Between Scylla and Charybdis

Tussle over AIS Cadre Rules

The Union government proposes to amend the rules for the deputation of cadre officers of the All-India Services (AIS) to the Centre. This has evoked strident protestations from some Chief Ministers, expectedly of the Opposition-ruled states, alleging that the amendments proposed are against the ‘spirit of cooperative federalism’.

So, what exactly does the Centre propose to do? The changes proposed to the Rules: If the state government delays posting a cadre officer to the Centre and does not give effect to the central government’s decision within the specified time, “the officer shall stand relieved from cadre from the date as may be specified by the central government”; the Centre will decide the number of officers to be deputed to the central government in consultation with the state and the latter should make available such number of officers. Current deputation rules already require the states to depute the All-India Service (AIS) officers to the central government offices not exceeding 40% of the total cadre strength; in case of any disagreement between the Centre and the state, the matter shall be decided by the central government and the state shall give effect to the decision of the Centre “within a specified time”; in specific situations where services of cadre officers are required by the central government in ‘public interest’ the state shall give effect to its decisions within a specified time. Incidentally, remember that the central government is the cadre-controlling authority for AIS officers.

If the AIS (IAS, IPS, and IFoS) are to remain what they are intended to be — a strong and effective bridge between the Centre and the states in our federal polity — they must be kept above party, or indeed petty, politics. The central government, the appointing authority of the AIS, should also be responsible for the functioning and conduct of AIS officers, as also the prevention of their undue harassment, regardless of whether an officer is serving at the Centre or in the states. On first principles, the appointing authority must also have the right to draw on the services of the officers, and should not have to wait for the consent of the officer or the state cadre on which s/he is borne.

The AIS represent a unique feature of our federal polity, especially because the India Constitution, though federal in form, is unitary in substance. The legislative, financial and administrative powers vested in the Centre leave little doubt that the Union has been assigned not just more decisive, but even overriding, powers over the states.

The AIS scheme is part of this general policy of making the Centre strong in the overall constitutional arrangements. The self-righteous expression of outrage by some Chief Ministers is woefully out of place; made worse by quoting Sardar Patel completely out of context.

As a matter of fact, it is in some of these very states that AIS officers are perceived as polarised along party lines, with government-wide transfers routinely carried out each time the transfer of power from one party to another takes place.

The stand taken by states like West Bengal and Tamil Nadu are neither new nor surprising. They had expressed similar views in their submissions to the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-state relations in 1985; and the Sarkaria Commission, like the States Reorganisation Commission before it, dismissed their submissions.

It is not without reason that Sardar Patel championed the cause of the AIS. In October 1946, he sought the consent of the premiers of the provinces to the AIS scheme; and all the premiers agreed, barring two provinces — Punjab and Bengal — which withheld consent. The crucial question was of ultimate control over the proposed service. Patel argued that provincial control would expose the service to undesirable influences. The underlying assumption was, and events in the last 75 years have demonstrated, that the states are less immune to undesirable influences than the Centre.

This must not be seen in a pejorative or derisive sense, but as a reflection of the often local, disparate, parochial, and political-economy interests that state politics represent, leading to a greater propensity to treat the civil servant as the handmaiden of politics.

To paraphrase the Sardar, ‘this Constitution is meant to be worked by a ring of service which will keep the country intact. We have in our collective wisdom come to a decision that we shall have this model wherein the ring of service will be such that will keep the country under control.’ But for the AIS, there would have been no need for Part XIV of the Constitution dealing with services under the Union and the states.

Let us look at what happens in practice: Several states, notably, all the states south of the Vindhyas and those in the North-East, remain exceptionally underrepresented in the Government of India. Indeed, when some Chief Ministers visit New Delhi, they can barely count a handful of officers from their states at the Centre.

On the other hand, to borrow Ashish Bose’s evocative description, the ‘BIMARU’ states are over-represented at the Centre — crawling out of the woodwork, if you will.

This has longer-term implications for pan-India governance, both in emphasis and nuance. It is creating within the AIS two classes of officers: those who serve in the Government of India, and move back and forth between the Centre and the state; and those that choose to spend their entire careers in the states, blurring the distinction between what is an AIS and what would otherwise be a provincial service. The Centre’s proposal resolves these issues, compelling states to meet their Central Deputation Reserve obligations, without affecting their own requirement of officers, and ensures a more even geographic representation at the Centre.

This is a modern-day parable, if ever there was one: some states wanting to reduce the AIS to a glorified provincial service; and the appointing authority being chided that it cannot post the officers where it needs them; and the officers, stuck between Scylla and Charybdis.

(The writer is a former IAS officer and currently, Director, Public Affairs Centre, Bengaluru)