Pause before the pounce

China’s international image took a hit on July 12, 2016, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, announcing its decision on a case filed by the Philippines in January 2013, dismissed all of China’s claims on South China Sea (SCS) as without legal basis.

The decision additionally injected a high degree of instability in an already volatile situation in the SCS. The ‘live firing’ exercises being conducted in the area by three fleets of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) during July 8-11 and the ongoing ‘Malabar Exercises’ among Indian, US and Japanese Navy ships, lend a sharper edge to the PCA’s decision.

The 501-page decision of the PCA, which as anticipated, was in favour of the Philippines, went well beyond the issues raised by Manila. The ruling effectively demolished the various arguments advanced by China. It dismissed China’s contention that its claims date back to the 2nd century BC and ruled that Beijing has no legal basis for its maritime territorial claims over 3 million square km of the SCS and neither over its undersea mineral and other resources.

The Court concluded that ‘historical navigation and fishing by China in the waters of the SCS represented the exercise of high seas freedoms, rather than a historic right, and that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of the SCS or prevented other states from exploiting their resources.’

Significantly, it added that the “nine-dash” line used by Beijing to delineate its South China Sea claims contravenes a United Nations convention on maritime law.

China has consistently declined to accept the PCA’s jurisdiction with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaring “the award is null and void and has no binding force.” Though non-binding, the decision is a definite setback to China’s assiduous efforts since 1974 to build a case for claiming sovereignty over the disputed sea.

Importantly, including for India, it negates China’s bid to cite ancient historical records like 2000-year old travellers’ accounts and old navigation maps to substantiate its claims, thus implicitly weakening China’s other territorial claims. Supported by the US, G7 countries, 28 EU nations, Vietnam, Japan and India, the PCA decision strengthens the claims of countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia and isolates China.

Beijing’s riposte was swift. Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated that the waters had been Chinese territory since ancient times and the ruling could not invalidate history. Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted “This farce is now over. China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards.”

China’s stance is somewhat shored by the fact that no permanent member of the UN Security Council has ever complied with a ruling by the PCA on an issue involving the Law of the Sea and none has ever accepted any ruling which they felt infringed their sovereignty or national security interests.

Orchestrated protests
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) orchestrated diplomatic protests summoning several Western ambassadors on July 12-13 to complain against the PCA decision. At a press briefing in Beijing on July 13, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin questioned the PCA’s competence and integrity saying its five arbitrators – one of whom is a Japanese – lacked knowledge of “Asian culture” and were effectively employed by the Philippines. He asked: ‘Can a ruling issued by such an arbitration tribunal have any effect? Does it have credibility? Who would implement a ruling that has no credibility?’

Meanwhile, the “Beijing Office of the Emergency Committee” promulgated heightened security precautions from the early morning of July 12, 2016. While this would have been to appease Chinese nationalist sentiment, the stated purpose was to pre-empt popular protests similar to the anti-Japan demonstrations in 80 Chinese cities four years ago.

China’s President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping also instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to “check all the possibilities” and “prepare to make war.” The PLA has been placed on "secondary alert" and the PLA’s South Zone or Southern Theatre Command, the PLA Navy (PLAN)’s South China Sea Fleet, Air Force and Rocket Forces have been placed on "pre-war status".

The Strategic nuclear forces are also on alert. China’s official media publicised that PLAN's South China Sea, East China Sea and North China Sea fleets have been conducting ‘live-fire’ exercises in the waters near the Xisha Hainan Island from July 8-11, 2016, in the presence of senior commanders including PLA Navy (PLAN) Chief Wu Shengli.  At the same time, Beijing appears to be moving towards de-escalating tensions.

A lengthy 149-paragraph White Paper on the South China Sea issued on July 13, 2016 reiterated China’s historical claims and sovereignty over the SCS and suggested a willingness to negotiate with the Philippines. Chinese foreign minister separately hinted that China could respond positively to a suggestion for peaceful negotiations made by the new Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte on June 30, 2016.

The days and weeks ahead will be important for the region. Notwithstanding its mutual defence pacts with Japan and the Philippines signed in 1951, the US has close, extensive ties with China and little desire for hostilities. The South East Asian nations are dependent on China’s economy. Beijing will not resile from its claims of sovereignty over most of the SCS which are integral to its global ambitions.

Importantly, Xi Jinping, who proposed the ‘China Dream’ with its muscular ambitions and is preparing for the 19th Party Congress in late 2017 – cannot afford to appear weak. Beijing might declare a limited Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) while opting for a carefully calibrated response of maintaining its claims while easing tension. But this will only be a strategic pause.

(The writer is former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and currently President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi)