Challenges to India's policy

India's Sri Lanka policy is facing a litmus test in Tamil Nadu where both the government and Opposition want New Delhi to be tough in dealing with Colombo on the question of justice and rights for the Sri Lankan Tamils.

At the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, India voted under pressure for the US-sponsored resolution that called for an independent and credible investigation into human rights abuses during the last days of the war against the LTTE. Yet, a section of people in Tamil Nadu sees the UPA government as insensitive to the Tamil cause, sentiments and interests.

The central government's rejection of the State Assembly resolution is bound to strengthen such views and perception in emotion-ridden Tamil Nadu. It is not an easy task for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to forge a policy that would please Tamil Nadu and also be acceptable to the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime.

Politics and ethnic emotions are the twin factors that shape Tamil Nadu's current stand on Sri Lanka. Politicians have capitalised on people's emotions to draw political advantages. Each factor feeds into the other. Both have collectively generated a strong sense of ethnic antipathy vis-a-vis the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan regime.

The antipathy is sourced by the international outcry against the military brutality on the innocent Tamil civilians, the Rajapaksa regime's utter disregard and refusal to provide retributive justice to the war victims and perpetuation of its policy of subjection and marginalisation of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the post-war period. The President believes in deceitful tactics. Backtracking is the regime's virtue and defiance is its chosen strategy.
India has found it difficult to deal with such a regime. Particularly on the issue of political solution, it is perturbed by the Rajapaksa government's unwillingness to commit itself to a greater power-sharing arrangement. Promises made on this have been wilfully reneged. India is not any more interested in Sri Lanka’s empty diplomatic rhetoric.

At the same time, it appears helpless when Colombo backtracks. Therefore, the UNHRC session and the resolution passed therein essentially to 'name and shame' Sri Lanka have provided an opportunity to expose the regime's deceitfulness and increase its vulnerability. India's vote for the resolution should be seen beyond satisfying the internal political forces or responding to their pressure.

It is also an outcome of India's sense of disappointment, accumulated over the years, caused by Sri Lanka's failure to formulate a genuine policy of peace and reconciliation. One is not sure about the immediate changes the international pressure would bring about in the ground situation. But Sri Lanka's loss of international credibility is real.

In the post-Geneva resolution period, India faces greater resistance from the hardliners in the island. Chauvinists have taken to the streets against the perceived and real 'enemies of Sri Lanka'—primarily the West. While Tamil Nadu is bracketed with the West, the Indian government is suspected to be a source of negative influence in the country. In this adverse situation, India has no option except engaging the Rajapaksa regime. But the battered regime is not going to be amenable to reason and fairness. India cannot overlook the fundamental question of accountability. Tamil Nadu may not easily give up the issue, at least till the next general elections.

Even if we consider the State Assembly resolution (demanding India to move the UN to hold a referendum on Tamil Eelam, impose economic sanctions on recalcitrant Sri Lanka and not to treat the island as a 'friendly nation') as a mere pressure tactics, the fact is that it has brought the Eelam demand back in the external actors' agenda. Sri Lanka should feel the pressure to work out a political solution based on greater devolution. At the same time, it is imperative to investigate the war crime allegations. But unfortunately the regime is not in a hurry to do anything. Under this situation, India's identification with the Western initiatives on Sri Lanka will become inevitable.

India’s limitations

It is true that benign and non-hegemonic Indian power faces limitations in the island. But Sri Lanka's 'China card' is not as powerful as it is made out to be. The Rajapaksa regime has purposefully cultivated China to defeat the LTTE and ward off international pressure. The Chinese have willingly played a patron role and, in return, gained strategic access to the island. But they understand their own limitations. While being a reliable source of economic and military support, the Chinese may not be useful in establishing national stability and cohesion. In the ultimate analysis, peace and order can be created only through internal political processes. In this context, India alone is better placed to ensure their success. Sri Lanka needs to understand its inherent weakness and vulnerabilities before providing strategic space for China to compete with India for power and influence in the region.

(The writer is Professor of South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

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