The second coming of P V Narasimha Rao

Next to Nehru, PV was India's most consequential PM, steering the country through its worst economic crisis and a dramatic adverse change in its security environment

Twenty-five Republic Days have come and gone since he left office and yet no Prime Minister has had the generosity of spirit and courage of conviction to name former Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao for the nation’s highest honour, the Bharat Ratna. It is a pity that even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh shied away from naming his political mentor a Bharat Ratna. Now, all of a sudden, every political party wants PV conferred that honour. PV’s case is easily made and certainly his claim is far stronger than that of many like VV Giri, Zakir Hussain, Gulzarilal Nanda, MG Ramachandran, Nanaji Deshmukh and even a CNR Rao. Next to Jawaharlal Nehru, PV was India’s most consequential Prime Minister.

The best way to measure a Prime Minister’s contribution to nation-building would be to compare the state of the nation on the eve of one’s assumption of office with what one leaves behind at the end of one’s tenure. By that yardstick, Nehru was a great Prime Minister, despite all his foibles and errors of judgement. Indira Gandhi, too, left India a stronger nation than what it was when she inherited office. This cannot be said of Rajiv Gandhi or of any of the revolving door PMs of the 1980s and the 1990s.

PV’s tenure was unique in many ways. First, he was brought out of retirement, when he was on the verge of becoming a pujari in a temple, to become PM. He was not a natural leader of his party when he became PM, a situation similar to Indira’s in 1966. He had to stage the April 1992 session of the All-India Congress Committee, risking a split while fighting detractors, to acquire a semblance of control over his party. If Indira Gandhi alienated the ‘Syndicate’ to gain control of her government, PV had to earn the displeasure of Sonia Gandhi and her coterie.

Second, PV had to wage these political battles even as he managed an unprecedented economic crisis and a sudden change in the global security environment, with the implosion of the Soviet Union.

Few today understand the seriousness of the economic crisis that gripped the country between October 1990 and June 1991, with India on the precipice of external debt default for an entire two months, mortgaging gold to stay afloat. Few also understand the loss of national confidence when the Soviet Union suddenly disappeared and the United States, a country closer to China and Pakistan than to India at that time, became the sole superpower.

Pulling the country back from the precipice, PV offered clever, if not bold, political leadership to fundamental changes in economic policy. Most of the ideas were all there in many academic studies and government reports but neither Indira nor Rajiv had the political courage to implement them. PV provided the political cover that enabled Manmohan Singh and P Chidambaram to pursue policy changes. More importantly, PV himself took the initiative as minister for industry, to end the infamous licence-permit-control Raj that the Nehru-Gandhi darbar presided over for over three decades. The policies PV put in place have since been continued by successive governments, though there has been some reversal on the trade front in recent months.

Reconfiguring Indian foreign policy to meet the needs of a post-Cold War world, PV built stronger relations with the US and the European Union and launched a Look East Policy, beginning with Singapore, that has stood the test of time. PV was the architect of a new equation with East Asian nations, Japan and South Korea, with South and West Asian neighbours and with Israel. Each of these pivots created lasting good relations with a range of rising powers.

The main charge against PV has been that he was complicit in the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and, earlier in 1984, had not stepped in as home minister to prevent the killing of Sikhs in Delhi after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. The facts do not merit either charge. In 1984, he was explicitly told by the Prime Minister’s office that the PMO would handle the Delhi situation. His inactivity at the time was an act of omission, not commission. There are other Congressmen who have to bear that cross. In 1992, the entire Union cabinet met and resolved that the Union government would allow the state government of Uttar Pradesh to deal with the ground situation in Ayodhya and that the Centre would not impose President’s rule pre-emptively.

To the extent that the government of the day ought to be held responsible for not upholding the rule of law, the Congress governments of 1984 and 1992 must carry the can, just as the BJP government in Gujarat has to for the events of 2002. However, these errors of judgement on PV’s part will have to be weighed against the immense weight of his contribution to post-Cold War economic development and foreign policy. Finally, there is the matter of India’s nuclear weapons status. Many PMs have played a role in India’s emergence as a nuclear power. The credit for giving the green signal for the Pokhran-II tests should, even in the words of Vajpayee, go to PV.

It has taken a quarter of a century and the arrival of PV’s centenary year for the Union government and the state government of Telangana to finally acknowledge the importance of his leadership. It cannot be anyone’s case that there were no flaws in PV’s character or faults in his leadership. That could be said for almost any politician in a democracy. It is, however, a travesty of justice that PV’s contribution remains ill-acknowledged and inadequately celebrated.

(The writer is an economist and author of “1991: How PV Narasimha Rao Made History”)