Lessons from Iraq war

“The invasion of Iraq and its bitter aftermath should remind politicians of the high cost of the roll of ‘the iron dice’.”

The costs of the second Iraq war, which began 10 years ago this week, are staggering: nearly 4,500 Americans killed and more than 30,000 wounded, many grievously, as well as tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis wounded or killed, more than $2 trillion in direct government expenditures and the significant weakening of the major regional counterweight to Iran and the consequent strengthening of that country’s position and ambitions. Great powers rarely make national decisions that explode so quickly and completely in their face.

It may seem folly to seek a silver lining among these thunderclouds. There are, however, three flickers of light that offer some hope that the enormous price was not paid entirely in vain. These coins offer a meagre return on our enormous investment, but not collecting them would be an insult to the memory of all that we have lost.

The first lesson is for America’s politicians, from both parties, who pushed our country into a war that we did not need to fight, for dubious reasons that eventually were proven false. Iraq was not, as we were repeatedly told, developing weapons of mass destruction. Even if it had been, there was no reason that deterrence, which had prevented war with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, could not have worked against a nuclear Iraq. There was no link between al-Qaida and Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, and no al-Qaida presence in Iraq until the American invasion, which caused social order to collapse and provided the terrorist group with a powerful recruiting message and a dangerous new base from which to attack.

The invasion of Iraq and its bitter aftermath should remind politicians for generations of the high cost and unpredictable results for those who roll what Otto von Bismarck called “the iron dice,” and should forever discredit the notion of ‘preventive war.’ The first Iraq war, in which I led a tank platoon, was necessary. This one was not.

Reluctance to send American ground troops to intervene in Libya and Syria, while providing different levels of political and military support, gives some hope that the country will think more than twice before fighting another unnecessary war. Good intentions do not always lead to favourable outcomes.

The second lesson is for the American military, justly proud of its renaissance after the debacle of Vietnam and its subsequent triumph in the cold war, but grievously unprepared for the wars of this century.

The British historian Michael Howard noted that it was impossible to perfectly prepare military forces for the next war. What is important is to make sure that you have not gotten the preparations so wrong that the military cannot quickly adapt when it is next needed.

The Department of Defence failed that test. It ignored preparations for counterinsurgency operations and neglected the need for a deep understanding of languages and cultures, which played a critical role in the Sunni Awakening that eventually changed the course of the Iraq conflict.

These are old lessons – they were in fact codified in the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940 – but had to be painfully relearned during the past decade. They cannot be forgotten now that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are finally drawing down. Recognizing that post-invasion stability operations, including counterinsurgency, are core military tasks for which the Pentagon must prepare is an important first step.

It also would be wise to make further investment in remotely piloted vehicles, special-operations forces and the capacity to train and advise foreign militaries, all of which will bear much of the burden of the most likely conflicts of this century. Of course, given the spending constraints now being imposed by Congress and the subsequent painful trade-offs those constraints bring, it remains to be seen whether these lessons really have been learned.

Finally, the experience of the Iraq war offers a breath of hope for the American people at large. In the wake of Vietnam, the United States began its grand experiment with an all-volunteer military. It most certainly was an experiment: There was no expectation that the system would hold together in a major war, and for two generations young men have been required to register with the Selective Service in case a general conflict erupted.
There have been two such wars during the past decade, however, and the all-volunteer force has come through these crucibles of blood and fire with enormous distinction.