<div align="justify">India’s northern border with China has become “live” with the nearly two-month-long Doklam standoff between their armies. Perhaps the Doklam confrontation is a result of India’s response to China’s maritime adventurism in the South China Sea (SCS) and its lack of support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).<br /><br />Meanwhile, China’s “all-weather” ally Pakistan continues to keep India’s western border also “alive”. But apart from being India’s northern neighbour, China is also a southern neighbour.<br /><br />This refers to China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean waters since 2014 when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) started submarine deployments with conventional and nuclear submarines which undertook port visits to Sri Lanka, under the flimsy pretext of anti-piracy missions. Clearly, Beijing’s rationale was to send a strong message to New Delhi that it could project naval force into South Asian waters.<br /><br />Since 2008, China used the advent of piracy off Somalia to extend its sea legs when the PLAN sent a three-warship anti-piracy task force to the Horn of Africa in rotational deployments. This continues till date, with the 26th task force in station. Beijing has used these naval deployments as a training platform to garner experience for distant seas to woo allies and influence old ones.<br /><br />In 2013, China announced its grandiose ‘One Belt One Road’ (since renamed BRI) plan, an economic masterstroke in which to couch its strategic intentions in the region. The New Maritime Silk Route (NMSR) is the maritime component of BRI and traverses the waters from the Indian Ocean to Africa, West Asia and to the Mediterranean.<br /><br />In tandem with border issues in the north, the NMSR could also exert pressure from the south on India’s Siliguri Corridor or Chicken’s Neck, in a bid to cut off India’s connectivity to the Seven Sisters that constitute the north-eastern region.<br /><br />To further complicate the situation, China proclaimed in April 2015 an upgradation of the segment from Gwadar to Xinjiang, which was termed the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with a $46 billion funding. India has opposed the BRI due to China’s non-consultative and unilateral push for the same and also because the CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), which is Indian territory.<br /><br />China has no qualms over cooperation with Pakistan in PoK and promotes the CPEC. However, Beijing warns India against bilateral ties with Vietnam over oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea (SCS).<br /><br />The BRI was meant to improve economic connectivity with Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries. But already, the decline is in progress. For instance, Hambantota and other Chinese projects have resulted in Sri Lanka’s debt with China ballooning to $8 billion.<br /><br />This has compelled Sri Lanka to handover an 80% stake in Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease, which compromises Colombo’s sovereignty. This is something that BRI countries need to take note of, as a familiar Chinese pattern.<br /><br />In other regional waters, China has, since the mid-1970s, been involved in maritime disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea with several smaller island nations that constitute the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean).<br /><br />However, the lack of unity among the Asean countries and the absence of adequate international pressure against China because of its economic clout has led Beijing to adopt a strident national security and foreign policy. In the process, China has reclaimed and militarised several islands there.<br /><br />In sharp contrast to China’s aggressive stand in the SCS, India resolved its maritime boundary with Bangladesh peacefully under the aegis of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in 2014, despite the loss of a larger chunk of the Exclusive Economic Zone than envisaged. This is something that New Delhi needs to trumpet to the international community at the appropriate diplomatic fora.<br /><br />Today, the SCS is the gateway for China’s push into the Indian Ocean drawing strength from an aggressive and unchecked stance in those waters. Eventually, what happens in the SCS will impinge on and determine the outcome in the IOR. Indian diplomacy therefore needs to sensitise the BRI countries and ask them, if China tramples on the rights of SCS claimant countries, how could they possibly trust Beijing?<br /><br />Aggressive ambitions<br /><br />Moreover, China has recently established an overseas military base at Djibouti in Africa and has despatched its marines there, and to Gwadar along Pakistan’s coastline. Beijing’s recent decision to reduce its army from 2.3 million to one million and increase its amphibious or marine expeditionary forces from 20,000 to 1,00,000 is an indicator of its aggressive maritime ambitions.<br /><br />Clearly, such a military move only highlights Beijing’s expansionist intentions vis-a-vis the SCS. India need not worry excessively about China but must do whatever is necessary to secure and promote its national interests. <br /><br />By both its cheque book diplomacy and its military ambitions, China evokes fear among the smaller nations of the region. On the other hand, India is seen as a benign power in the region. Geography is on India’s side while China will be perceived as an extra-regional power with hostile intentions. India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy and its ability to fulfil promises to friendly countries should be a sufficient strategy to keep China in check.<br /><br />While New Delhi has taken several steps to tackle China, clearly much more needs to be done. The Indian Navy needs more submarines and is woefully short of anti-submarine warfare helicopters. More importantly, India will have to augment its tri-Services Andaman & Nicobar Command both as a bulwark againstChina and as a springboard into the South China Sea.<br /><br />India has ignored development of military capabilities along its land boundaries for far too long. It cannot afford to do the same along its maritime frontiers any longer.<br /><br />(The writer is a former Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, and also served in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India)<br /><br /></div>
