JOIN USChina has shown geopolitical chutzpah with Saudi-Iran truce. What next?
On Friday, March 10, just as all eyes in America, and India, were on the crisis surrounding Silicon Valley Bank of Santa Clara, California, thousands of miles away in China, the geopolitical challenger to America, the National Security Advisers of Iran and Saudi Arabia were, in the presence of China’s State Councillor Wang Yi, raising a toast to cement their new-found friendship, brokered by Beijing.
The two countries, representing the two antagonistic versions of Islam – (Arabised) Sunni and Shia -- were brought together by Communist China, which considers religion as the undesirable “opium of the masses”. The two antagonists, brought together by either adversity or geopolitical compulsions, resolved to bury the hatchet and, having decided to reach a common understanding on their concerns, agreed to re-open their embassies in each other’s capital within two months. How long will the camaraderie between these two, nay three, countries, who have nothing much in common among themselves, except their contempt for democracy (and America – yes, the Saudis included), is difficult to predict but it can be safely said that this is not a very comfortable friendship, much less a relationship that will last till “death do us apart.”
Also Read: Iran, Saudi back on talking terms
For decades, even as the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, divided by a common religion as it were, were wishing death upon each other, there had been several efforts to broker truce, if not peace, between them. The history of the feud between them goes back to the late seventies, when the radical Islamic revolution, germinated, ironically again, out of the idea of “Marxist hatred for Western Imperialism”, spearheaded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini brought down the (secular) monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, heralding a major geopolitical realignment in the region, and within Islam. The siege of Mecca and the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat lent credence to Saudi Arabia’s apprehensions that its position as the “cradle of Islam” was under challenge from the Shiite Islamic dispensation in Tehran and its allies. After the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran, the diplomatic relations between the two were severed and the mutual hatred and fear manifested in sporadic attacks and a proxy war. The two countries had even frozen all diplomatic ties between them.
The seeds of the Iranian revolution were sown by the forces that claimed to be fighting Western imperialism. China’s Marxist nationalism is fuelled by creating an enemy out of the West. So, the partnership between the anti-US Tehran and Beijing, which considers the US as the enemy and obstacle to its rise to global superpowerdom, could be a natural one. Besides, China’s promised huge investment in Iran, particularly Chabhahar, adds to Beijing’s compulsion to have Iran firmly on its side, and vice versa. But what is intriguing is the presence of Saudi Arabia, long an American ally, in the same room. With America’s dependence on Saudi oil having reduced over the past decade, thanks to its own shale oil and gas, perhaps the Arab kingdom has no choice but to befriend China to buy up the kingdom’s oil.
Besides surpassing the US as the largest trading partner of developed nations such as Japan and the European Union countries, China has made phenomenal inroads in the Middle East, too. China’s trade with Saudi Arabia now exceeds the latter’s combined trade with the US and the EU. It is thus Saudi Arabia’s dominant trade partner. In such a context, it makes sense for Beijing to strategise to ensure a stable and peaceful Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as build a stronger trade ‘trilateral’ between them where it can pay them in Yuan for oil and gas and get back the Yuan by selling them its cheap merchandise. So, it is a win-win situation for all, potentially leaving the US and the dollar out in the cold.
Another possible fallout, in the long run if not immediately, could be the PLA Navy’s warships frequenting the Persian Gulf under the guise of patrolling or anti-piracy initiatives. This will either invite direct confrontation with the US Navy or turn the Gulf waters into an area of prolonged stand-off between the two contesting powers. Chinese attempts to station PLA Navy’s nuclear submarines in the Persian Gulf and ply them in the adjoining Indian Ocean also cannot be ruled out.
It may be argued that the American dependence on the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) is not as inevitable as that of China’s, which requires the Gulf countries to transport nearly 80 per cent of its energy supplies by sea. In fact, this itself could be one compelling reason for Beijing to rush to broker peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
By inserting itself, even if it be as a peace-broker, between two bitter religio-geopolitical rivals, has China walked into a minefield? Will the peace between the rivals outlive the staying power of the US to remain relevant in the Middle East? Unlike China, the US will witness a political regime change in the White House next year, and the new regime may well decide to roll-up its sleeves and enter the arena once again with renewed vigour. What will be Beijing’s reaction then, other than confrontation at a cost, once Washington challenges its new role as peacemaker. The future is pregnant with possibilities and intriguing situations, even as the world is slowly but surely inching towards a new global order. Meanwhile, New Delhi could choose to wait and watch, but it has its task cut out to expedite its projects in Iran and strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia.