Maldives: Rising jihadi networks

In a bomb attack on May 6, former Maldivian president Mohamed Nasheed was critically injured, as were a few others. Going by the magnitude, the attack looks small, but in terms of the target selected, it cannot be underestimated. The fact that the attackers could get close to a high-profile target like Nasheed, who is also currently Speaker of the People’s Majlis, the Maldivian parliament, raises two principal questions: Is there a larger jihadist context to the attack? Or was it an attack by his political opponents?

Over the past decade or so, Islamic radicalisation has reared its head in this Sunni-majority state. The number of Maldivians drawn to Islamic State (IS) and Pakistan-based madrasas and jihadist groups has risen. Protests by Islamists bearing IS flags have become common on the islands. According to a Government of Maldives report, about 200 Maldivian citizens had travelled to Syria and fought alongside IS; double that number did try to sneak out, but many were impeded. In terms of proportion to population, this number is high, compared to other Muslim-majority Asian countries. Notably, those who returned from Syria indulge in radicalisation and recruitment of unemployed youth on behalf of IS through Furqan and Noor mosques. Political uncertainty and socio-economic issues are the main drivers that have fuelled Islamic radicalism in the atoll state.

Pakistan-based jihadist group Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) has exploited these faultlines through its charitable front organisation, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, to establish a foothold, especially in southern Maldives, in the garb of relief operations post-2004 tsunami. Developments in West Asia and the Af-Pak region have also influenced Maldivians toward radicalisation. Maldivian youth who returned from religious studies in Pakistani madrasas controlled by various jihadist groups and from Saudi Arabian madrasas carried radical ideas, and also jihadi connections. The madrasa-educated youth are indoctrinated to wage jihad in trouble spots like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Chechnya.

This has had impact on the domestic front in the form of the rise of new Islamic radical groups with opportunistic political connections. Interestingly, Nasheed himself observed in 2019 that “The al Qaeda and IS are developing a deep state within the Maldives and are capturing strategic positions in the security establishments – in the police, military, in immigration, in the education ministry...so that a deep state is able to influence.”

Consequently, the country, which is known for its tourist attraction, has been witnessing violent attacks in the past decade. The first major terror attack took place in 2007 in Malé’s Sultan Park, resulting in 12 casualties. Afrasheem Ali, a member of parliament, was assassinated in October 2012 for his anti-radicalisation stance. In August 2014, a local al Qaeda affiliate group claimed to have killed Ahmed Rilwan Abdulla, a noted journalist critical of Islamic radicalism in the country. In February 2020, three foreign tourists were attacked on the island of Hulhumalé. In April 2020, the IS claimed that it was responsible for the attack on Mahibadhoo harbour. Now, the attack on Nasheed is likely due to his criticism and personal push for countermeasures against Islamic radicalisation in the country. Notably, 17 jihadist organisations were banned in Maldives on the recommendations by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security that fall within the purview of Nasheed as the Speaker of the Majlis.

The emerging pattern, therefore, suggests a clear involvement of a jihadist group associated with the IS. Ever since its loss in Syria and Iraq, IS has been spreading in the rest of the continent, most notably in South and Southeast Asia. The dispersion is in the form of affiliate groups that show allegiance to IS. The Easter attacks in Sri Lanka in April 2019 were, for instance, perpetrated by local affiliate groups like NTJ and JMI. Some of the local jihadist affiliates in Maldives include Soldiers of the Khilafah in the Maldives, Dot and al Mustaqim Media.

Despite the emerging patterns, it is surprising that the local intelligence and security agencies failed to foresee an attack on a high-profile target like Nasheed. Maldives’ intelligence mechanism and cooperation with other countries has to be strengthened. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and a possible resurgence of the Taliban may encourage possible outflow of Maldivian youth to Afghanistan. It is, therefore, important for Malé to keenly monitor egress of would-be jihadists and ingress of battle-hardened returnees. There are indeed some countermeasures taken by the present government in the form of strengthening existing Prevention of Terrorism Act and establishing a National Counter Terrorism Centre for better coordination of all counterterrorism activities by various government bodies. But they are not sufficient. A national-level counterterrorism strategy that addresses the very root causes of radicalisation in various remote and poverty-stricken islands of the archipelago is the need of the hour.

(The writer is Associate Professor, Department of International Studies, Political Science and History, Christ (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru.)