<p>The last few days have seen an outburst of violence across Bangladesh, following former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s call to the Awami League for a lockdown as the nation awaits the verdict of the International Criminal Tribunal on charges of crimes against humanity she has been accused of, due on 17 November.</p><p>Since 5 August 2024, Bangladesh has been witnessing drastic social and political changes. Periodic violence has kept the nation on the boil. Mobocracy has become the new normal, with frequent protests and street agitations pressing for various demands. Although Prof Yunus has announced elections by 12 February 2026, doubts and scepticism continue to linger — and not without reason.</p><p>The Interim Government, headed by Prof Muhammad Yunus, took charge along with a group of advisers on 8 August as an interregnum arrangement and the best available option amid the unexpected chain of events that led to Hasina’s ouster in early August. The breakdown of law and order, coupled with dire economic conditions, required urgent intervention, and over time, the Interim managed to address the most pressing challenges. Responding to heightened political fervour to rectify the perceived ills of the previous government, the Interim set up new commissions to recommend reforms. Public sentiment overwhelmingly sought to transform Bangladesh into a state embodying democracy, accountability and transparency. However, the Interim’s overcommitment — including several initiatives clearly beyond its mandate and capacity — has resulted in mounting public disillusionment and an unending stream of demands from various stakeholders, contributing to a continuing political crisis.</p><p>Tensions have risen further as various Islamic groups have become more vocal in spreading their brand of religious nationalism. Meanwhile, the success of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir, in winning all Central Student Union elections in four major universities sends a clear message. A student organisation long associated with violence securing such victories suggests both a rejection of mainstream party candidates and a shift in youth political engagement. Although university election outcomes do not always mirror results in the Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament), the youth — roughly 45 million of the 130 million eligible voters — remain a crucial bloc in the upcoming elections.</p><p>Many young voters appear to be rejecting centrist political parties weighed down by allegations of corruption and nepotism, seeking instead new alternatives. It is also possible that a large section of students, notably those at Dhaka University who may once have favoured the Awami League, are now deliberately attempting to prevent the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) from gaining ground. Over the past year, the BNP’s reputation has suffered due to recurrent accusations of extortion and the use of muscle power. Although more than 1,000 BNP workers were expelled over such allegations, the party’s image remains tarnished.</p><p>The recent campus victories have encouraged the Jamaat, which has renewed its calls for reforms and for proportional representation in Parliament even before elections take place — a position contrary to that of the BNP, which continues to push for early elections to capitalise on the political vacuum left by the Awami League’s departure. Political flux intensified further with rumours of internal divisions within the Army. These reports were promptly dismissed by senior officer Lt Gen Mohammad Mainur Rahman, yet the Army’s historical role in the political arena continues to evoke public unease.</p><p>As part of a broader national consensus-building effort, the Interim has held several rounds of political deliberations. These culminated in the July Charter, signed in mid-October by almost all major political parties except the National Citizen Party (NCP). The NCP objected to the dissent note introduced by the BNP. Under the latest presidential order, Parliament will have 180 days to enact constitutional amendments. The July Charter — a key demand of the youth movement that drove the July uprising — seeks constitutional reforms aimed at restoring institutional balance and curbing the authoritarian tendencies of previous administrations.</p>.Violence mounts in Bangladesh ahead of verdict in Hasina trial.<p>The Jamaat and the NCP recommended that the Charter be given legal status, but its signing was ultimately seen as a collective pledge by political parties to implement its aims within the framework of the Constitution and national laws. Questions have nevertheless arisen regarding the Interim’s legal authority to alter the Constitution or the parliamentary structure. Controversy deepened when the final version of the Charter was published without the dissent note, prompting accusations of executive overreach. The recent announcement by Yunus that parliamentary elections and a referendum on the Charter will be held on the same day has, for now, eased some tensions.</p><p>Bangladesh continues to move from one controversy to another, and some of its foreign policy shifts — particularly the Interim’s overtures to China and Pakistan — have drawn attention. Beyond signing several bilateral agreements on trade, infrastructure, education and culture, Dhaka’s interest in purchasing 20 Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets appears hasty under the current circumstances. A series of high-level visits between Bangladesh and Pakistan — including those by Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi — resulted in multiple agreements, including the abolition of visas. The docking of Pakistan’s naval ship PNS SAIF in Chittagong further strengthens military ties in a way unseen for decades. While Islamabad seems keen to normalise relations with Dhaka, historical grievances are likely to impede a fully stable bilateral relationship.</p><p>Pakistan’s decision to allow Bangladesh access to Karachi port for exporting jute and other goods comes at a convenient moment, following India’s restrictions on overland jute trade. Currently, India and Bangladesh remain politically, economically and socially disconnected. Hasina’s use of international and Indian media to criticise Yunus and rally Awami workers inside Bangladesh has only worsened already-strained bilateral ties.</p><p>India’s call for inclusive multiparty elections (implicitly including the Awami League) may carry limited weight, given its previous acceptance of consecutive non-democratic elections during Hasina’s tenure. Despite the ongoing political chaos, elections still appear likely. Whether India and Bangladesh continue to remain burdened by recent history or move beyond it will depend on their strategic calculations. The South Asian neighbourhood dilemma endures.</p> <p><em>(The writer is a professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O P Jindal Global University, Haryana)</em></p>
<p>The last few days have seen an outburst of violence across Bangladesh, following former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s call to the Awami League for a lockdown as the nation awaits the verdict of the International Criminal Tribunal on charges of crimes against humanity she has been accused of, due on 17 November.</p><p>Since 5 August 2024, Bangladesh has been witnessing drastic social and political changes. Periodic violence has kept the nation on the boil. Mobocracy has become the new normal, with frequent protests and street agitations pressing for various demands. Although Prof Yunus has announced elections by 12 February 2026, doubts and scepticism continue to linger — and not without reason.</p><p>The Interim Government, headed by Prof Muhammad Yunus, took charge along with a group of advisers on 8 August as an interregnum arrangement and the best available option amid the unexpected chain of events that led to Hasina’s ouster in early August. The breakdown of law and order, coupled with dire economic conditions, required urgent intervention, and over time, the Interim managed to address the most pressing challenges. Responding to heightened political fervour to rectify the perceived ills of the previous government, the Interim set up new commissions to recommend reforms. Public sentiment overwhelmingly sought to transform Bangladesh into a state embodying democracy, accountability and transparency. However, the Interim’s overcommitment — including several initiatives clearly beyond its mandate and capacity — has resulted in mounting public disillusionment and an unending stream of demands from various stakeholders, contributing to a continuing political crisis.</p><p>Tensions have risen further as various Islamic groups have become more vocal in spreading their brand of religious nationalism. Meanwhile, the success of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir, in winning all Central Student Union elections in four major universities sends a clear message. A student organisation long associated with violence securing such victories suggests both a rejection of mainstream party candidates and a shift in youth political engagement. Although university election outcomes do not always mirror results in the Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament), the youth — roughly 45 million of the 130 million eligible voters — remain a crucial bloc in the upcoming elections.</p><p>Many young voters appear to be rejecting centrist political parties weighed down by allegations of corruption and nepotism, seeking instead new alternatives. It is also possible that a large section of students, notably those at Dhaka University who may once have favoured the Awami League, are now deliberately attempting to prevent the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) from gaining ground. Over the past year, the BNP’s reputation has suffered due to recurrent accusations of extortion and the use of muscle power. Although more than 1,000 BNP workers were expelled over such allegations, the party’s image remains tarnished.</p><p>The recent campus victories have encouraged the Jamaat, which has renewed its calls for reforms and for proportional representation in Parliament even before elections take place — a position contrary to that of the BNP, which continues to push for early elections to capitalise on the political vacuum left by the Awami League’s departure. Political flux intensified further with rumours of internal divisions within the Army. These reports were promptly dismissed by senior officer Lt Gen Mohammad Mainur Rahman, yet the Army’s historical role in the political arena continues to evoke public unease.</p><p>As part of a broader national consensus-building effort, the Interim has held several rounds of political deliberations. These culminated in the July Charter, signed in mid-October by almost all major political parties except the National Citizen Party (NCP). The NCP objected to the dissent note introduced by the BNP. Under the latest presidential order, Parliament will have 180 days to enact constitutional amendments. The July Charter — a key demand of the youth movement that drove the July uprising — seeks constitutional reforms aimed at restoring institutional balance and curbing the authoritarian tendencies of previous administrations.</p>.Violence mounts in Bangladesh ahead of verdict in Hasina trial.<p>The Jamaat and the NCP recommended that the Charter be given legal status, but its signing was ultimately seen as a collective pledge by political parties to implement its aims within the framework of the Constitution and national laws. Questions have nevertheless arisen regarding the Interim’s legal authority to alter the Constitution or the parliamentary structure. Controversy deepened when the final version of the Charter was published without the dissent note, prompting accusations of executive overreach. The recent announcement by Yunus that parliamentary elections and a referendum on the Charter will be held on the same day has, for now, eased some tensions.</p><p>Bangladesh continues to move from one controversy to another, and some of its foreign policy shifts — particularly the Interim’s overtures to China and Pakistan — have drawn attention. Beyond signing several bilateral agreements on trade, infrastructure, education and culture, Dhaka’s interest in purchasing 20 Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets appears hasty under the current circumstances. A series of high-level visits between Bangladesh and Pakistan — including those by Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi — resulted in multiple agreements, including the abolition of visas. The docking of Pakistan’s naval ship PNS SAIF in Chittagong further strengthens military ties in a way unseen for decades. While Islamabad seems keen to normalise relations with Dhaka, historical grievances are likely to impede a fully stable bilateral relationship.</p><p>Pakistan’s decision to allow Bangladesh access to Karachi port for exporting jute and other goods comes at a convenient moment, following India’s restrictions on overland jute trade. Currently, India and Bangladesh remain politically, economically and socially disconnected. Hasina’s use of international and Indian media to criticise Yunus and rally Awami workers inside Bangladesh has only worsened already-strained bilateral ties.</p><p>India’s call for inclusive multiparty elections (implicitly including the Awami League) may carry limited weight, given its previous acceptance of consecutive non-democratic elections during Hasina’s tenure. Despite the ongoing political chaos, elections still appear likely. Whether India and Bangladesh continue to remain burdened by recent history or move beyond it will depend on their strategic calculations. The South Asian neighbourhood dilemma endures.</p> <p><em>(The writer is a professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O P Jindal Global University, Haryana)</em></p>