Hastening the thaw

What stands out is that the initiative on the current five-day visit by China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie to India came from Beijing. And Beijing took the initiative knowing that the fiftieth “anniversary” of the 1962 conflict is just ahead.

India’s policymakers, who are deeply versed in China’s complex political and diplomatic idiom, grasped its profound meaning, especially since the Chinese leadership is deeply immersed in a once-in-a-decade transition and Liang himself might retire within weeks and indeed there is nothing really emergent in the Sino-Indian military-to-military relationship.

The last time a Chinese defence minister visited India was in 2004. The Indian defence minister A K Antony visited China in 2006. Beijing proposed this rare visit with the intent to convey that any thought of challenging the status quo in the relationship is far from its mind.

Significantly, Liang’s delegation includes Yang Jinshan, commander of the Tibet military district. It needs to be put alongside the rare permission granted by Beijing for the Indian ambassador to travel to Lhasa and the inclusion of Tibet in the tour itinerary of the visiting Indian military delegation recently.

On the one hand, China’s sensitivities are to be duly noted with regard to the instability in Tibet. On the other hand, Indian analysts are restive over the expansion of the Chinese military infrastructure across the Line of Actual Control and a spate of combat exercises undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.

The Indian defence ministry statement on Liang’s visit underscored the “enhancement of measures for maintenance of peace and tranquility along the borders and confidence-building measures” as key agenda items of Liang’s talks in Delhi with the Indian leadership. One outcome of Liang’s visit could be the resumption of army exercises. Priority would be given to the working of the new bilateral boundary coordination mechanism, which became operational earlier this year.

The heart of the matter is that the border dispute is not easily resolvable. A national consensus is difficult to build – in India in the divisive climate of coalition politics as well as in China where the bar of public accountability for policies is steadily rising. Having said that, both countries are interested in keeping the LAC as a peaceful and tranquil border. Thus, Liang’s visit may pay attention to CBMs.

A commentary by the government-owned China Daily favorably commenting on the Indian defence ministry statement also conveyed this impression. The report cited a Chinese scholar saying that the development of Sino-Indian ties are “often hampered by matters such as the unresolved boundary issue, which is not conducive to building mutual trust.” He added, “Without good communication and candid dialogue, military relations between China and India won’t be stable and fast moving.”

Big picture

However, it is difficult to overlook the big picture. China harbors suspicions about India’s growing ties with the United States but is willing to recognise that it is pursuing legitimate interests. What it expects from Delhi is that it sticks to its approach of not getting drawn into the US’ containment strategy.

Liang’s visit to India has been scheduled almost on the eve of the visit of the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta to China in mid-September, which itself is a swift “return visit” after Liang’s trip to the US in May. The hectic Sino-American parleys are taking place against the backdrop of the US’ so-called “pivot” to Asia, which Beijing sees as a thinly disguised containment strategy. Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is also due to visit Beijing later this week, “as part of our efforts to build a cooperative partnership”, to quote the spokesperson in Washington.

India cannot but take note of this dense traffic between Washington and Beijing, notwithstanding their Asia-Pacific acrimony or their seasonal diplomatic storms, which only goes to signify their mutual interest to look beyond whatever current discords at the far horizons where the two great powers will eventually need to cohabitate in a state of interdependency.

Liang arrived in India after a 5-day visit to Sri Lanka. Beijing would signal that its mil-to-mil ties with Sri Lanka are not directed against India’s interests. While addressing Sri Lankan soldiers, Liang said, “The PLA’s efforts in conducting friendly exchanges and cooperation with its counterparts in the South Asian nations are intended for maintaining regional security and stability and not targeted at any third party.” Our pundits often view Chinese activities in the South Asian region as “anti-India”. But this is also a matter of self-opinion – claiming Indian Ocean to be our “sphere of influence”, which in itself is an altogether obsolete thought in the contemporary world situation that also ignores geopolitical realities.

The South Asian countries have own perspectives on ties with China. Even as Liang headed for South Asia, Maldives President Mohammed Waheed left for Beijing seeking a $500 million loan for infrastructure development. Our litmus test lies in coolly, dispassionately assessing how far China’s activities are indeed “India-centric”. The onus lies with us ultimately to catch up with China’s infrastructure development of the far-flung border regions or to match the quality time Beijing gives (in self-interest, of course) to small countries of immense strategic consequence such as Maldives.

Liang’s visit may go toward advancing the thaw in the military-to-military ties but then, when it comes to China, everything adds up. Indian diplomacy has been optimal in calibrating the ties with China.
(The writer is a former ambassador.)