US can impose sanctions on Myanmar, Delhi has to play a delicate game

This is not the first time that the Tatmadaw has seized power in Myanmar. As was expected, the army has used every letter in the country’s 2008 Constitution but glossed over its spirit. President U Win Myint, State Counsellor and popular democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, the chief ministers of all the provinces and dozens of political leaders have been arrested and whisked away to undisclosed locations. Vice President U Myint Swe, a military appointee, has been named interim President.

Unlike in democracies, armies under an authoritarian ruler are not expected to be answerable to the people, and the Myanmar military has lived up to this expectation. Only the army knows what immediate danger the country was facing that required the sacking of a duly elected government and derailing the fledgling democratic process. Perhaps the army had to do so to save itself from becoming irrelevant in the country’s politics.

It is important to understand and analyse the coup as it has happened at a time of great churn in the region. Myanmar’s democratic transition began in about 2011 when the former military general changed into civilian clothes to become President in a rigged election. The real change over to democracy came about in 2015. But the military has always had a tight leash around the civilian government. Protests against the army have begun but it is unlikely to last long or succeed in bringing back democracy given the disunited political class and the strength and deep roots the army has among civilian groups.

Meanwhile, the West, especially the Biden administration, has become active in doling out advice to the army in Myanmar and other countries in the region. The standard operating procedure -- warning of severe action, sanctions and boycotts – is being dusted off the files in the White House. It has ordered freezing of assets, blocking the military’s access to $1 billion in Myanmar government funds held in accounts in the US, and blacklisting of military officials responsible for the coup. Stringent export controls could be added soon.

The history of US sanctions on Myanmar goes back to 1988, in the wake of a popular uprising and its brutal suppression and suspension of civil liberties by the ruling Junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The sanctions also required China to terminate all military assistance to Myanmar failing which the US would vote against multilateral financial assistance to China as punitive action. The EU and ASEAN members were also told to fall in line and cancel Myanmar’s membership in the latter. India followed suit and ended all ties with Myanmar. The cumulative effect of all these punitive actions resulted not in the restoration of democracy but in driving Myanmar straight into the protective patronage of Beijing over the years. Finally, the sanctions were eased in 2011, when the SPDC was dissolved and power was vested with Thein Sein, the former army general and prime minister under the military Junta.

Instead of blanket sanctions, this time the US sanctions apply mostly to commercial establishments associated with the Tatmadaw. But given the economic structure and long years of military rule, there are few high-value business entities in Myanmar that fall out of the ambit of the military or the government. Since the military will now be running the government, every aspect of the economy, banking, payment schedules and investments would be seen as part of government activity and fall within the ambit of sanctions. Canada and the UK have also joined the sanctions bandwagon.

Delhi has so far moved cautiously on the issue of the coup as well as the reactions to it from the democratic world. This is understandable in light of the fallout – the setback to India’s strategic interests -- of the earlier sanctions, when Delhi followed the West’s lead. Beijing, too, has reacted cautiously and would prefer to wait and watch. Both Delhi and Beijing have the fact sheets of one another’s engagements with Myanmar. The army chief and coup leader Min Aung Hlaing has maintained close ties with both capitals. But a section of the army under his command strongly believes that China is arming the Rohingya groups like the Arakan Army and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), to be used as troublemakers in case there is an unfavourable tilt towards India to the detriment of China’s BRI projects.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the window of opportunity that Myanmar’s democratic transition provided, the Modi government had moved fast and improved defence and security cooperation, after reciprocal visits by the army chiefs of both countries. This was followed by the visits of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Foreign Secretary Shringla and Army Chief Gen. Naravane. India has given the INS Sindhuvir submarine, light-weight torpedoes and other military hardware as part of Maritime Security Cooperation and White Shipping Information Sharing agreements that adds to India’s maritime strength and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Thus, Myanmar has come to occupy a position of strategic importance for India in its engagements with our immediate and extended neighbourhood in the wake of China’s rapid and hegemonic expansion plans. It is important for Delhi to apprise the White House of the delicate situation and the need to strike a balance between the urge to restore democracy and tackling changing regional equations that can tilt the balance in China’s favour in an emerging new global order.

Meanwhile, Delhi should keep open all lines of communication with the army and the political leaders in Myanmar, impress upon the coup leaders to restore democracy at the earliest and nudge all stakeholders in Myanmar to prioritise the country’s development.