‘Pak project is to submerge Af in a larger radical Islamist identity’

The Embassy of India in Kabul was shut down soon after the Taliban marched into the Afghan capital in September 1996. After the Taliban was ousted from power in October 2001, New Delhi sent one of its ace diplomats, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, to Kabul to reopen the embassy. He later served as India’s ambassador to Afghanistan from 2010 to 2013. The Taliban is now again in control of Kabul. Mukhopadhaya, now retired from the Indian Foreign Service, tells DH’s Anirban Bhaumik that the Taliban does not have an organic presence and is not going to be a permanent phenomenon in Afghanistan

What went wrong in Afghanistan?

The February 29, 2020, US-Taliban ‘deal’ was flawed and virtually handed over Afghanistan to the Taliban and Pakistan on a platter. The deal was signed behind the backs of the people and the Government of Afghanistan, with the help of Pakistan. It delegitimised the already weak, fractured and increasingly discredited government of Afghanistan and instead legitimised the Taliban. It placed Pakistan as the major enabler, giving it undue influence in the process.

How did the Taliban remain such a potent force and why did the Afghan National Army (ANA) fail to resist it after the withdrawal of US and NATO troops?

The US came to Afghanistan not to build a nation, but just to avenge the September 11, 2001 attacks and to eliminate the Al Qaeda. It came with a heavy military and political footprint and spent money, lining the pockets of contractors, middlemen, power brokers and opportunists. But it did not invest in the country or its economy or its people. It did not invest in democracy and institution-building. The US kept its investment in the ANA limited to counterterrorism training, to avoid not only spending more, but also (to avoid) hurting the sensitivities of Pakistan. The ANA Special Forces acquitted themselves admirably in dealing with terrorist attacks but were not equipped to hold territory or retake provinces or defend boundaries. It was a few ANA units that had to fight against the Taliban all over the country without adequate mobility.

The US did not regard Afghanistan as strategic enough to prioritise it over Pakistan. Pakistan worked on a patient multi-pronged strategy to trick the US right from the beginning, preparing for the return of the Taliban once the US would inevitably tire and leave Afghanistan. It fooled the US again and again. It enabled training, financing and equipping of the Taliban. What happened in Afghanistan was a war by Pakistan against Afghanistan using Afghans brainwashed in the refugee camps and Madrasas along the Durand Line by radical preachers as a part of a Pakistani project to erase their Afghan and Pashtun identity and submerge it in a larger radical Islamic identity with the blurred territorial boundaries of an Emirate.

The leaders of Afghanistan also failed to discern motives and actions of international players, build institutions, devise strategies to overcome foreign tutelage, connect with the people and join hands in rebuilding a united, independent and strong Afghanistan.

It was a collective failure.

How should the world take the Taliban’s claim that it has changed from what it was 20 years ago?

The Taliban has changed, has understood the value of international legitimacy, recognition and diplomacy. It has learnt to use information and communication technology and language very well. It has used deception to great effect, including making President Ashraf Ghani believe at the last stages of the military takeover that a deal was in the making, and lulling the US into believing that it would not push for Kabul before complete withdrawal of NATO troops. Their rank and file may be amenable for some tactical discipline, but they have not changed. Their true colours are bound to come out, sooner or later.

What should India brace for after the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan? How should it respond to it?

The change of regime in Afghanistan does pose a long-term challenge for India. The alignment of power and influence that has existed in Afghanistan since 2001 will now be replaced with the informal alliance of Taliban, Pakistan and China, with Russia and Iran, too, aligned against the US. We still have our ties with Russia and Iran, but our only allies left in Afghanistan are the ones who will resist the Taliban. Some leaders of Afghanistan are holding talks with the Taliban to form what they call an ‘inclusive’ government. We should wait and see what they actually do. Most likely, even the appearance of some ethnic leaders will not change the reality of a total Taliban monopoly over power. With Pakistan in control, India will have no say in the new government in Afghanistan.

We should let that process play out until the contradictions emerge. There is also some resistance beginning in different parts of the country. The Taliban has no organic presence in Afghanistan. Its presence is a result of failures of the international community and the Afghans. It is difficult to believe it is a permanent phenomenon. We should be wary of legitimising them or their military takeover, or recognising them until they clarify their relationship with Pakistan and, more importantly, with the Afghan people who do not share their alien ideology.

Does the way it withdrew from Afghanistan diminish the reliability and credibility of the US as a strategic partner for India in the Indo-Pacific?

The chaotic final moments of its withdrawal from Afghanistan will badly affect the standing of the US in the world. Not only has the US abandoned Afghanistan to the Taliban and Pakistan once again, but has betrayed democracy, human rights, especially women’s rights, for a regressive and repressive theocracy. The US allies in the region, democratic Afghanistan and India, are simply collateral damage. Our relations with the US are much wider and cannot be defined by Afghanistan alone. Afghanistan is far away from the US and ‘collateral’ to it. But we should not make the mistake of treating Afghanistan as just collateral in our larger relationship with the US. Afghanistan is strategically important for India. India should pursue its own independent policy towards Afghanistan, together with those other regional powers who will experience the downside of a Talibanised Afghanistan. Iran, Central Asian Republics and even Russia, too, are likely to feel the bite of extremism emanating from Pakistan.