<div align="justify">India’s northern border with China has become “live” with the nearly two-month-long Doklam standoff between their armies. Perhaps the Doklam confrontation is a result of India’s response to China’s maritime adventurism in the South China Sea (SCS) and its lack of support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).<br /><br />Meanwhile, China’s “all-weather” ally Pakistan continues to keep India’s western border also “alive”. But apart from being India’s northern neighbour, China is also a southern neighbour.<br /><br />This refers to China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean waters since 2014 when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) started submarine deployments with conventional and nuclear submarines which undertook port visits to Sri Lanka, under the flimsy pretext of anti-piracy missions. Clearly, Beijing’s rationale was to send a strong message to New Delhi that it could project naval force into South Asian waters.<br /><br />Since 2008, China used the advent of piracy off Somalia to extend its sea legs when the PLAN sent a three-warship anti-piracy task force to the Horn of Africa in rotational deployments. This continues till date, with the 26th task force in station. Beijing has used these naval deployments as a training platform to garner experience for distant seas to woo allies and influence old ones.<br /><br />In 2013, China announced its grandiose ‘One Belt One Road’ (since renamed BRI) plan, an economic masterstroke in which to couch its strategic intentions in the region. The New Maritime Silk Route (NMSR) is the maritime component of BRI and traverses the waters from the Indian Ocean to Africa, West Asia and to the Mediterranean.<br /><br />In tandem with border issues in the north, the NMSR could also exert pressure from the south on India’s Siliguri Corridor or Chicken’s Neck, in a bid to cut off India’s connectivity to the Seven Sisters that constitute the north-eastern region.<br /><br />To further complicate the situation, China proclaimed in April 2015 an upgradation of the segment from Gwadar to Xinjiang, which was termed the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with a $46 billion funding. India has opposed the BRI due to China’s non-consultative and unilateral push for the same and also because the CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), which is Indian territory.<br /><br />China has no qualms over cooperation with Pakistan in PoK and promotes the CPEC. However, Beijing warns India against bilateral ties with Vietnam over oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea (SCS).<br /><br />The BRI was meant to improve economic connectivity with Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries. But already, the decline is in progress. For instance, Hambantota and other Chinese projects have resulted in Sri Lanka’s debt with China ballooning to $8 billion.<br /><br />This has compelled Sri Lanka to handover an 80% stake in Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease, which compromises Colombo’s sovereignty. This is something that BRI countries need to take note of, as a familiar Chinese pattern.<br /><br />In other regional waters, China has, since the mid-1970s, been involved in maritime disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea with several smaller island nations that constitute the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean).<br /><br />However, the lack of unity among the Asean countries and the absence of adequate international pressure against China because of its economic clout has led Beijing to adopt a strident national security and foreign policy. In the process, China has reclaimed and militarised several islands there.<br /><br />In sharp contrast to China’s aggressive stand in the SCS, India resolved its maritime boundary with Bangladesh peacefully under the aegis of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in 2014, despite the loss of a larger chunk of the Exclusive Economic Zone than envisaged. This is something that New Delhi needs to trumpet to the international community at the appropriate diplomatic fora.<br /><br />Today, the SCS is the gateway for China’s push into the Indian Ocean drawing strength from an aggressive and unchecked stance in those waters. Eventually, what happens in the SCS will impinge on and determine the outcome in the IOR. Indian diplomacy therefore needs to sensitise the BRI countries and ask them, if China tramples on the rights of SCS claimant countries, how could they possibly trust Beijing?<br /><br />Aggressive ambitions<br /><br />Moreover, China has recently established an overseas military base at Djibouti in Africa and has despatched its marines there, and to Gwadar along Pakistan’s coastline. Beijing’s recent decision to reduce its army from 2.3 million to one million and increase its amphibious or marine expeditionary forces from 20,000 to 1,00,000 is an indicator of its aggressive maritime ambitions.<br /><br />Clearly, such a military move only highlights Beijing’s expansionist intentions vis-a-vis the SCS. India need not worry excessively about China but must do whatever is necessary to secure and promote its national interests. <br /><br />By both its cheque book diplomacy and its military ambitions, China evokes fear among the smaller nations of the region. On the other hand, India is seen as a benign power in the region. Geography is on India’s side while China will be perceived as an extra-regional power with hostile intentions. India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy and its ability to fulfil promises to friendly countries should be a sufficient strategy to keep China in check.<br /><br />While New Delhi has taken several steps to tackle China, clearly much more needs to be done. The Indian Navy needs more submarines and is woefully short of anti-submarine warfare helicopters. More importantly, India will have to augment its tri-Services Andaman & Nicobar Command both as a bulwark againstChina and as a springboard into the South China Sea.<br /><br />India has ignored development of military capabilities along its land boundaries for far too long. It cannot afford to do the same along its maritime frontiers any longer.<br /><br />(The writer is a former Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, and also served in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India)<br /><br /></div>
