JOIN USChanging times
The stage has been set for the annual India-Russia summit slated for early November.
The visit by Russian deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin to New Delhi last week rounded off the series of high-level consultations on the substantive issues of cooperation that are expected to figure at the summit. A week earlier, Russian defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov had visited Delhi to discuss the finalisation of multi-billion dollar worth new contracts for purchase of Russian weaponry by India.
Three things can be mentioned at the outset. One, India-Russia annual summits have become a ‘routine’ affair, and, therefore, do not look for earth-shaking results. Two, having said that, they could still come up with solutions to the problems of cooperation; the ‘sherpas’ huddled together in Delhi for the final countdown. Three, emanating out of the above, this year’s summit is somewhat unusual as it is taking place under the shadow of two or three irritants that somehow spilled over into public domain.
Serdyukov quietly transacted several lucrative deals. Russia’s place as India’s key partner in sourcing advanced weaponry is by far assured. The Indian side chose not to make a hue and cry about the latest postponement of the delivery of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. But Rogozin livened up the proceedings, bringing into the Russia-India partnership a new facet of American-style public diplomacy. The Indians are unused to such a spectacle involving ‘time-tested’ Russian friends.
But then, India-Russia partnership is entering a new phase with the injection of a heavy dose of market forces into it, which has become inevitable for two reasons. First, the two economies are accelerating their globalisation and old modes have become insufficient.
Second, the strategic content of the partnership has undergone a big transformation in the recent decade, and the transactional part of the relationship is inevitably catching up.
Take defence cooperation, for example. India is looking for quality products and it can afford them. Its decision to overlook the Russian bid for the MMRCA deal illustrates this.
Again, India is cherry picking. Besides, India has also become ambitious, which is where, paradoxically, Russia hopes to cash in – namely, taking the defence relationship to new modes of cooperation such as co-production and joint design as well as bringing in advanced technology.
However, this innovative approach is lacking in the civilian sector. China, in comparison, is scoring with far greater ease in the Indian market, although it is constrained to operate with one hand tied behind its back. Therefore, the Sistema problem becomes an interesting test case of how the two leaderships and bureaucracies can make a difference to the relationship in the changed climate. Much can be said on both sides.
But, as Rogozin pointed out, can the rules of the game be changed mid-stream? The short answer is ‘No’; it takes away the level playing field. But situations arise when such things happen. Unfortunately, the Sistema issue gets identified – even if only by remote association – with the can of worms called 2G scam and the Indian government is perched on a hot tin roof.
The impasse over Kudankulam 3 and 4 poses a less complicated problem – apparently, India insists on applying the new legislation on safety and interestingly, Russia hasn’t demanded amendment to the Indian nuclear liability legislation – unlike the United States – but is opting for a commercial approach. That leaves the two sides to renegotiate the price of the reactors and the related equipment for the next phase at Kudankulam. External affairs minister S M Krishna expressed the confidence that the project would go through.
Finally, the summit in November cannot afford to overlook the regional and global backdrop. The post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan will hog attention. The prospect of a long-term western military presence in the region outside the United Nations ambit changes the power dynamic of the region. Russia consistently seeks a ‘neutral’ Afghanistan, while the Indian stance has become delightfully vague. Thus, while Russia and India have shared interests and even common principles with regard to regional security, they also pursue specific interests. The heart of the matter is that Russia’s reset with the United States has run into headwinds, whereas the US-Indian partnership is accelerating.
The Russian efforts to integrate the Eurasian region are entering a qualitatively new phase, while India, although it wishes to “eschew archaic concepts of Great Game and Grand Chessboard”, as vice-president Hamid Ansari recently said, seems nonetheless comfortable with the US’ New Silk Road Initiative. The geopolitical reality is that the co-relation of forces internationally at present works to India’s advantage in furthering its objectives of national development, whereas Russia is a big power that happens to carry the burden of preserving the global strategic balance.
Russia’s ties with Pakistan are warming and there is no reason for the recent years’ trend not to continue, while its strategic coordination with China can be expected to intensify against the backdrop of the US’ deployment of its missile defence system in Asia under its overarching ‘rebalancing’ in Asia. Quite obviously, the task across-the-board in a period of transition and great fluidity will be to put in proper perspective the aspirations and priorities in the respective Indian and Russian thinking without allowing them to cast a shadow on the India-Russia partnership. Indeed, the specific interests in regional security, which the two countries pursue in the present transformative period, are not necessarily contradictory.
(The writer is a former ambassador)