Nuances of building a dynamic information ecosystem

Karnataka recently announced a decision to establish a Fact Check Unit (FCU) to curb disinformation in Karnataka. The FCU will proactively monitor the spread of disinformation on social media, issue orders for takedowns, and instigate penal action as relevant. Separately, there is an effort to keep an eye on ‘fake news factories’ or syndicates involved in the spread of disinformation. 

In response, the Editors Guild, quite rightly, has pointed out that a unit like this may inhibit the right to free speech. In the absence of frameworks to govern operation and grievance redressal, it may be damaging to the very notions of liberty sought to be protected. This point has been made even in the context of Australia’s plans to regulate disinformation. While the government has clarified that safeguards will be put in place, it is worthwhile to explore what governing a dynamic information ecosystem might look like. 

Costs of disinformation 

Disinformation (i.e., false, or misleading information spread with the knowledge that it is false) remains a persistent problem, with observable costs to society. For example, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, circulating information exposed religious and communal faultlines, putting vulnerable groups at risk of harm. Earlier in 2018, there were attacks on people based on information that there are child kidnappers around. The spread of disinformation on social media has been seen as an enabler of genocide in Myanmar, leading to the Rohingya community seeking damages through a lawsuit against Meta. 

Besides the obvious costs in terms of human life and safety, disinformation can have consequences such as muddling the quality of public engagement, leading to lowered trust. Equally, it allows those with financial resources, including State and non-State actors, to weaponise information for problematic purposes. In contexts where institutional capacity and trust in policing is frayed, this can magnify the harms of disinformation, and victims may not be able to seek redress. 

Any State effort must consider the delicate balance between the fundamental right to free speech on the one hand, which it is obliged to protect, and the need to safeguard the public sphere and citizens from harm. In this context, an approach aimed at enhancing information integrity may present a way forward. 

How can State action be imagined 

As per the UN Secretary General’s policy brief, information integrity has three components — accuracy, consistency, and reliability of information. These principles apply to both the content of the information and the process of production. State efforts can advance these areas, balancing human rights and freedom of speech concerns, though every effort must be accompanied by a consideration of second- and third-order consequences. 

First, the State can play a role in accuracy, by enhancing the availability of accurate information. This can be done by supporting institutions and departments of the State to put out accurate information. This is a careful line to tread and propaganda by State machinery can poison the political discourse and vitiate the purpose of the effort.

The State can encourage and support civil society organisations to actively engage and fact check information, and support victims. The State could also explore establishing clear standards for governance of disinformation for platforms, potentially implemented through a law, or community guidelines and codes of conduct. 

Second, to enhance consistency, having clear consequences for mutation and manipulation of information may be considered. Penal provisions, particularly for mutation and manipulation could be explored. However, ensuring robust procedural safeguards is critical. 

Third, to enhance the reliability of information, the State could consider certification of news and media agencies. This, again, is not without limitations as the process may become partisan. Here, ensuring the neutrality of certification bodies and having clear criteria is important. 

Most importantly, it is valuable to recognise that existing laws already may offer measures of protection for citizens; however, frayed trust and lengthy action times may render these protections nugatory. Enhancing capacity of State institutions and civil society organisations may yet be the most critical elements of curbing disinformation. Indeed, a State unit, playing a decisive role and taking a systemic view, can have a transformative impact on the information ecosystem in Karnataka as well as serve as a global model. 

(Sarayu Natarajan is Founder, Aapti Institute. Twitter: @iissarayu)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH