Science and its expression of discontent

The term ‘paradigm shift’ has become so ubiquitous in writing and conversation that some tend to view it as a cliche to be shunned. But that would be doing it an injustice, given its antecedents. A paradigm is a way of seeing the world and the current state of knowledge the only guide to what the unknown might be like. Therefore, a change to a whole new paradigm is necessarily discontinuous with the old.

The term ‘paradigm shift’ was first used, from the perspective of the progress of science, to describe a revolutionary change in scientific development. One man advanced this idea, and single-handedly changed the world view on the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. Thomas Samuel Kuhn, is without doubt, the most influential philosopher of science of the twentieth century, and his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (The Structure), one of the most cited academic books.

The central idea of this extraordinarily influential book is simple: The development of science is discontinuous, alternating between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ phases. The revolutionary phases are more than merely periods of accelerated progress, but differ qualitatively from the previous science. In normal periods, science is driven by a ‘paradigm’ posing problems for scientists to resolve, or puzzles to solve, as Kuhn described it, much to the annoyance of some scientists; and providing the tools, methods and standards for their solution.

A crisis in science arises when the paradigm fails to solve particularly persistent questions called anomalies; and it is such crises that trigger scientific revolutions. Revolutionary science is therefore not cumulative in that scientific revolutions involve a revision of existing scientific beliefs or practices. Kuhn’s contribution to the philosophy of science marked a radical departure from the past and most of Kuhn’s critics, notably Karl Popper, failed to appreciate the emphasis he placed upon the idea of a paradigm as an exemplar or model of problem-solving.

Born in 1922, Kuhn studied physics at Harvard, graduating in 1943 and completed his PhD in physics in 1949. It was just happenstance that he soon switched to the history of science, and thereafter to the philosophy of science, the serendipitous result of being commissioned to teach a class in science for undergraduates in the humanities at Harvard.

The Structure first aroused interest among social scientists, although it did in due course create the interest among philosophers that Kuhn had intended, and before long, among a much wider academic and general audience.

Kuhn’s insight — that one can understand scientific development only if one understands the intellectual frameworks within which scientists work — is what animates this thought-provoking book.

What set the cat amongst the pigeons in the scientific community was Kuhn’s idea of ‘incommensurability’ — that theories from differing periods cannot be compared — as a natural corollary to his scientific revolution thesis. In sum, it contested the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ metaphor that prevailed at the time.

Assessing Kuhn’s significance presents a conundrum. Unquestionably he was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century. It is as if he himself brought about a revolution but did not provide the replacement paradigm. One ought to read The Structure, if only for one reason: it transforms our understanding of the scientific method, and in particular the sociology of scientific knowledge.

Far from introducing irrationality into the discourse on Science, Kuhn was departing from what was the need for an imagined pure rationality; and presenting an original idea: in essence, the view that science, rather than progressing towards a goal, progresses away from poorer paradigms to better ones.

The Structure serves as a powerful counterweight to the human quest for certainty. To paraphrase Kuhn, we may have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them, closer to the truth.

The things that science discovers exist independently of our conceptions of them. Merely because we invent words and their meanings, does not mean we invent the world. Kuhn provides a powerful insight to enable us to engage with the specificity of the past without its foreshadowing of the present. This remarkable book is a profound reminder of the need for epistemic humility to replace epistemic rhetoric. We might pride ourselves as ostensibly rational beings, but can easily fool ourselves into thinking we know more than we really do.

Add this masterwork to your must-read list. In the unending human quest for knowledge, the study of science as we know it will remain Kuhn’s enduring legacy.