Is the US sincere about West Asia peace talks?

George J Mitchell, the US West Asia envoy, tried to counter low expectations for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations by harking back to his experience as a mediator in Northern Ireland.

Mitchell reminded journalists that during difficult negotiations in Northern Ireland, “We had about 700 days of failure and one day of success” — the day in 1998 that the Belfast Agreement instituting power-sharing between pro-British unionists and Irish nationalists was signed. Mitchell’s comparison is misleading at best. Success in the Irish talks was the result not just of determination and time, but also a very different US approach to diplomacy.

The conflict in Northern Ireland had been intractable for decades. Unionists backed by the British government saw any political compromise with Irish nationalists as a danger, one that would lead to a united Ireland in which a Catholic majority would dominate minority Protestant unionists. The British government also refused to deal with the Irish nationalist party Sinn Fein, despite its significant electoral mandate, because of its close ties to the Irish Republican Army, which had carried out violent acts in the United Kingdom.

Partiality

A parallel can be seen with the American refusal to speak to the Palestinian party Hamas, which decisively won elections in the West Bank and Gaza in 2006. Asked what role Hamas would have in the renewed talks, Mitchell answered with one word: “None.”

No serious analyst believes that peace can be made between Palestinians and Israelis without Hamas on board, any more than could have been the case in Northern Ireland without Sinn Fein and the IRA.

The US insists that Hamas meet strict preconditions before it can take part in negotiations: recognise Israel, renounce violence and abide by agreements previously signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, of which Hamas is not a member. These demands are unworkable. Why should Hamas or any Palestinian accept Israel’s political demands, like recognition, when Israel refuses to recognise basic Palestinian demands like the right of return for refugees?

As for violence, Hamas has inflicted a fraction of the harm on Israeli civilians that Israel inflicts on Palestinian civilians. If violence disqualifies Hamas, surely much greater violence should disqualify the Israelis.

It was only by breaking with one-sided demands that Mitchell was able to help bring peace to Northern Ireland. In 1994, for instance, Mitchell, then a Democratic senator, urged President Bill Clinton — against strenuous British objections — to grant a US visa to Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader.

Mitchell later wrote that he believed the visa would force Adams “to persuade the IRA to declare a cease-fire, and permit Sinn Fein to enter into inclusive political negotiations.” As mediator, Mitchell insisted that a cease-fire apply to all parties equally, not just to the IRA.

Both the Irish and West Asian conflicts figure prominently in American domestic politics — yet both have played out in very different ways. The US allowed the Irish-American lobby to help steer policy toward the weaker side: the Irish government in Dublin and Sinn Fein and other nationalist parties in the north. At times, the US put intense pressure on the British government, levelling the field so that negotiations could result in an agreement with broad support. By contrast, the US government let the Israel lobby shift the balance of US support toward the stronger of the two parties: Israel.

This disparity has not gone unnoticed by those with firsthand knowledge of the Irish talks. In a 2009 letter to ‘The Times of London’, several British and Irish negotiators, including John Hume, who shared the Nobel Peace Prize for the Belfast Agreement, criticised the one-sided demands imposed solely on Hamas. “Engaging Hamas,” the negotiators wrote, “does not amount to condoning terrorism or attacks on civilians. In fact, it is a precondition for security and for brokering a workable agreement.”

The resumption of peace talks without any Israeli commitment to freeze settlements is another significant victory for the Israel lobby and the Israeli government. It allows Israel to pose as a willing peacemaker while carrying on with business as usual.