to the South China Sea has been omitted this time, perhaps to avoid needling China unnecessarily before the NSG plenary. Contrary to uninformed speculation that India may sign one or more of the US proposed foundational agreements during the visit, even the finalised Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement was, somewhat surprisingly, not signed. <br /><br />With the US Congress moving legislation to treat India on a par with NATO allies and Japan with regard to defence supplies, the joint statement notes for the first time, the US recognition of India as a “Major Defence Partner” (the legal implication of this is unclear) and as such the US “will continue to work” toward facilitating technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners. <br /><br />The understanding reached under which India would receive licence-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies in conjunction with steps that India has committed to take to advance its export control objectives suggests that the US has been pressing us to make our export control legislation more stringent, even though we have already aligned it with the NSG and MTCR requirements and are ready to sign the Wassenaar Arrangement. No new project was announced under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). The intention to deepen cooperation on cyber security has been reiterated.<br /><br />On combating terrorism, the joint statement contains the usual robust language which has not got translated into actual practice in our region so far, though the finalisation of an arrangement to facilitate the sharing of terrorist screening information is a new element. <br /><br />Calling on Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the 2016 Pathankot terrorist attacks to justice adds to pressure on the former. No new element figures in the joint statement on bolstering economic and trade ties. Not surprisingly, WTO issues were not mentioned. All in all, Mo-di’s visit has been reasonably productive.<br /><br /><em>(The writer is a former Foreign Secretary)</em><br /></p>
<p>Prime Minister Narendra Modi has accelerated relation-building with the US with his fourth visit to that country in his two years in office. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the leadership on both sides is obviously cognizant of the potential of the relationship as well as its limitations. </p>.<p>The US is very difficult to deal with because of its immense power, its assumption that others must subscribe to its economic, political and legal notions to merit the benefits of a close partnership, the constant pressure it applies for market opening and reforms, and its sanctimoniousness on human rights and religious freedoms. <br /><br />The US no doubt considers India difficult as well, resistant to change, wedded to outmoded economic ideas - a hindrance in international trade negotiations - unwilling to make clear external political choices, attached still to notions of “strategic autonomy”. This makes the management of ties difficult.<br /><br />If Modi believes, as he said in his excellent address to the US Congress, that India considers the US “an indispensable partner”, the purpose would be to garner more American support for his development ambitions for India encapsulated in various specific campaigns he has launched, respond to the aspirations of the modernising young Indian entrepreneurial class, capitalise on India’s high growth rates when the global economy is still sluggish, position India as a partner of choice at a time when China is challenging US power and the US looking for burden-sharing in maintaining the global order, and encourage joint combat against religious extremism and terrorism in our region, a point he weaved into his speech discreetly. <br /><br />His purpose in pitching the relations to that height would also be to contain the pressure from anti-India US lobbies, as evidenced by the New York Times editorial on the day of Modi’s arrival opposing India’s NSG membership on entirely specious grounds and the US Congress holding hearings on the deteriorating state of human rights and religious freedoms in India. <br /><br />The joint statement on Modi’s visit recapitulates the diverse elements of the expanding relationship, updates progress in some areas and contains some new elements. In the area of civil nuclear cooperation, the immediate start of preparatory work (engineering and site design work) for six 1,000 Westinghouse reactors in Andhra Pradesh is mentioned, along with a competitive financing package to be negotiated between India and the US EXIM Bank and contractual arrangements to be finalised by June 2017. <br /><br />The scope of this announcement is unclear. Because the site for these reactors has been changed from Gujarat to Andhra Pradesh, it would seem that the "pre-Early Works Agreement” involving the Gujarat site may now be repeated at the new site. One cannot reasonably expect actual construction to begin until a contract is signed.<br /><br />Expanding relationship<br /><br />In their joint press conference, Modi had specifically thanked Obama for his support for India’s NSG membership. The joint statement mentions Obama’s support for India’s membership and his call on other countries to do so, with China no doubt in view of its public opposition to India’s membership. It remains to be seen whether the US, given the increasing tensions in its relations with China, will be able to persuade the latter to discard its unreasonable position. <br /><br />India’s imminent entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was positively noted in the statement, for which the road had been cleared by India signing the Hague Code of Conduct on ballistic missile proliferation.<br /><br />Significantly, the two leaders applauded the completion of a roadmap for future cooperation under the 2015 US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. This suggests that the Joint Vision would be translated into practical steps in coming years, even though we have currently rejected the idea of joint patrols in the South China Sea. <br /><br />Significantly, while repeating the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and exploitation of resources as per international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, a specific reference to the South China Sea has been omitted this time, perhaps to avoid needling China unnecessarily before the NSG plenary. Contrary to uninformed speculation that India may sign one or more of the US proposed foundational agreements during the visit, even the finalised Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement was, somewhat surprisingly, not signed. <br /><br />With the US Congress moving legislation to treat India on a par with NATO allies and Japan with regard to defence supplies, the joint statement notes for the first time, the US recognition of India as a “Major Defence Partner” (the legal implication of this is unclear) and as such the US “will continue to work” toward facilitating technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners. <br /><br />The understanding reached under which India would receive licence-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies in conjunction with steps that India has committed to take to advance its export control objectives suggests that the US has been pressing us to make our export control legislation more stringent, even though we have already aligned it with the NSG and MTCR requirements and are ready to sign the Wassenaar Arrangement. No new project was announced under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). The intention to deepen cooperation on cyber security has been reiterated.<br /><br />On combating terrorism, the joint statement contains the usual robust language which has not got translated into actual practice in our region so far, though the finalisation of an arrangement to facilitate the sharing of terrorist screening information is a new element. <br /><br />Calling on Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the 2016 Pathankot terrorist attacks to justice adds to pressure on the former. No new element figures in the joint statement on bolstering economic and trade ties. Not surprisingly, WTO issues were not mentioned. All in all, Mo-di’s visit has been reasonably productive.<br /><br /><em>(The writer is a former Foreign Secretary)</em><br /></p>
